The role of the Dallas Housing Authority in providing decent, affordable and low-income housing for blacks, 1985-2003, 2004 by White, Brian C. (Author) et al.
ABSTRACT
POLITICAL SCIENCE
WHITE, BRIAN C. B.A. PRAIRIE VIEW A&M UNIVERSITY, 1991
M.P.A. TEXAS SOUTHERN UNIVERSITY, 1993
THE ROLE OF THE DALLAS HOUSING AUTHORITY
IN PROVIDING DECENT. AFFORDABLE AND
LOW-INCOME HOUSING FOR BLACKS. 1985-2003
Advisor: Professor Johnny L. Wilson
Dissertation dated December 2004
This study examines whether the Dallas Housing Authority has succeeded in
providing adequate housing for black families in Dallas, Texas. Furthermore, this
research examines whether the Dallas Housing Authority has complied with the Walker
v. HUD, 734 F. Supp 1289 (N.D., TX. 1989) suit in building public housing in non-
minority areas despite opposition from other pressure groups.
This study begins with the premise that the Dallas Housing Authority is
adequately providing public housing to black families in Dallas County, Texas.
A case-study approach was used to analyze data gathered to determine whether equality
and fair housing are being practiced by the Dallas Housing Authority, although opposing
viewpoints would indicate otherwise.
The researcher's conclusion supports the premise that the Dallas Housing
Authority is meeting the needs of black families in providing adequate low-income
housing on a temporary basis.
THE ROLE OF THE DALLAS HOUSING AUTHORITY
IN PROVIDING DECENT, AFFORDABLE AND LOW-INCOME HOUSING
FOR BLACKS, 1985-2003
A DISSERTATION
SUBMITTED TO THE FACULTY OF CLARK ATLANTA UNIVERSITY
IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS FOR
THE DEGREE OF DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY
BY
BRIAN C. WHITE




I thank God for allowing me the opportunity to be in school. I also thank Dr.
Theo Herrington for being a mentor to me in and out of class. I am especially grateful to
my dissertation committee chairman, Dr. Johnny L. Wilson, for his patience, advice and
criticism with regard to this research. I also owe a special thanks to Dr. Hashim Gibrill
and Dr. Stacey Jurhee for their advice, patience, and criticism regarding this research.
My debt ofgratitude would not be complete without acknowledging Ms. Sonia Jordan for
typing this manuscript and for sacrificing her time and her resources for this process. I
would also like to thank Ms. Crystal Sneed and Ms. Carrie Cantrell for helping me to
have a place to stay during my commute to Atlanta and for their words of encouragement.
A debt of gratitude is owed to Ms. Monica Busy for her assistance and support in
maintaining my status in school. My appreciation is expressed to Mrs. Jennifer Kuzbury
for her editing assistance. To my family, Attorney Stanley and Patricia Mays, Ryan and
Kimberly Pullin, Mrs. Ruby Barton (Grand-grand), Mr. Ike White, and others, I thank
God for you all. To my wife, Carmen, I could not have completed this scholarly
endeavor without your support. I also thank my entire extended family. I apologize to
anyone who I may have overlooked. I pray that this dissertation will, even in a small
way, contribute to the understanding of housing needs in Dallas, Texas. Finally, I hope
this dissertation proves to Kassidy Pullin, Gabria Pearson, Avery Pearson and the future









Purpose of Study 9
Research Questions 9
Methodology 10
Significance of Study 12
Limitations ofthe Research 12
Definition ofTerms 12
Outline ofDissertation 14
2 REVIEW OF THE LITERATURE 15
Introduction 15




Site Selection Process 32
Impact of Public Housing on Neighborhoods 34
Conclusion 35
3 DALLAS, TEXAS: ITS ORIGIN, DEMOGRAPHICS
AND HISTORY OF OPPOSITION TO FAIR
HOUSING FOR BLACKS 37





Political Voice for Blacks in Dallas 54
Conclusion 66
in
4 HISTORY OF HOUSING FOR BLACK FAMILIES
IN DALLAS COUNTY TEXAS: 1920-1985 68
Early Housing for Blacks 69
The Role of the Press 71
Racial Tensions and Housing 74
Escalating Resistance to Blacks 76
Expanding the Housing Supply for Blacks: The War Years 81
Early Efforts to Address the Housing Shortage 83
Enduring More Bombings—The Shelton Experience 86
The City's Response to Bombings and to Housing Needs 88
Proposed Black Subdivision in Mesquite, Texas 91
The Cedar Creek Project 92
The John Stuart Plan 94
The Annexation ofWest Dallas 99
The Emergence ofNew Politics and Its Impact on Housing 101
The Push for Public Housing Rather than Urban Renewal.. 104
DHA's Freedom ofChoice Plan 105
A Change in Policy at DHA but Little Desegregation 107
U. S. Desegregation Policies Related to Public Housing 114
Federal Assisted Public Housing 114
Early Public Housing Projects 115
Political Debate on housing Desegregation 116
The Urban Crisis ofthe 1970s Through the 1990s 121
The Kerner Commission Report Revisited 121
Title VIH ofthe Civil Rights Act of 1968 123
Special Authority ofHUD 124
The Brooke Amendment 124
The Housing Act of 1975 127
The Bush Administration and Fair Housing 128
The Clinton Administration and Housing Policies 132
The Bush Administration and Home Ownership 138
Conclusion 141
5 WALKER, et al. v. U. S. DEPARTMENT
OF HOUSING & URBAN DEVELOPMENT IN DALLAS, TX 143
West Dallas Projects' History and Conditions 151
Debra Walker et al. Consent Decree (1987) 152
Opinion Walker I (1989 Special Master) 154
Opinion Walker II (1989 Frost-Leland Amendment) 154
Opinion Walker HI (1989 The City ofDallas) 156
Opinion Walker IV (1990 Funding the
Demolition ofPublic Housing) 156
Supplemental Consent Decree (1990) 157
Remedial Order Affecting DHA (1995) 160
IV
District Court Remedial Order (1997) 161
Remedial Order (1999) 164
U.S. Supreme Court Denies Review (2000) 165
U.S. Department ofHousing and Urban
Development Settlement (2001) 165
Implications ofthe Walker Case 167
Conclusion 176
CONCLUSION 178
The Difference Being Made by DHA 182
Opportunity for Lessons Learned 185




1. Population, Median Income, and Poverty Level, Dallas, TX, 1970... 41
2. Population, Median Income, and Poverty Level, Dallas, TX, 1990.... 42
3. In the United States District Court: Civil Case 45
4. School Desegregation Timeline 49
5. Review ofPublic Housing Lawsuit 150




The idea of adequate shelter has been a concern since recorded history. Although
shelter conies in various forms, history is replete with examples of families not having
adequate shelter. The problem has been most acute in black households across the
United States. Even today, after a century of increased government intervention in this
policy area, adequate and affordable housing remains a major concern.1 Jane Tanner's
research concluded that the home ownership rate among white families in America is 73
percent. Among black families, home ownership is less than 47 percent.2
The housing reform focus at the local and national levels is on the badly
deteriorated neighborhoods, but a major concern is the equity of the housing policy. To
illustrate this point in Dallas, Texas, it is necessary to examine how the ruling in William
v. City had an impact on the allocation of affordable housing to low-income black
families.3 This case not only discusses racial intolerance in the political arena, but also
outlines the discriminating practices of the city of Dallas with regard to
1 Peter Salins, "America's Permanent Housing Problem," HousingAmerica's Poor (Chapel Hill;
University of North Carolina Press, 1987), 5.
2 Jane Tanner, "Affordable Housing: Is There A Shortage? " Congressional Quarterly 11
(February 9,2001), 100.
3 William v. City, 734 F. Supp 1317 (N.D. Tex 1990).
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public housing. Further, it discusses the need to stop housing discrimination for the
good ofthe city's future.4
From 1876 to 1907, the municipal government structure of Dallas was mayor-
council. A mayor was elected at large and members of the city council elected from
single-member council districts.5 In 1907, the Dallas city charter was amended by
adopting a section, entitled "Segregation ofthe Races," which authorized the city council
to pass ordinances "to provide for the use of separate blocks for residence, places of
public amusement, churches, schools and places of assembly by members of white and
colored races."6 Because of the growing discontent by white citizens over public policy
at the city level, the charter was changed to a council-manager form of government that
required the hiring of a professional manager. This form of government limited the
mayor's role in setting policy for the city.7
The city is surrounded by several other cities including Irving, Richardson, Grand
Prairie, Garland, Mesquite, Balch Springs, Sunnyvale and Desoto. Dallas County is
governed by five-person County Commissioners Court, comprised of four county
commissioners elected by district and a county judge, elected at large, who presides over
the County Commissioners Court.
In the era ofthe Great Depression and with the newly developed council-manager









7 Char Miller and Heywood T. Sanders, Urban Texas (College Station: Texas A&M University
Press, 1990), 142.
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housing for city residents. These federal funds were used to provide key improvements
in infrastructure for sewers, roads, parks and schools in Dallas.8 In addition, Dallas
participated in the New Deal social programs. The city received $4 million for the
unemployed from the Federal Emergency Relief Administration.9 Dallas also secured the
only Public Works Administration public housing project in Texas. The project was built
by the city to justify the exclusion of black families from living on land north of the
central business district.10 In 1938, the city council created the Dallas Housing Authority,
which developed a six million dollar public housing program shortly after Congress
passed the Housing Act of 1937.n
The Dallas Housing Authority (DHA) is comprised of a five-member board of
commissioners. The board members are appointed by the mayor and serve two-year
terms. The board is responsible for setting policy for the DHA and for appointing a
President/CEO to manage the day-to-day operations of the DHA.12
The objectives of the DHA are to:
1. provide decent, safe and sanitary housing at low rental rates for
eligible low-income families currently living in substandard or
overcrowded housing conditions;
2. provide decent, safe and sanitary housing designed and built to serve







12 James L. Stephenson, Animal Reportfor Dallas Housing Authority (Dallas: The Housing
Authority of the City, 1973), 2.
3. allow low-income families to help themselves through the provision of
good housing at rents they can afford;
4. provide a "stepping-stone" from slum living to low-rent housing with
the ultimate goal ofhome ownership or the ability to pay an economic
rent in standard private rentals;
5. encourage good citizenship and individual responsibility in the care of
apartments and yards;
6. serve low-income families and elderly persons in a friendly and
efficient manner;
7. cooperate with all branches of local government;
8. assist in the overall improvement ofthe city; and
9. serve an economic cross section ofthe low-income group with the
ultimate goal of a better-housed community.
Since the DHA was established, it has worked to aid families who are homeless
and who need other types of family support, such as family counseling and job training.
David Cohn, in 1940, published an essay entitled "Dallas."13 In his essay he discussed
the shortcomings of Dallas and, in particular, the living conditions of black families.
According to Conn's article, census data revealed that of the 50,000 black families living
in Dallas at the time, several thousand occupied dwellings that needed major repairs.
Furthermore, at least 32,000 thousand dwellings contained no private baths or toilets.14
The black population could only live in certain areas of town. As the black
population grew, the city and the DHA began working to clean up black slum areas in
"Miller and Sanders, Urban Texas, 142.
14 Ibid.
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1938.15 DHA made plans for black families to move into white neighborhoods if the
cleanup was not completed. This turned out to be the case, i.e., the cleanup was not
completed, and blacks migrated to white neighborhoods. This migration resulted in the
black families' homes being vandalized and bombed.16
In the 1940s, black families responded to the vandalism and violence by calling
the local police for protection, and they continued to move into white neighborhoods
because of the growing population. The United States entered World War II, and
between January 1940 and February 1941 the U. S. Department of Defense awarded
more than 91 million dollars in defense contracts within the city of Dallas.17 No single
business activity more profoundly affected the city than did aircraft manufacturing.
Lockheed's aircraft plant at Love Field and Southern Aircraft Company were the two
1 ft
largest companies to receive federal contract.
Although the black population grew during the war, new housing to accommodate
this growth was sparse.19 Many of the federal housing units built by the government
were for whites only. 20 After the war, blacks received only 176 of the 5,325 units


















substandard housing was nearly three times as high as for white families.22 A. Maceo
Smith, a racial relations advisor for the Federal Housing Administration (FHA), pointed
out that "it is harder to find houses for Negroes in Dallas than in any other city in the
South."23
In 1950, the "Report of the Joint Committee on Negro Housing," prepared by the
Dallas Chamber of Commerce, the Dallas Citizens Council, and the Dallas Inter-Racial
Committee, found that "the shortage of housing for Negroes in Dallas is acute and
critical."24 The report also found that serious tension had resulted among both the black
and white populations. Some of the present Negro residential districts were hemmed in
and could not possibly be expanded without the displacement of white residents. On
several occasions, blacks attempting to move into the neighborhood of South Dallas were
met with the bombing of their residences.24
Black residents worked with the Dallas police and fire departments to try to solve
this problem. No real solutions were found.
The Joint Committee on Negro Housing report in 1940 recommended the
implementation of public housing in West Dallas. It stated:
(a) The Negro housing sections, if carefully zoned and properly
restricted by the city or county, will attract Negro families of good
character, people who, under proper environment, will make
citizens ofwhom our community can be proud.
22 Ibid.
23 Ibid., 151.
24 Char Miller and HeywoodT. Sanders, Urban Texas, 151.
25 Ibid.
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(b) We remind the people of Dallas that if we do not provide home sites
for Negroes who want to, and can afford to, buy or rent suitable
and decent homes, the alternative is terrible overcrowding,
dissatisfaction, disease, tension resulting from Negroes buying into
white neighborhoods and many other serious consequences.26
On September 25, 1950, Dallas Mayor Wallace Savage requested DHA to annex
West Dallas for the construction of the 3,500-unit West Dallas Project, the largest low-
rise public housing complex in the nation.27
With the completion of the West Dallas development in 1954, DHA ceased
building public housing units until the 1970s. This was due mostly to the fact that in the
1960s, the citizens and leadership of Dallas had grown more conservative and, as a
consequence, less willing to help West Dallas improve the housing stock. Instead, local
attention focused on rehabilitating areas closer to the downtown area. This was part of
the larger program to encourage development in and around the central business district.
The city of Dallas had turned to work on the physical needs of the central business
district while problems of race and public housing continued to haunt Dallas.
Statement of Problem
The problem of race and public housing in Dallas came to the attention of the
federal government in the case of Walker v. HUD29 In this case, seven black women
brought suit against the Dallas Housing Authority (DHA) and the U. S. Department of
Housing and Urban Development (HUD) challenging their policies and practices that
26 Williams v. City, 734 F. Supp 1317 (N.D. Tex 1990).
27 Ibid.
28 Miller and Sanders, Urban Texas, 153.
29 Walker v. U.S Department ofHousing and Urban Development, 734 F.Supp. 1231 (N.D.
Tex. 1989).
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maintained and perpetrated racial segregation in DHA's housing programs. According
to the plaintiffs, DHA and HUD maintained segregation within DHA's programs by
assigning white elderly tenants to predominately white projects and black elderly tenants
to predominately black projects.30 In addition, the plaintiffs alleged that the defendants
practiced racial segregation by placing all black tenants in only black areas oftown. This
made racial discrimination persistent in DHA's policy. Further, the Section 8 vouchers
utilized by DHA also placed black families only in black areas of town. The plaintiffs
cited examples of perpetual racial segregation. These examples included the fact that:
1. DHA had 12 public housing projects for low-income families that
were 90 to 95 percent black; and
2. DHA's other two family projects were 99 percent Hispanic (Little
Mexico) and 82 percent black (Cedar Springs).31
Moreover, the West Dallas projects were in terrible condition. According to
Walker v. U.S. Department ofHousing and Urban Development:
Because of the appalling conditions at West Dallas-housing that
was barely fit to live in; almost 1300 vacant units that were
boarded up; severe problems with drug dealers, with other crimes,
with transients, and with vandalism; health risks due to lead
contamination; a bitter life with roaches and rats and rubbish; and
little or no hope that these things would change; people in need
were refusing to accept housing in the West Dallas projects. In
1986, the rejection rates for George Loving, Edgar Ward and
Elmer Scott ranged from 58 percent to 60 percent.32
Ten years after the plaintiffs filed the lawsuit DHA was ordered by the U. S.






Highlands of McKamy Homeowners Association sued to stop the building of public
housing for low-income black families but lost in 1998. DHA completed the low-income
housing and moved 75 residents to Frankford Town Homes, located in North Dallas, a
predominately white neighborhood. Homeowners living near two other proposed North
Dallas public housing sites sued DHA and won in federal court. They based their suit on
a claim of reverse discrimination and violation ofthe 14th Amendment which is the equal
protection clause ofthe Constitution. In March 1999, DHA received a ruling from the U.
S. 5th Circuit Court of Appeals sending the Walker v. HUD case back to the District Court
for more hearings.33 In January 2000, the U.S. Supreme Court declined to hear the
plaintiffs appeal. A federal mandate was issued requiring DHA to increase the
availability of Section 8 subsidized housing opportunities in the private sector throughout
the entire Dallas area.34
Purpose of the Study
The purpose of this dissertation is to examine whether DHA has lived up to the
decision of Walker v. HUD and whether blacks and low-income residents have been able
to secure affordable housing. Moreover, the study will also examines whether DHA has
complied with the Walker v. HUD decision which required it to buy scattered-site
housing for low-income black residents throughout Dallas including housing in
predominantly white communities ofDallas, Texas.
Research Questions
The study addresses the following research questions:
33 Mike Williams, "High Court Rejects Dallas' Judge Order on Public Housing," Houston
Chronicle (January 19,2000), 3A.
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(1) Does the Dallas Housing Authority have the authority to provide low
income housing for blacks?
(2) Does the Walker v. HUD case provide the "best of all possible ways" to
ensure that race will be eliminated as a consideration in the construction of
public housing in Dallas County Texas?
(3) Can the Dallas Housing Authority be forceful in using its authority to create
a plan to use Section 8 certificates and vouchers to remedy the lack of new
public housing in predominately white areas?
It is critical that these questions are addressed in order to determine whether
families received fair housing provided by the DHA. The researcher chose to evaluate
the impact of DHA programs and policies on 3,116 black households residing in
predominately black areas where the poverty rate exceeds 40 percent.
Methodology
The research questions were explored using primary and secondary data sources.
The primary data sources comprised interview data collected in Dallas in 2000. Using an
hour-long, in-person interview schedule, twenty participants were interviewed. The
interviews were conducted at various locations, including, but not limited to, participants'
houses, local black owned businesses, and the DHA. With interviewees' permission, the
interviews were recorded using a micro recorder. The participants were selected from
black and low-income residents living in housing projects managed by the DHA.
Interviews were also conducted with Mike Daniels, the plaintiffs attorney in the Walker
v. HUD suit; Fred Blair, editor of the Elite News; Ruby Barton and Marie Shelton,
original tenants ofthe first Dallas housing projects; and DHA department staff members.




Barbershop, fraternity and sorority historians, and members of the local Dallas
Chamber ofCommerce.
Secondary data were collected from the Dallas Housing Authority because it had
information on each public housing unit and on the families who lived there. Staff
members ofDHA informed the researcher about other Dallas Housing Authority issues.
Relevant journals, monographs, research reports and court cases were also used to
get a better sense of the history of housing policies at the national level and in Dallas in
particular.35 Journals provided statistical analyses and case studies to assist in
understanding issues and trends related to future housing policies.36 Karl and Alma
Taeuber's Negroes in Cities, and Darwin Payne's Big D Triumphs and Troubles of an
American Super City in the 2&h Century, were especially useful in this analysis31
Newspaper articles, typically not very relevant in scholarly research, provided important
information about DHA and its policies with the city, especially the Dallas Morning
News, and the Dallas Express, a Black newspaper that discusses the ideas and the
concerns Black families which are relevant to housing policies.
Websites were valuable research sources for information concerning the mission,
latest developments, and action ofto the DHA. Two websites, in particular, were helpful:
www.dallashousing.org, which discusses what DHA is about; and www.nhlp.org, which
35 Robert Farley, C. Sleeth, C. Jackson and K. Reeves, "Continued Racial Residential Segregation
in Detroit: "Chocolate City, Vanilla Suburbs," Journal ofHousing Research, vol. 4, no. 1 (November
1993), 18.
36 John M. Stahura and R. L. Hollinger, "Black and White Subuiban Population Growth Since
World War II: A Comparison of Intradecade Models," Journal of Urban Affairs, vol. 9 (1987).
37 Darwin Payne, Big D (Dallas: Three Forks Press, 1994).
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addresses policy concerns and issues with regard to housing needs and the latest HUD
rules.
Significance of Study
This study is unique in that, unlike previous efforts to study housing conditions in
Dallas tended that focused on how the DHA engaged in building houses, this study
focuses on the demographic characteristics of the housing recipients. Moreover, rather
than focusing on the black residents, many of the previous studies tended to concentrate
on the views of the land use planner, city representatives, and developers who sought to
reduce the black communities' access to the housing market. This study is designed to
fill the void by focusing on the low-income residents themselves and the impact that
DHA's policies, procedures and programs have had on their quality of life.
Limitation of the Research
This study is limited to the use of secondary books, journals, newspapers and
published documents on the Internet. The court case allowed the researcher to identify
housing service problems experienced by black and low-income housing residents served
by the Dallas Housing Authority. Many of the tenants were quite concerned about being
interviewed for the study, thereby, only twenty residents responded to the survey.
Definition of Terms
The definition of several terms used in this study will facilitate ease in
understanding the analysis for those not familiar with housing concepts.
Public housing consists of rental units owned by public housing agencies
(PHA's), which are public or quasi-public entities. Public housing units are found in a
13
variety of housing structures including garden-style apartments, high-rise buildings,
and even single-family homes.38
Project-based Section 8 housing includes subsidized rental units in buildings
owned and operated by private owners. Section 8 project-based subsidies can cover all of
the units in a given housing development or a designated number of building units.
Under this program, the federal government pays private owners the difference between a
unit's rent and the tenant's rental payment, which is fixed by Congress at 30percent ofthe
tenant's annual income.39
Tenant-based vouchers and certificates are subsidies that help tenants rent housing
in the private market. The subsidies cover the difference between the apartment rental
rate and the tenant's rental payments, usually set at 30 percent of the tenant's income.
Currently, about 1.5 million vouchers and certificates exist nationwide; nearly one
million ofthese finance housing for families with children.
Family Self-Sufficiencv Program (FSS) is a program developed by the DHA in an
effort to provide Section 8 and public housing residents with supportive services and
incentives, such as childcare, transportation, remedial education, job training and
placement, and budget management skills, to help families become self-sufficient during
the course of a five-year plan.
The Housing Opportunity Program (HOP) assists applicants in their efforts to
locate affordable housing in non-impacted neighborhoods. These neighborhoods are




have less than 37 percent Hispanic, black, or other minority representation in the latest
census tract. HOP staff provide relocation assistance and counseling services for
interested individuals, make social service referrals, handle housing referrals, make
certain that allegations of housing discrimination are reported to the proper authorities,
and provide assistance in obtaining extensions on certificates and vouchers.
Outline of Dissertation
Chapter II presents the literature review, which covers a brief history of housing
policy in Dallas, theories of housing location, suburbanization, and segregation. It also
discusses site selection policies for low-income housing and the impact of public housing
on neighborhoods. Chapter HI explores the social, economic, and political characteristics
of Dallas and how these are related to the issue of provision of adequate housing for
blacks and low-income residents. Chapter IV illuminates the struggles of Black families
to obtain decent, affordable housing in Dallas County, Texas. Chapter V analyzes the
impact of decisions of the Walker, et al. v. U.S. Department of Housing and Urban
Development in Dallas, Texas on the provision of housing by the Dallas Housing
Authority for blacks and low-income residents in Dallas. Chapter VI is the conclusion
chapter.
39 Janet Johnson and Roichard Joslyn, Political and Social Life (Washington, DC: Congressional
Quarterly Press, 1995), 73.
CHAPTER n
REVIEW OF THE LITERATURE
Introduction
This literature review begins with a discussion of the housing policies in Dallas
and then provides a summary of the historical development of housing for blacks in
Dallas from the theoretical perspectives found in the literature. This includes a discussion
of the relevance of ecological theory and theories and studies related to black
suburbanization and racial segregation. These discussions are augment by showing the
relevance of site selection policies for the construction of public housing. The chapter
concludes with a brief statement on the impact of public housing on neighborhoods and
issues surrounding this subject area.
Housing Policy in Dallas
Several writers have discussed housing policy in Dallas as it relates to black
families. Howard James' history ofDallas, points out how black families in Dallas first
lived in Deep Elem. He also tells of how discussions of housing reform ceased after the
beginning ofWorld War II.40 A few years later, in 1963, Carol Thometz gave insight
into housing policy from a city government perspective. Thometz points out that many
ofthe elected officials did not want to see racial integration. She also highlights the fact
40 Howard James, Big D isfor Dallas: Chapters in 2(fh Century History ofDallas (Austin, TX:
University Cooperative Society, 1957), 25.
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that black families who went beyond their communities were often met with resistance
in the local community and by local law enforcement officers.41
In 1977, Sam Acheson noted that housing for black families was not only scarce,
but that black families had limited places to live. This was also true for Mexican
Americans.42
In 1986, Jim Schutze discussed the politics of race in Dallas. His work highlights
the bombings of the homes of new black residents in white communities. He argued
there should be housing assistance for black residents because the population was
increasing and many black families were living in slums.43
A similar study about public housing in Dallas, Texas, was written by Roy
Williams and Kevin Shay. In their 1993 book on the history of Dallas, they wrote about
the first slaves to live in Dallas. Their research is significant because it tells how the
different racial communities lived during the latter part of the 19th Century. A critical
dimension of their work was how the state legislature put laws in place to enforce
segregation in Texas.44
Robert Prince also studied the history of Dallas. His work relates to housing for
blacks in Dallas, and he revealed how local officials helped to perpetuate segregation in
housing for blacks. His work also highlights how local and national leaders tried to
41 Carol Thometz, The Decision Makers: The Power Structure ofDallas (Dallas: Southern
Methodist University Press, 1963), 10.
42 Ibid.
43 Jim Schutze and Kevin Shay, The Accommodation (New Jersey: Citadel Press, 1986), 23.
44 Roy Williams, Time Change an Alternative View ofDallas (Dallas: Three Fork Press, 1993),
45.
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break down housing segregation in Dallas. These national leaders include the first
black city councilman, Al Lipscomb, and the civil rights leader Dr. Martin Luther King,
Jr.45
In 1994, Darwin Payne wrote about the big push for housing for black families in
Dallas, Texas. He also wrote about the history of the Dallas Housing Authority. He
acknowledged those who fought for integrated housing for blacks in Dallas including the
National Association for the Advancement of Colored People (NAACP). Lastly, he gave
details about the house bombings that some black families experienced.46
In 1996, Patricia Hill analyzed the effects of the shift in the black population of
Dallas, Texas and argued that more housing would be needed for black families in Dallas.
She discussed how some civic leaders wanted to assist black families in acquiring better
housing, and how others, such as the Klu Klux Klan, did not want to see black families
progress.47
In 1998, William Wilson wrote about a different aspect of the housing story in
Dallas. He wrote about the first black suburb, Hamilton Park. The problem encountered
in building Hamilton Park was that each city sector did not want to see this suburb in its
area. Many black families, according to Wilson, had little money to own homes. Despite
this fact, Hamilton Park's progress was not impeded. With more families on the rise, this
165.
45 Robert Prince,^ History ofDallas (Dallas: Urban Press, 1994), 52.
46 Darwin Payne, Big D (Three Forks Press, 1994), 82.
47 Patricia Hill, Dallas: The Making ofaModern City (Austin: University of Texas Press, 1996),
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suburb became one of the most respected areas of town for black families. Its
construction was aided by government assistance and hard working families.48
Also in 1998, Robert Fairbanks wrote about the planning stages that evolved as
the Dallas city council tried to help families who did not have adequate shelter. He
highlights how developers in Dallas were influenced to help black families obtain shelter.
He also discusses the influential court cases that helped to develop housing policies for
blacks living in Dallas, Texas.49
Ecological Theory
The definition of ecological theory is that the residential location of ethnic and
racial groups is linked to the group's socioeconomic status.50 The root of ecological
theory, often referred to as "socioeconomic segregation," derives from Robert Park's
work in 1925 at the University of Chicago. Park indicates that socioeconomic
segregation is the theory that "changes in economic social status tend to be registered in
changes in location."51 As part of his research, Parks traced the sequence of residential
locations of the immigrant ethnic populations. Karl and Alma Taeuber also researched
the theory of "socioeconomic segregation" and used Chicago as their model. They noted
in their research that older, unattractive housing is used as temporary residence for new
48 William H. Wilson, Hamilton Park (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1998), 15.
49 Robert Fairbanks, For the CityAs a Whole (Columbus: Ohio State University Press, 1998), 192.
50 Joe T. Darden and SamethM Famel, "Black Residential Segregation in Suburban Detroit:
Empirical Testing of the Ecological Theory," The Review ofBlack Political Economy (Winter 2000), 104.
51 Robert E. Park, Social Central and Collective Behavior, (Chicago, JJ1: University of Chicago
Press, 1967), 61.
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immigrants. As immigrants progress financially, they are more apt to leave depressed
communities. More new families to the country replace the moving immigrant families.52
Implicit in the socioeconomic status model is the basic assumption that a group's
status determines its ability to compete for housing sites in the open market. Because
blacks have lower incomes than whites, the housing opportunities for blacks are
restricted.53 Whites share the economic segregation faced by blacks, since the majority
ofpoor households in America are white. Nonetheless, a pattern of dual housing markets
exists, caused, in part, by long established practices of racial segregation in housing,
while whites occupy certain areas of the city, blacks continue to compete for housing
within their own neighborhoods.54
The research over the last thirty years generally confirms the ecological theory
that residential segregation in cities between ethnic groups relates directly to measurable
differences in social and economic variables. Scholars have assessed the question as to
whether the lower socioeconomic status of blacks was a major factor in explaining their
high level of residential segregation.55
Segregation is uniformly high between blacks and whites with equal incomes.
Blacks and whites earning $30,000 a year are no less segregated from each other than
52 Karl Taeuber and Alma F. Taeuber, Negroes in Cities: Residential Segregation and
Neighborhood Changes (Chicago, 111.: Aldine Publishing Co., 1965), 45.
53
Ibid., 78.
54 Thomas F. Pettigrew, "Attitudes on Race and Housing: A Social-Psychological View,"
Segregation in ResidentialAreas: Papers on Racial and Socioeconomic Factors in Choice ofHousing
(Washington, D.C.: National Academy of Science, 1973), 21-24.
55 Taeuber and Taeuber, Negroes in Cities, 125.
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blacks and whites earning $5,000 a year.56 Most empirical studies show that blacks
and whites in poverty usually live in separate neighborhoods as do affluent blacks and
whites. If families were distributed in neighborhoods on the basis of income instead of
race, most neighborhoods would contain numerous blacks and whites with low racial
residential segregation levels in cities and their suburbs.57
Nevertheless, the debate that fuels the discussion of class as opposed to race is the
cornerstone debate over why black residential segregation continues. A study by William
Clark and John Ware analyzed black residential segregation and socioeconomic status in
the southern California counties ofLos Angeles, Orange, Riverside, and Ventura.58 Their
results show decreasing segregation with increasing levels of socioeconomic status.
On the other hand, most scholars contend that American cities were still quite
segregated at the turn of the 21st Century. For example, Massey and Denton, in 1987,
estimated that the likelihood of black and white individuals sharing a common
neighborhood in 60 standard metropolitan statistical areas of the United States was 5
percent. Even more recently, in 1998, Yinger cited evidence that little had changed since
1987. Yinger observed "housing agents sometimes discriminate to take advantage of
perceived weaknesses in the bargaining position of blacks".59 Yinger underscores a
56 Joe T. Darden, "Socioeconomic Status and Racial Residential Segregation: Blacks and
Hispanics in Chicago," International Journal ofComparative Sociology (January-April 1987), 17.
57 Pam Downing and L. Gladstone, "Segregation and Discrimination in Housing-A Review of
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58 William Clark and John Ware, "Trends in Residential Integration by Socioeconomic Status in
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variety of techniques that lenders can use to discriminate in mortgage markets despite
the Fair Housing Act of 1968 and the Equal Credit Opportunity Act of 1974.60
Black Suburbanization
A suburb is defined in most studies as an incorporated place located within the
boundary lines of a metropolitan area that lies just outside of central city. Historically,
blacks have been excluded, relative to whites, from this portion of the metropolitan
area.61 Many scholars have documented patterns of black suburbanization across the
United States. Black suburbanization, however, is characterized as a slower and less
dramatic movement than the inner city transition from all white to all black
neighborhoods. It is driven primarily by less demand for housing by whites as the black
population increases.62 Further, the majority of blacks remain confined outside the
suburbs without the luxury of a residential choice based on preferences. However, most
blacks are often unable, due to racial discrimination, to move to the suburbs that offer
better public services and tax rates as discussed in Davidson's article. This problem of
lack of spatial mobility occurs despite blacks' dissatisfaction with public services in
centralcities.63
Researchers have also documented a pattern of segregation associated with black
suburbanization. Census data shows that patterns of segregation in central cities are being
60
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repeated in the suburbs. Black suburbanization is largely confined to deteriorating
inner suburbs. Overall, less segregated suburbs are found in southern and western states,
and the most segregated areas are located in the Northwest and Midwest.
Farley and Frey, in 1994, offered a detailed explanation to account for the
geographical differences in the segregation patterns. First, residential integration occurs
more easily in smaller and mid-sized metropolitan areas, which is a more typical
characteristic of the southern states. Secondly, towns with military bases are less
segregated due to frequent population changes. Thirdly, the recent construction spurts in
the South have made its suburbs seem less segregated when compared to other
geographical regions across the United States. This phenomenon is due to the fact that a
greater proportion of newer housing is associated with less segregation and that homes
built in the 1970s and 1980s were subject to the Fair Housing Act of 1968.
Institutionalized discrimination persists in older metropolitan areas of the industrial north
and in some areas in the South. Finally, political reasons also explain segregation in the
community. Some local governments have planned segregated suburban areas.
Structural forces that inhibit or promote black suburbanization are also the
subjects of investigation by many scholars. Results of these studies have revealed that
socioeconomic status is not a predictor of black suburbanization. Blacks of higher
socioeconomic status were found to be much less likely than whites to move to the
63 Ben Davidson, "Integration: Southern Comfort," Psychology Today, vol. 27, no. 5 (September
1994), 16.
64 Reynolds Farley, et al, "Changes in the Segregation of Whites From Blacks During the 1980s:
Small Steps Toward a More Integrated Society," American Sociological Review: vol. 59, no. 1 (February
1994), 25-45.
23
suburbs.65 Results also reveal that black suburbanization is not the result of public
policies and programs designed to attract or accommodate minorities. For example,
blacks affected by court orders stemming from the 1969 federal court decision Gautreaux
v. Chicago, which aimed at relocating low-income blacks from public housing to some
private housing units in middle-income white suburbs, faced serious problems such as
acquiring transportation and finding a landlord who was willing to rent units to them.66
In Detroit, for example, Farley, et al. found that blacks in suburban Detroit believe that
"pervasive racial discrimination by real estate agents and lenders" is the cause of
segregation.67
On the other hand, other scholars have focused on the characteristics of the
suburban communities attracting blacks. Results reveal that the characteristics ofthe
suburbs open to blacks usually include those with a poor tax base, low service
expenditures, and high population density. In other words, suburbs with a higher
percentage of blacks do not have the resources to meet the needs for better services.
Locational models reveal that whites, Asians, and Hispanics usually live in suburban
65 Michael Stall, "When Jobs Move Do Blacks and Latino Men Lose? The Effect of Growth in Job
Decentralized on Young Men's Jobless Incidence and Duration," Urban Studies: vol. 35, no. 12 (December
1998), 2221-2239.
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Development: vol. 52, no. 4 (July 1995), 6-9.
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census tracts with higher socioeconomic indicators than blacks. Blacks are usually
residing in suburban tracts with substantially lower socioeconomic characteristics.69
Finally, the case- study approach was used to investigate trends and variations in
black suburbanization. In 1992, in Michigan, Darden and Farnel used census data on
more than 100,000 people to identify the percentage ofthe black population suburbanized
since the 1960s. The study revealed that in 1990, only 5 percent of the black population
lived in suburban areas.70
Racial Segregation
Several studies of residential racial segregation have been conducted on national,
regional, and local levels. These studies confirm that residential segregation by race is
much greater than segregation by socioeconomic status in American cities. A classic
example is the study of residential segregation in Chicago by Taeuber and Taeuber. They
concluded in 1950 that income differences among the 75 community areas accounted for
only 14 percent of the observed racial segregation.71 Using 1960 census data,
Kantrowitz, Rosenber, and Lake found high levels of ethnic residential segregation years
after the European migration ceased. The Puerto Rican population remains segregated in
the Bronx, Brooklyn, and Manhattan.72
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Guest and Weed studied segregation in Cleveland from 1930 to 1970 and in
Boston and Seattle from 1960 to 1970. They conclude that ethnic populations are
segregated by socioeconomic status, but that ethnic segregation would continue to exist
even if the economic status that differed among the various ethnic groups disappeared.
Hermalin and Farley came to a similar conclusion in their study of residential segregation
in the 29 larger urbanized areas of the United States from 1960 to 1970. They stated:
"We believe that economic factors continued to account for little of the racial segregation
ofneighborhoods in central cities."74
Farley extended the analysis to consider the separate effects of racial and
socioeconomic segregation. Using 1970 census tract data, Farley measured the
residential segregation of blacks and whites. High levels of racial segregation were found
in all 29 urbanized areas among blacks and whites that were of the same socioeconomic
status. Farley ascertained:
Racial segregation is much more extensive than social class residential
segregation. Whites in any social class category are more highly
segregated from blacks in that same social class than they are from whites
in different social class categories.75
Studies of black residential segregation in thel980s reveal that most metropolitan
areas experienced a slight decline, according to Goeing and Kamely. Of the 60 areas
73 Avery M. Guest and James Weed, "Ethnic Residential Segregation: Patterns of Change,"
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reviewed, 54 declined in residential segregation. Nonetheless, cities such as Chicago,
Detroit and Cleveland remained considerably high in residential segregation.
Analogous to the studies in the 1980s was the research of the 1990s regarding
residential racial segregation. Brickford and Massey completed one of the few research
studies ofthe 1990s. They found that segregation in residences is quite high, particularly
in cities like Chicago. Massey and Kangiaupni also conducted similar research in this
area. They argue that public housing plays a critical role in generating high rates of
neighborhood poverty. They conclude that:
Public Housing thus represents a key institutional mechanism for
concentrating numbers ofpoor people within a small geographic space
often within dense, high-rise buildings. Because low-income projects
were systematically targeted to black neighborhoods in a
discriminatory fashion...this institutional mechanism greatly
exacerbated the degree of poverty concentration for one group in
particular-blacks.
Public housing projects may be viewed as testing grounds for the achievement of
racial desegregation in residential areas. The projects are integral parts of the
neighborhood in which they are constructed, and they are subject to the process of
residential segregation. One offspring of building public housing in neighborhoods is the
notion of white flight. Crowder argues that whites tend to leave an area once public
housing is built. Not all whites leave, however.78 Massey and Denton's study of
residential segregation confronting the vast majority of blacks (not just those in poverty)
76'' John Goeing and Ali Kamely, "Recent Research on Racial Segregation and Poverty
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was written in 1993. They argue that segregation explains the characteristics of
concentrated poverty better than alternative explanations, such as the culture of poverty,
institutional racism, government welfare policy, and structural economic change.
Moreover, barriers to integrated neighborhoods are more pronounced for blacks of all
economic classes than for non-black of any economic class, and these barriers have not
been alleviated significantly by federal mandates such as the Fair Housing Act of 1968.79
While not focusing specifically on black inner-city poor, Borjas developed a model to
examine the employment skills the inner-city poor from one generation to the next. He
suggests that parental earnings refer to the earnings of the parent's generation of the
ethnic group. He demonstrates that ethnicity has a major influence on economic
empowerment. Moreover, he suggests that racial segregation will always have a special
negative impact on children's earnings, and that living in an ethnically integrated
neighborhood can lead to a better rate of pay due to changes in education and
employment.
In 1996, Massey expanded the idea of racial and ethnic groups' expansion in
neighborhoods in his work, "Age of Extremes." Massey's analysis of extreme social
classes is important in the study of class segregation because it points out the probable
on
consequences ofresidential separation for not only the poor but also for the affluent.
Massey and Denton work in 1993 and Massey's work in 1996 were analyzed of
the spatial distribution of affluent and poor classes. Instead of examining income
79 Douglas S. Massey and N. A. Denton, American Apartheid: Segregation and the Making ofthe
Underclass, (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1993), 56.
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segregation within the black, white, Hispanic, and Asians population, Massey and
Egger explore segregation within the population as a whole. They conclude that the
geography of inequality has taken place among affluent and poor families, where affluent
families have become more concentrated in neighborhoods of families of various races,
while poor families have become isolated in areas with other poor families. In Massey's
1996 work he concludes that this level of spatial polarization continued into the 1980s
along with rising economic inequality. The result of this "Age of Extremes" is that
affluent families live in neighborhoods characterized by advantaged schools, fewer
crimes, superior services, and a vibrant economy. On the other hand, poor families are
concentrated in areas with poor schools, high crime rates, inadequate services, and
unemployment.81
Although significant studies suggest whites discriminate against blacks by barring
them from moving into their neighborhoods, research also suggests that blacks want to
live among themselves. In 1965, Kenneth Clark asserted that considerable psychological
suffering occurs in the ghetto. "Most Negroes take the first steps into an integrated
society tentatively and torn with conflict.... A person who has been forced to be
ashamed of his identity cannot easily accept himself as a human being and surrender
either the supportive group or its identifications."82 More recently, in 1997, Orlando
Patterson and Stephen Thernstrom have maintained this view. They blame persistent
segregation on the strongly held preferences of blacks. They cite evidence about the
81 Mario Sims, "High-status Residential Segregation Among Racial and Ethnic Groups in Five
Areas, 1980-1993," Social Science Quarterly 80 (September 1999), 558.
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increasingly racial attitudes of whites, specifically the greater tolerance of whites
already living with black neighbors. They contend that whites are not to blame for
continuing segregation. Instead, blacks prefer to live with their own race, and their
preference for residential segregation has not changed over time. For example, in 1982
Thernstrom reported that only 4 percent of blacks wished to live in majority white
neighborhoods. By 1997 this had barely increased to 5 percent. Neighborhoods remain
segregated, they argue, because blacks overwhelmingly prefer majority black areas or
locations that are evenly integrated.83 After reviewing such evidence, Patterson
concludes: "The answer which liberal students of segregation repeatedly insist as
stepping stones is that persistent segregation is partly~and for most middle-class blacks
largely-a voluntary phenomenon."84 This reasoning led Krysan and Farley in 2002 to
the conclusion that even if real estate brokers and lenders treat blacks and whites
identically, segregation will persist since blacks prefer to live with blacks.
In 1996, William J. Wilson examined in detail the social consequences of
decreased employment opportunities and decreased contact with middle-class institutions
in high-poverty black neighborhoods. In Chicago, for example, young men with few
skills and employment options in the 1990s could not support themselves or their families
in the formal economy and, therefore, turned to the informal economy. With little
82 Kenneth B. Clark, Dark Ghetto: Dilemmas ofSocial Power (Chicago: Harper & Row, 1965), 3-
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employment or services outside the ghetto, individuals had little reason to experience
life outside the ghetto and thus they learned social values that were are at odds with
perceived middle-class standards. Wilson argues that access to stable, well-paying
employment rather than residential integration is most important for the transformation of
high-poverty black communities.86
A link between the "segregation-first" hypothesis of Massey and Denton and the
"jobs-first" hypothesis of Wilson is the spatial mismatch hypothesis. As stated by R. M.
Fernandez in 1994:
[Limitations on the residential choices of minorities, particularly the
almost total exclusion of African Americans from white suburban areas,
inhibit access to jobs (especially low-skilled jobs), which have been
steadily dispersing from central cities to suburban areas of most
metropolitan areas for at least the past 30 years. Consequently, racial
barriers in housing are hypothesized to be responsible for a large portion
ofthe low rates ofemployment and low earnings of minority workers.87
Fernandez adds that firms choose to relocate from urban areas to suburban areas
to acquire cheaper land and infrastructure, to have access to better-qualified workers, and
to escape from inner-city social problems.
This spatial mismatch hypothesis has been the subject of intense study since its
proposal by Robert Kain in 1968. Inner-city unemployment in the midst of a robust
metropolitan economy is often referred to as spatial mismatch. The phrase refers to the
85 Maria Krysar and Reynolds Farley, "The residential preference of Blacks: Do they explain
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spatial separation of unemployed central city workers and low-skilled job vacancies
that are increasingly concentrated in the suburbs of major U.S. metropolitan areas. In
1987, Jencks and Mayer divided the spatial mismatch hypothesis into two parts: a
"demand-side" argument and a "supply-side" argument. The demand-side argument
states that suburbanization of blue-collar jobs would reduce employers' tendencies to hire
black workers for fear of offending white workers and residents. The supply-side
argument states that even if suburban employers were willing to hire blacks, barriers in
housing, transportation, and information would reduce labor force participation among
blacks. Christopher Jencks finds sparse and inconsistent evidence for the demand-side
argument, and abundant but conflicting evidence for the supply-side argument; this is due
to selective migration of blacks to the suburbs.88 Fernandez surveyed more recent
literature and concluded that selective migration cannot be the sole or primary
explanation for spatial mismatch effects.
Spatial mismatch has been characterized by three important features: (1) the
unemployment rate for low-skilled central city residents exceeds that of comparable
suburban dwellers; (2) the low-skilled job vacancy rate is higher for suburban firms than
for central city firms; and (3) wages for low-skilled workers are higher at suburban firms
than at central city firms.89
Ihlanfeld offers three reasons why companies do not fill vacancies in other
locations. One reason is because of racial discrimination. A second reason is because of
88 Christopher Jencks, Is the American Underclass Growing? The Urban Underclass (Washington,
D.C.: The Brookings Institution, 1991), 28-43.
89 N. Edward Coulson, Derek Laing, and Ping Wong, "Spatial Mismatch In Search of
Equilibrium," Journal ofLabor Economics 1.9 (October 2001): 1.
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transportation costs. Those living in the inner city may find the expense of traveling
from home to not be worth the effort over a period of time. A third explanation is that
inner-city workers find it difficult to gathering information about suburban jobs that are
advertised in certain sectors of communities and not others.
N. Edward Coulson, et al., proposed a possible solution to the problem created by
the spatial mismatch theory. They concluded that the remedy is to reduce the cost of
public transportation in various places and to mitigate search frictions, which imply
working with all sectors ofthe community to promote jobs ads.91
Because public housing is built in certain areas, the federal government and local
housing authorities have initiated policies designed to encourage desegregation. The
historical development ofthese policies is presented below.
Site Selection Policies
Donald Foley's research analyzed the criticism of the site selection policies of
local housing authorities. The Housing Acts of 1937 and 1949 tied public housing
construction to slum clearance. The research shows that over 80 percent of these projects
were located in run-down central city neighborhoods already inhabited by poor racial and
ethnic groups.92
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Although support for public housing may have brought the votes from the low-
income population, few city officials found it politically wise to locate projects in their
home districts.93 There was similar consensus among suburban city governments to
exclude public housing developments simply by not authorizing the construction of
multi-family dwellings.94 Public housing was kept out of the suburbs of the central cities
and located in poor neighborhoods.
While there has been little recent research related to racial segregation in public
housing, statistics show the majority of residents in public housing units and on waiting
list are black. Part of the reason so many blacks live in public housing is because of the
shift in the economy and society. Robert Murdie quotes Wilson who has suggested that,
because blacks have become part of the underclass, public housing is all these families
can afford.95 Schill, in 1993, contended that several factors contribute to racial
concentration in public housing. One factor is low-income ceilings. Another factor is
that as whites earn more money they are inclined to live in suburban communities.
The increasing concentration and isolation of poor and minority households in
public housing have created an environment that has hurt the quality of life for residents.
Lemann's work in 1991 argued that the black urban underclass has been established in
plantation-like communities headed by female heads of households. The Civil Rights era
93 Leonard Freedman, Public Housing: The Politics ofPoverty, 112-115.
94 Noel Gist and Sylvia Fava, Urban Society (New York, NY: Thomas Crowell Press, 1974), 292.
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did not help families in the housing projects. The "War on Poverty" was bad because
it made enemies of local elected officials by giving money to families and by passing
local government. Lemann asserts that to help families in the projects, more government
jobs will have to be created.97
Kotlowitz looked at the residents of public housing in Chicago in 1991. He
pointed out that there were no children living in public housing because they had seen too
much of a bad situation. His research suggested that the stereotypical ideas of public
housing residents were wrong. Children can grow up in public housing to become
productive citizens, but the odds are quite low because of horrible events they may
experience and the lack of positive role models.98
Impact of Public Housing on Neighborhoods
Although concentrations of poverty within public housing have been well
documented, little research has been done to examine the effects of public housing
developments on their surrounding neighborhoods. The few studies that have examined
the impact ofpublic housing on neighborhoods have failed to find a negative effect.
Three studies that examined the effects of public housing on neighborhood
composition reached contradictory conclusions. Carter-and Schill referred to Goldstein
and Yancey's 1986 study and concluded that public housing in neighborhoods has little
97 Nicholas Lemann, A Tale ofThree Cities, The New York Civilest Counterpart (New Yo.(fr:
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99 Alex Kotlowitz, There Are No Children Here (Chicago: Simon Schuster, 1988), 20.
35
effect in the surrounding community.100 Carter and Schill also note Galster and
Keeney's research in 1993 in which they examine the effect of subsidized housing in
neighborhoods. Unlike Goldstein and Yancey, they found a significant relationship
between the number of units of subsidized housing and an increase in the proportion of
Black residents. They reported that the magnitude ofthis is small.
The third study by Massey and Kanagaupan in 1993 examined Chicago census
tracts to determine whether the existence of public housing constructed between 1950 and
1970 was related to the needs of families with income below the poverty line. They
found a positive statistically significant relationship between the existence of public
housing in a census tract and the proportion of families in poverty in 1980.
Conclusion
The review of the literature carefully examined the themes and policies that have
been utilized with regard to housing programs. While policies have been put into place to
stop housing discrimination, research shows that discrimination still exists. Further
research indicates that these housing needs suggest a broader issue with regard to jobs
and the economy. A conclusive study that public housing brings down the property value
of surrounding neighborhoods has not been done. Yet the literature suggests that black
families who choose to live in the suburbs are still not welcomed with open arms.
This study will add to the body of literature because it discusses decisions that
were made based on demographic characteristics of the housing recipients rather than
100 William H. Carter, Michael H. Schill, and Susan M. Wachter, "Polarization, Public Housing
and Racial Minorities in U.S. Cities," Journal ofPolitics, (October 1998), 1894.
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how the Dallas Housing Authority has engaged in building houses. Many of the
former studies tended to provide the views of land use planners, city representatives, and
developers who sought to reduce black community residents' access to the housing
market but excluded the views of the housing recipients. This study is designed to fill
this void by focusing on the perspective ofthe low-income housing.
CHAPTER HI
DALLAS, TEXAS: ITS ORIGIN, DEMOGRAPHICS AND HISTORY OF
OPPOSITION TO FAIR HOUSING FOR BLACKS
Students of Political Science, Public Administration, Urban Planning, and Public
Policy Analysis have indicated there is a close association between social and economic
factors and the level ofblack power and empowerment in the South.
Mack H. Jones has declared that in order for researchers to forthrightly facilitate
an understanding ofthe nature of black power one should first include a discussion about
the type of social and economic demographic conditions existing within a community.101
For more than half a century, social scientists have worked with government, social and
academic leaders and government to provide affordable housing in North Texas. This
chapter focuses on how demographic characteristics have influenced the Dallas Housing
Authority's ability to provide decent, affordable, and low-income housing for blacks in
Dallas, Texas. Similar to Jones' position, William J. Wilson has expounded on the
necessity to analyze the dynamics of how politics, race, and class affect the public policy
making process.102 Constructing such an analysis will allow us to provide systematic
101 Mack H. Jones, "A Frame of Reference for Black Politics," In Lenneal J. Henderson, Jr., ed.,
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and supportive data to determine characteristics essential to providing blacks in Dallas,
Texas. This discussion shows a link between the income of families and the housing that
income will purchase.
Origins of Dallas, Texas
Dallas is located in North Central Texas on the Trinity River in the center of
Dallas County. John Neely Bryan founded the city in November 1841.103 The origin of
the name Dallas is unknown. When Dallas County was founded in 1846, Dallas was
designated as the temporary county seat. Later, in 18S0, voters selected Dallas as the
permanent county seat. The Texas Legislature granted Dallas a town charter on February
2,1856.104
From 1837 to 1887, Indian tribes occupied most of Dallas County. The Caddo
and Cherokee tribes were forced out of Dallas County by Texas soldiers. While the
soldiers were forcing the Indian tribes out of Dallas, Bryan was convincing families to
move there. Bryan was also instrumental in helping Dallas become a major service
center for new families to the area.105
As the white settlers migrated to the Northern Texas region, most ofthem brought
their slaves with them from states like Kentucky and Louisiana. The first slave of record
in Dallas County was a man named Allen, who came with John Huitt to Farmers Branch,
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a city established in Dallas County in 1843.106 The growth of cotton plantations fueled
the demand for slaves. In fact by 1860, slaves made up over 30 percent of the total
population. In Dallas County, the black slave population rose 500 percent from 207 in
1850 to 1,074 in 1860, and made up 12 percent ofthe population.107
In the late 1870s, banking and insurance emerged as major industries in Dallas.
In addition, Dallas businessmen launched the State Fair ofTexas (which brought revenue
to the city). Dallas also acquired telephones in 1881 and electricity in 1882. By 1890,
Dallas ranked as the most populous city in Texas with 38,067 residents.108
Dallas Demographics
Population
According to the 1970 United States Census, the population of Dallas, Texas was
estimated at 992,695, ofwhich 24.9 percent (247,181) was black.109 In that same year in
Dallas County, the total population was estimated at 1,,327,321 of which 16.6 percent
(220,512) was black. The median income of black households in Dallas County in 1970
was $6,279. The city ofDallas, according to the 1970 Census, had a population ofblacks
with a median household income of $6,309. The median household income of white
residents in the city of Dallas was $11,289."° The percentage of the black population
106 Ibid., 33.
107 Ibid.
108 Texas State Historical Association, The New Handbook ofTexas (Austin, TX: Austin, 1996),
479.
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living below the poverty level was 25.1 percent compared with 5.1 percent ofthe white
population living below the poverty level (see Table 1). Dallas County, in the 1970s,
had a median household income for Blacks of $6,279. The median income of whites in
Dallas County was $11,477. The 1970 Dallas County census data further revealed that
25.3 percent of black Families (12,459) lived below the poverty level. m By 1980, the
population ofDallas County had risen to 1,556,419.
The State of Texas had approximately 1,445,813 blacks in 1970. Blacks
constituted 12.5 percent of the state population. This percentage exceeded the black
national percentage, which was 11.0.112 In 1970, blacks comprised 24.9 percent of the
population in Dallas and 16.6 percent of the Dallas County population. The difference
can be explained by the fact that Dallas became one of the largest technology centers in
the nation, thus employing a larger number of blacks. The companies making up the
technology force included Ling-Tempco-Vought (LTV Corporation) and Texas
Instruments.
In addition, Dallas developed the Dallas Market Center, the largest wholesale
trade complex in the world. The opening of Dallas/Fort Worth International Airport also
attracted jobs for blacks. Racial integration of public facilities began on August 15,
1961, when a carefully orchestrated plan sent blacks to lunch counters and businesses




























Source: U. S. Bureau of the Census, County and City Data Book, 1972. (Washington,
D.C.: U. S. Printing Office)appointed by the Dallas and Negro Chambers of Commerce.
This committee devised a publicity campaign and notified business owners in advance. It
was only after this work was done that progress was made for blacks in employment in
Dallas, Texas.113
While Dallas was still segregated by race in the 1970s and 1980s, blacks
continued to make moderate progress in the political arena and in economics. The 1980
census showed that minorities made up 81 percent of those in poverty in Dallas County
with blacks comprising 57 percent. Although employment in Dallas tripled from 1963 to
1983 and Dallas County gained over 200,000 people in the five years after 1975,
unemployment rates for minorities remained stagnant and significantly higher than the
rates for whites.114 In 1991, Bob Ray Sanders, a radio and talk show host said:
113 Texas State Historical Association, The New Handbook ofTexas (Austin, TX: Austin, 1996),
479.
114 Robert Prince, A History ofDallas: From a Different Perspective (Dallas, TX: SMU Press,
1994), 117.
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"Nowadays, the established power structure works in subtle, indirect ways to hold
oppressed people back."115
By 1990, Dallas' population had declined to 1,006,877, but the number of blacks
had increased to 296,994.116 According to the 1990 census, those numbers did not
improve over a twenty-year period. The data further revealed that, in 1990, of the
1,006,877 total population ofthe city of Dallas, 26.4 percent ofthe black population was
living below poverty level compared to only 6.2 percent of the white population. The
median household income for blacks was $21,242, only half of the $42,952 for whites.
In Dallas County the numbers were similar. The median household income for blacks
was $21,645, and 23.9 percent of blacks was living below the poverty level with a
median household income for whites was $43,383 and only 5 percent living below
poverty level (see Table 2).
Table 2




















Source: U. S. Bureau ofthe Census, County and City Data Book, 1990. (Washington,





According to the 1970 U.S. Census, 68,376 people were enrolled in the public
school system in Dallas; ofthese people 30.7 percent were black. Moreover, 10.6 percent
ofthe black population was enrolled in private elementary or high schools and 2,657
blacks were enrolled in kindergarten.117 The report also indicates that 5.5 percent of the
black population completed less than five years of school, 54.2 percent completed at least
four years ofhigh school, and only 14.0 percent had four or more years ofcollege.118 On
the other hand, the white students were in the majority and 69 percent of the white
population enrolled in elementary or high schools. Further, 5,128 white students were
enrolled in kindergarten. This report also indicated that 8.2 percent of the white
population completed less than five years of school. A majority of white students (50.1
percent) completed four years of high school but only 22.0 percent completed four or
more years ofcollege.119
In 1990, the educational statistics of Dallas County remained discouraging for
blacks. Between 1960 and 1970 a majority ofthe black population in Dallas County lived
in a segregated area which limited where they attended school. Only 18.1 percent of
blacks lived in owner-occupied housing units compared to 73.0 percent ofthe whites who







Evidence of segregation in the Dallas Independent School District (DISD) has
been presented in Federal Court. On Tuesday, October 6, 1970, in the Tasby v. Estes
case, the DISD was accused of operating a racially, ethnically, and economically
segregated school system under a de jure segregated attendance plan. Although some
elementary schools were integrated, beginning in the early 1960s Mr. Tasby's children
had to pay to ride city buses to an all-black school when they could have walked to a
white school located closer to their home.121 On Friday, July 17, 1971 Judge William M.
Taylor, U.S. District Judge for the Northern District of Texas, found the defendants guilty
(see Table 3). In his words:
Seventy schools are 90 percent or more white (Anglo), forty schools are
90 percent of more black and forty-nine schools with 90 percent or more
minority; 91 percent of black students in 90 percent or more of the
minority schools, 3 percent of the black students attending schools in
which the majority is white or Anglo. It would be less than honest not to
conclude that elements of a dual system still remain. And this was not the
result ofchanges in neighborhood patterns, nor was it the result ofa 1965
court order; rather, the Dallas school board had failed to make the
necessary efforts to correct the situation, despite the fact that it and its
administration were aware ofthe problem.
Proposed Remedies to School Segregation
The Judge ruled that Dallas must gerrymander secondary school attendance zones
to mix students and bus students from one school to another to "help ethnic groups
communicate with each other."123 The Judge also agreed to allow black and Hispanic
121 Scott Paiks, "IsDISD ready to move oriT DallasMorning News (October 31, 2002), 13A.
122 GlenM. Under, Desegregating Schools in Dallas (Dallas, TX: Three Forks Press, 1996), 74.
123 Ibid., 75.
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children to transfer from schools where their race was a majority and to use television
to link classroom with student learning.124
Table 3
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS
DALLAS DIVISION
EDDIE MITCHELL TASBY,ETAL. § CIVIL
vs. § ACTION
CHAD WOOLERY, GENERAL SUPER- § NO.
INTENDENT, DALLAS INDEPENDENT §
SCHOOL DISTRICT, ET AL. § 3-.CV-4211-H
NOTICE TO CLASS MEMBERS
Notice is hereby given to all African American and Hispanic students and
their parents ofthe Dallas Independent School District that a hearing has been
scheduled by the honorable Chief Judge Barefoot Sanders in the above
referenced matter regarding the DISD's Motion for Unitary Status. This
hearing will be conducted beginning at 9:00 a.m. on May 9, 1994, in the
courtroom of Judge Sanders, Court 15B16, United States Courthouse, 1100
Commerce Street, Dallas, Texas 75242, which is on the 15th floor ofthe above
referenced building.
Unitary status is being sought by the DISD as the termination of the
school desegregation issues raised in this litigation, which has been on file
since October 6, 1970. Should the Court grant such motion, under whatever
terms and conditions it sees fit, supervision by the federal court of the Dallas
Independent School District and its desegregation efforts will terminate on the
date selected by the court.
You are invited to attend and observe.
Edward B. Cloutman, in E. Brice Cunningham Robert H. Tomas
3301 Elm St. 777 S. Thornton Fwy. #121 P.O. Box 50100
Dallas, Texas 75226 Dallas, Texas 75203 Dallas, Texas 75250
Counsel for Plaintiffs Counsel for Integration Counsel for Defendants
Source: Dallas Observer (April 28-1994), 4.
124 Ibid., 76.
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On August 17, 1971, Judge Taylor completed his final desegregation order. He
ordered the Dallas Independent School District to:
1. desegregate its faculty and staff;
2. provide transportation on a non-segregated and nondiscriminatory
basis; a majority-to-minority transfer option permitting eligible
students to transfer to any school in the district and providing
transportation for students who made the change;
3. insure that all extra-curricular activities continue on a desegregated
basis;
4. appoint a Tri-Ethnic Committee with new and enlarged powers to
report monthly on progress of the program;
5. report to the court on November 1,1971, and on August 15,1972,
and annually thereafter on April 15 of each succeeding year;
6. [recognized that] the case is to remain with the district court to the
end ofthe desegregation plan to ensure that a unitary school system
be maintained in the Dallas Independent School District.125
7. [implement] a Confluence of Cultures program designed to
produce quality, integrated schools;
8. [implement] a Compensatory Education Program;
9. consult [with] and [gain the] approval of the Tri-Ethnic Committee
for the selection of future school sites or the start of any
construction, as well as a directive that all work be done in a
manner that would prevent the recurrence of a dual school
structure.
Status ofEquity in Public Education
Although 50 years have passed since the Supreme Court ruled against segregation




court order to desegregate students in the school system.126 There has been a push,
however, to end the court order. Former Dallas School Superintendent Marvin Edwards
convinced the DISD Board of Trustees to ask the court to relieve it from the court order
in 1988, about 17 years into the lawsuit. U.S. District Judge Barefoot Sanders refused to
alter his original desegregation order. DISD Superintendent Chad Woolery urged the
Board of Trustees to ask Judge Sanders the same question in 1994. Judge Sanders
retained his jurisdiction, which implied that the order was still needed (see Tables 4).127
Dr. Mike Moses, the current DISD Superintendent, would now like the DISD
Board of Trustees to ask Judge Sanders to release the DISD from the 31 year old court
order that requires measures to improve education for minority children. Dr. Moses has
indicated he would like to use the $560,000 per year for administrative court cost to help
pay for teacher's salaries and to educate more students. Second, he has indicated that
minority students in the DISD are now the majority; consequently, the order is moot.
Third, Dr. Moses believes that DISD has done what it has been told to do.
In October 31,2002,165,000 students enrolled in the Dallas Independent School
District: 57 percent Hispanic, 34 percent black, 7 percent white and 2 percent Asian or
American Indian. Most of the 11,000 white students in the District are concentrated in
North Dallas, East Dallas, and Seagoville.128
In order for Dr. Moses' request to be heard in Court, five of the nine members
Board of Trustees must agree by vote. His request will be met with challenges. Several
126 Scott Paiks, "Is DISD ready to move on?" Dallas Morning News (October 31, 2002), 13A.




Board members do not believe the court order should be lifted because the statistics do
not show a complete compliance with the court order. Kathlyn Gilliam, a former Dallas
School trustee and member of the black Coalition to Maximize Education, has indicated
that DISD has not complied with the court order. Lee Alcorn, president of the Coalition
for the Advancement of Civil Rights on May 17, 1994 contended that the gap between
white and minority students' test scores is still wide and thus a court order is needed to
oversee the issue.129
Sandra Malone, court-appointed monitor of DISD's progress under the court
order, maintains that DISD should still be under the court order. Under the court order,
the District makes two reports per year to account for its compliance efforts. Ms. Malone
evaluates these reports and presents updates of DISD's work to the court. On October
17, 2002, Ms. Malone indicated that DISD had plenty of work to do. She cited the
exclusion of minorities from honors programs. She also pointed out that test score
information presented by DISD is not clear and needs further clarification. In her words,
the statement and statistics presented, ...regarding the narrowing of the gap, are offered
without the support ofessential details".1
i 130
129 Joseph Garcia, "Court Auditor faults schools' efforts," Dallas Morning News, (May 17,1994),
1A.
130 Tawnell Hobbs, "DISD hasn't given enough data desegregation, monitor says compliance




A look atDISD's 48-year history with desegregation:
Sept. 12,1955: The NAACP files a
lawsuit alleging racial discrimination in
separate schools for black and white
students.
Sept. 6, 1961: A small group of black
first-graders enrolls in all-white elementary
schools to begin a "stair-step plan" of
integrating one grade at a time. DISD
remains overwhelmingly segregated.
Jul. 3,1965: The 5th Circuit Court of
Appeals Ihrows out the stair-step plan and
orders immediate desegregation.
Oct 6,1970: The Dallas Legal Services
Foundation files a suit, Tasby vs. Estes, for
21 Black and Hispanic children. It calls on
DISD to comply with U.S. Supreme Court
desegregation decisions.
Aug. 2,1971: U.S. District Judge William
M. Taylor orders busing to integrate junior
high and high schools but no busing for
elementary schools. Plaintiffs appeal to the
5th Circuit.
Aug. 1971-Jul. 1975: Tasby vs. Estes
remains in limbo at the appeals court,
which finally returns the case to Judge
Taylor for a more extensive integration
plan.
Apr. 7,1976: Judge Taylor issues an order
requiring busing for all grades and creation of
magnet schools to bring students into
predominantly minority neighborhoods.
Mar. 23,1981: U.S. District Judge Barefoot
Sanders is assigned to the Tasby case.
Feb. 1,1982: Judge Sanders issues a new
order requiring improved programs for
minority students and hiring goals for
minority faculty and administration staff.
Apr. 28, 1988: The DISD school board
votes to ask a federal court for "unitary"
status, declaring that the district has erased
vestiges of the dual school system for
blacks and whites.
Jul. 26,1994: Judge Sanders declares
DISD "unitary" but retains control of the
case until the district makes more attempts
to desegregate.
Oct. 2002: The DISD superintendent tells
the school board that it's time to seek a new
ruling from Judge Sanders that could lead
to the end ofthe Tasby suit.
Source: Dallas Morning News, October 31,2002
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According to the district's report, black students in the DISD who took the
Stanford-9 National Test in Reading, in Spring 2001, scored in the 44th percentile among
all students nationally, while Hispanic students scored in the 43rd percentile. White
students scored in the 71st percentile. The national average was the 50th Percentile. In
1994, Hispanics and blacks in the DISD were in the 31st percentile, while whites were in
the 62nd percentile. According to the District's reports, blacks and Hispanics scored better
than the previous year.
In addition, Ms. Malone was also skeptical about other aspects of DISD's report.
She visited Woodrow Wilson High School, J.L. Long Middle School, and Lakewood
Elementary School. She reported there was a clear separation of students in regular
classes composed primarily of ethnic minority students. Whites populated honors and
other advanced classes. She added that regular classes tended to be larger than honors
classes. Her report also noted that most of the students assigned to the advanced classes
were white. The separation of students is also visible in electives and extracurricular
activities.
Judge Sanders could dismiss the case if the DISD can show good cause according
to a 1994 ruling.131
Housing
In 1970, the U.S. Census Bureau reported that 26,686 of the housing units in
Dallas County were owned and occupied by blacks. The data also indicate that 2,071,
nearly 10 percent of the housing units, lacked some or all plumbing facilities.132 A total
of 126,182 owner-occupied housing units, owned by blacks, existed in Dallas County.1
133
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Jane G. Green, President of JG & Associates, along with the Greater Dallas
Housing Opportunity Center, conducted research to support their thesis that there existed
discrimination in housing. In 1974, they found that 70 percent of blacks surveyed had
experienced discrimination.134 Tactics of discrimination were subtle and included
independent brokers showing less expensive homes to blacks, Blacks being asked more
questions about their finances than whites, and Blacks being shown homes in less
integrated areas.135
To counter such discrimination tactics, the state legislature enacted the Title VIII
of the Civil Rights Act of 1968 and 1988, which makes discrimination in housing
because of race, creed, or color illegal. The enactment of Title VIII has helped real estate
companies and apartment associations to work together to stop these discriminating
practices.136
The work that has been put forth to end discrimination in housing in Dallas was
analyzed in the 1980s by Karl Taeuder of the University of Wisconsin. Although Dallas
131 Ibid.
132 U.S. Bureau of Census, County and City Data Book 1972 (Washington, D.C., U.S.
Government Printing Office, 1972).
133 Ibid.
134 Ann McDaniel, "Housing Discrimination in Dallas on the Wane, Federal Survey Finds," Dallas




has worked to end such illegal practices, Dallas was ranked 10th among the 28 most
segregated cities across the nation.
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In the 1990s, housing segregation concerns shifted to the practice of redlining or
ofwithholding bank loans in certain areas for black families seeking to buy a home.
While there have been agreements between community organizations and banks that this
process must stop, it is clear more work must be done. Congress passed the Community
Reinvestment Act in 1977 after finding that some financial institutions redlined low-
income neighborhoods, particularly minority areas. The Federal Deposit Insurance
Corporation examines financial institutions each year for compliance with the
Community Reinvestment Act.138
Although rules have been put in place to help cut out redlining, statistics show it
still exists in Dallas. According to the City Housing Assistance Plan, the number of
families living in substandard housing has grown from 47,600 in 1974 to a 1988 estimate
of 75,800, a 59 percent increase.139 Moreover, the City has not put forth a strong effort to
help those families in substandard housing. Federal money that has been allocated to
help families with housing has not been spent.140 On January 4, 1989, the Dallas County
Commissioners Court agreed to require banks seeking the county's depository contracts
137 Walter Borges, "U.S. City Laws Credited for Aiding Integration in Housing," Dallas Morning
News (May 10,1983), p. H-2.
138 Lawrence E. Young, "County Sets Bank Policy," DallasMorning News (January 4, 1989),
Al.
139 Craig Flournoy, "Federal grant money spent on bureaucracy, not poor," Dallas Morning News
(March 8, 1990), C2.
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to prove that they provide loans and other services to low-income neighborhoods.
Commissioner John Wiley Price, a strong advocate of the new program and respected
community leader, indicated:
Historically, local banks and insurance companies have been the
purveyors, the main perpetrators of discriminatory practices that have
led to the disenfranchisement of our (minority) communities; Price
said. 'What we are saying to the local financial community is you can
continue to red-line, but not with our (the county's) money.'U1
The City has also been working to reduce the practice of redlining. It has
encouraged banks not to discriminate. It has instituted a $30 million mortgage program
aimed at helping families obtain and maintain a home. The city wanted to utilize the
money before the deadline to avoid the risk that the funds might be reallocated by the
federal government.142
It is clear that many black residents in Dallas County have had problems
obtaining education, income, and housing. While these conditions have improved over
the years, there is still work that must be done. This work includes actions by those in
local government agencies. The facts indicate that programs are available to help
families, but management of these programs could be handled better. Moreover, the
research shows some institutions are not doing business in a fair manner. If equality is to
exist, then certainly the work ofvarious institutions in the private and the public sectors is
needed.
140 ibid.
141 Lawrence E. Young, "County Sets Bank Policy," Dallas Morning News (Januaiy 4,1989), Al.
142 Craig Flournoy, "Federal grant money spent on bureaucracy, not poor," DallasMorning News
(March 8,1990). C2.
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A Political Voice for Blacks in Dallas
From the beginning of the 20th Century, blacks in Dallas faced obstacles that
prevented them from voting or participating in politics. The most serious of these
barriers was the Terrell Election Law of 1905 that allowed the Democratic Party's county
executives to determine who could vote in party primaries.143 Although the law did not
specify race, it was understood that party executives would not allow blacks to vote in the
primaries. In 1923, the Texas Legislature amended the Terrell Election Law, which
excluded blacks from Democratic Party primaries. The amendment stated that "In no
event shall a Negro be eligible to participate in a Democratic primary election held in the
state of Texas, and should a Negro vote in a Democratic primary election such ballot
shall be void and election officials shall not count the same."144
Texas repealed the Primary Law of 1923; however, the voters went to the polls in 1923 to
support the law. Upon passage, the officials began to use the law to determine voting
qualifications.145 Blacks challenged the white primary several times. In 1927, the
NAACP helped Lawrence A. Nixon, an El Paso dentist, win an unanimous decision from
the U.S. Supreme Court declaring the Texas election statute unconstitutional. In 1932,
Nixon and the NAACP won a second Supreme Court decision invalidating the state's
attempt to bypass the 1927 decision. Nonetheless, the state then allowed the Democratic
Party to declare itself a "voluntary association" with the right to choose its membership
143 Donald Strong, "The Rise ofNegro Voting in Texas," American Political Science Review, 42
(June 1948), 511-12.
144 Ibid.
145 Marvin Dulaney, "The Progressive Voters League," Legacies III (Spring 1991), 27.
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and set qualifications for participation in its primary. From 1935 to 1944, blacks in
Dallas and in the State could vote in municipal, school board and general elections but
not in the primaries, which selected the candidates.
A state poll tax also prevented Blacks from voting. The Poll Tax passed in the
State Legislature in 1902. Each eligible voter was required to pay a poll tax of $1.75 at
the time he or she paid property taxes each year. Many blacks and poor whites chose not
to vote rather than pay the tax.146
Nevertheless, blacks were allowed to vote in spite of the poll tax. In many
instances, blacks used this law as a rallying point for black political activism in Dallas.
For example, The Dallas Express, the black newspaper with the largest circulation in the
city, ran advertisements encouraging blacks in Dallas to pay the poll taxes and to vote.
By 1928, less than a third of blacks in Dallas paid their poll taxes and voted. Moreover,
the editors of the Express examined the county poll tax lists and found that many black
pastors, doctors, lawyers and teachers did not pay their poll tax.147
In the 1930s, several black organizations began to work to change the voting
problem in Dallas. In 1933, the Dallas Negro Chamber of Commerce hired a Texarkana
native, A. Maceo Smith, as Executive Secretary of the Chamber, to develop economic
programs and political activities in the black community.148 In 1934, Smith and the
Negro Chamber of Commerce participated in Alpha Phi Alpha fraternity's annual
"Education for Citizenship" week to encourage service activities by blacks. During that
146 Donald Strong, "The Poll Tax: The Case of Texas," American Political Science Review, 38
(August 1944), 693-709.
147
Marvin Dulaney, "The Progressive Voters League," 28.
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week, Smith argued that voting was the duty and right of every good citizen. He also
stressed that blacks in Dallas could improve the services they received from the City if
they united and participated in the political process. Participants in this event went on to
form the Progressive Citizens League. The Progressive Citizens League, with the Negro
Chamber, organized the poll tax payment campaign among blacks in Dallas as well as the
unsuccessful lawsuit against the Democratic Party's white primary in Dallas County.149
The problems facing blacks in Dallas were many. Racial segregation forced them
to live in areas where streets were unpaved, law enforcement was lacking, housing was
overcrowded and inadequate, and city government neglected living standards. In
addition, the city refused to build a library for blacks. The worst situation, however, was
the segregated public school system. Dallas had only one black high school called
Booker T. Washington. It was overcrowded and the facilities were not accommodating.
Furthermore, the Great Depression exacerbated the problem.150
The campaign by blacks to use the political process to address these problems was
boosted in March of 1935 when Ammon S. Wells ran for the State Legislature. Wells, a
native of Dallas, stirred excitement in the city because of his ideas. Most blacks
supported Wells because they believed he could win with a split in the white vote.151
Some blacks opposed Wells candidacy because they feared racial violence in the city if
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state legislature shared these feelings. When Wells refused a request to withdraw, a
banker representing the Dallas Chamber of Commerce, pressured A. Maceo Smith by
promising to build a Negro exhibit at the 1936 Texas Centennial if Smith could convince
Wells to withdraw from the race. Smith refused. On the day of election, March 16, the
Ku Klux Klan circulated flyers to black neighborhoods threatening violence if Wells
won. Due to the threats, Wells finished sixth in the race.152
It was implied for Dallas' black leadership that if more blacks had paid their poll
tax, Wells would have won. The number of blacks turned out to vote, over 45,000, also
stunned them. The success and failure of Wells' campaign helped develop a big push for
a second poll tax payment campaign.153 The Dallas Interdenominational Minister's
Alliance (IMA), an organization of black ministers and pastors, joined with the
Progressive Citizens League and the Dallas Negro Chamber of Commerce to coordinate
the campaign. The IMA provided the funds to support the campaign, which took place in
May of 1935 immediately after the Wells' campaign. In addition, the IMA wanted to
make black voters a factor in Dallas politics. Reverend Maynard H. Jackson Sr., then
pastor ofNew Hope Baptist Church, served as spokesman for the IMA. Jackson argued
that blacks in Dallas lacked political clout and had been taken advantage of by the city's
white politicians. He also stated that the IMA campaign would not support any political
factions in the city, but would form a Christian coalition vote for political muscle. He
also noted that voters registered in the campaign would support only the politicians who
152 Ibid.
153 Dallas Express, March 23, 1935.
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supported the objectives of blacks in community activities, parks, school facilities,
employment, police protection, sanitation, and street improvements.154
The second poll tax campaign officially began in October of 1935. A. Maceo
Smith recruited volunteers to visit homes in the black community to pass out literature
and to persuade blacks to pay their poll tax.155 The campaign also organized black social
and fraternal organizations in support of their efforts to pay poll taxes for those people
who could not afford to pay their own. Smith, Jackson and others volunteered to work
with the poll tax campaign; they gave speeches at meetings and churches for support.
Under their leadership, the campaign featured methods such as essay contests on
citizenship, black schools, a mock trial which tried a citizen for failing to pay his poll tax,
and nine mass rallies at churches to discuss issues related to the paying of the poll taxes.
Despite these efforts, the campaign was short of its goal of getting 10,000 blacks in
Dallas to pay their poll taxes. They achieved about halfthat number.156
The group then turned to the federal government for help. Both Jackson and
Smith made trips to Washington in 1936.157 Jackson sought aid from the federal
government in obtaining jobs for blacks as postal workers in Dallas. After the Dallas
Chamber of Commerce refused to support an appropriation of $100,000 from the state
legislature for a Negro exhibit at the Texas Centennial, Smith traveled to Washington to
lobby for federal support. With the endorsement of Vice President John Nance Garner
154 Ibid., May 11,1935
155 Ibid., September 14,1935, November 23 and 30, 1935.
156 Ibid.
157 Marvin Dulaney, "The Progressive Voters League," 30.
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and other Capitol Hill politicians, Smith got $150,000 of the $3 million appropriated
by the federal government for the Centennial designated for a Negro exhibit. The
appropriation supported black participation in the Centennial celebration and the building
ofthe Hall ofNegro Life at Fair Park.158
According to Smith, three organizations emerged from the participation of the
black electorate in the Centennial: The Texas Conference of Branches of the NAACP,
the Texas State Negro Chamber of Commerce, and the Texas Negro Peace Officers
Association. On "Negro Achievement Day," October 19, 1936, blacks from all over the
State met in Dallas for black college activities and an opportunity to plan and coordinate
statewide efforts to fight segregation and to encourage participation in the political
process.159
In the fall of 1936, Jackson, Smith, and other black leaders reorganized the
Progressive Citizens League into the Progressive Voters League (PVL) to coordinate the
political activities ofblacks in Dallas. The new organization consisted of representatives
from all black groups in the city; they served as an advisory committee for the PVL's
voters' education and poll tax payment activities. A nine-member executive committee,
which included Jackson as president and Smith as vice-president, directed the PVL's
activities. Other members of the first executive committee were C. E. Smith, Attorney
Roger Q. Mason, A. A. Braswell, Mrs. George Moore, Mrs. Lovie Mae Jackson, Julius
McCowan, and Mrs. W. E. Shallowhorne. The last two members were elected at-large
158
Ibid., 31.
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from the advisory committee and reflected the PVL's attempt to represent as broad a
constituency as possible. While Jackson, Smith, and the executive committee chartered
the PVL's direction, the advisory committee did most of the work. Each advisory
committee member represented an organization, such as the Mooreland YMCA, the
Knights of Pythias, or a church fraternity, sorority, or women's social club. He or she
was responsible for ensuing that each member of the organization paid the poll tax in
order to vote. Some members of the PVL advisory committee did not represent a
particular organization but worked in private homes to register blacks who were not
members ofthe fifty-two organizations represented in the advisory committee.160
The first objective ofthe PVL was to carry out a third poll tax payment campaign.
The PVL worked to obtain poll tax payers for the April 1937 city council election. It
rallied a house-to-house campaign and asked various community leaders to speak to
citizens in support ofpaying the poll tax.161
The third poll tax campaign in Dallas was conducted from October 1936 to
January 1937. The black vote became one sixth of Dallas electorate power in the April
1937 city council election. Four civic associations in Dallas were competing for civic
council seats: the Forward Dallas Association, the All Dallas Association, the Dallas
Democratic Association, and the Utility Rates Reduction League. All recognized the
potential strength of the black vote in Dallas and sought their support. The PVL had
organized the black vote in Dallas into a block and advocated certain positions to endorse
160 Marvin Dulaney, "The Progressive Voters League," 31.
161 Dallas Express, October 31, 1936 and January 9, 1937.
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any candidate.162 For the first time in Dallas history, the white civic association that
controlled local politics had to bargain with the Dallas black electorate. The PVL
developed a five-point platform to present to two major civic organizations, the Citizens'
Charter Association and the Forward Dallas Association. The Dallas Express also
published the "Platforms ofthe Voters League," which included these five points:
1. A crime reduction campaign, which covers all phases oflaw and order
affecting life and property ofDallas Negroes.
2. Adequate parks and recreational places and facilities for the use and
enjoyment ofDallas Negroes.
3. Adequate proration of city work [i.e., a fair share of the city jobs for
blacks in Dallas].
4. Adequate school facilities.
5. City cooperation on the promotion of better housing and slum
clearance units in Negro districts.163
On the same day the PVL published its platform, the executive committee
announced its endorsement of the Forward Dallas Association. It did not endorse the
Citizens Charter Association because its platform did not address many of Dallas' needs
in the black Community. One promise that was made by the Forward Dallas Association
was "that when they present matters to the council they wili be met, not by deaf ears, but
by intelligent, earnest and sympathetic responses."164
In the April election, the Forward Dallas Association won five of nine city council
seats. Two of the contested seats were won in run-off elections. The PVL claimed
162 Strong, "The Rise of Voting," 519.
163 Marvin Dulaney, "The Progressive Voters League," 32.
164
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victory in this election because blacks had voted as a block for candidates. The
election return indicated that black votes had been especially helpful in the run-off
election. The Forward Dallas Association publicly acknowledged its debt to black voters
in Dallas.165
The Forward Dallas Association rewarded the PVL for its support by acting on
several of the PVL's platforms. During the summer of 1937 the city council planned for
a new black high school, Lincoln High School, which was completed in 1939. The city
also worked to develop the Wahoo Recreation Center for blacks in Dallas and increased
jobs for blacks by 300%. The city council also voted to employ a black as a police
officer in Dallas; however, no one was hired because of mass protest by white citizens.
Nevertheless, blacks had positive proof that they could use the political process to
improve the quality of life in their community.166
The 1937 election was a great victory for the PVL and set the standard for future
elections for the next thirty years. In every election, the PVL organized poll tax payment
campaigns. It interviewed candidates in local races and endorsed candidates in local,
state, and national races. The PVL was very serious in representing the interests of
Dallas' black community. For example, the PVL endorsed the Citizen Charter
Association in 1939 but riot in 1941 when the organization failed to investigate the
bombing ofblack homes in South Dallas.1
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Jackson and Smith left the grass roots organization to work on other projects.
In 1940, Dr. L.G. Pinkston, A.A. Braswell, Charles Brackins, and Nathan Chalmers were
the new leaders of the PVL. With the support ofMinnie Flanagan, a PVL board member,
they worked for more voter registration drives and educational activities.168
In 1944, the U. S. Supreme Court ruled in Smith v. Allwright that all-white
primaries were unconstitutional. The committee argued that blacks were being
discriminated against in Texas primaries. The court ruled in the plaintiffs favor. After
the Supreme Court's ruling, the PVL announced that it would remain nonpartisan and not
become part of the Democratic Party. Several PVL members and the NAACP disagreed
with this strategy. The split in the PVL took place at the state and local level. After
overcoming resistance of white Democrats in Dallas County, blacks in Dallas voted in
their first Democratic Party primary in 1946. Three blacks from the PVL, Dr. E. Homer
Browne, Reverend Stacy Adams, and Nathan C. Chalmers won Democratic Party
precinct chairs. This split was the first political break in the Dallas Black community.169
Because of the new elections, the PVL aligned itself with the Democratic Party
and changed its name to the Democratic Progressive Voters League (DPVL). Other
political organizations emerged to take the place of the DPVL, but those did not have a
strong impact. The 1950s and 1960s would bring in new leadership to work for black
concerns in Dallas, Texas.170 These concerns, however, now challenged the structure of
the election process in Dallas.
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The first court case that pushed for election equality in Dallas was the
Lipscomb v. Wise, which was decided in 1995. The plaintiff, Al Lipscomb, argued that
the city's at-large method of election of members of the city council diluted the black
citizens' vote. The election scheme presented by Dallas is a combination single-member
and at-large districts. It provides for eight elected from single-member districts and three
elected at-large, including the mayor. The eight council members elected from the eight
single-member districts must reside within the district they represent and are elected by a
majority vote of the residents of their district. The three at-large seats have no residency
requirements and are elected by a majority of all votes cast within the entire city. One of
the at-large council seats is designated as mayor.171
The plaintiff argued that voting dilution took place in the 1959, 1961, 1969, and
1991 city council elections. In each instance, the black candidate received over 50
percent of the vote in the black neighborhoods. In the at-large elections, however, the
black voice was consistently diluted because the whites always ended up with the most
votes.172
Because of these patterns, and the current law, the District Court ruled that the
citywide, at-large system of electing members to the Dallas City Council was
unconstitutional, because this system was intentionally adopted and maintained to dilute
the voting strength ofblacks.
173




The court further upheld the plaintiffs argument because Dallas had a history
of past discrimination in general (from 1907 to 1975) and because a "customary lesser
degree of access [was provided to blacks in] ... the process of slating candidates than
enjoyed by the white community."174
Similar to the Lipscomb case was the Williams v. City in 1988. The plaintiffs
were Roy Williams and Marvin Crenshaw. Several months later, in 1988, other
minorities intervened and joined as a party plaintiff. They were part of the Ledbetter
Neighborhood Association composed largely of Mexican-Americans. They brought suit
against the City alleging that the system for the election of members of the city council
members violated the Voting Rights Act.175
The issue concerned the 8-3 system for the election ofmembers ofthe Dallas City
Council (i.e., eight single-member districts and three at-large places). Under this system,
no Blacks have ever been elected to one of the at-large seats; only one Mexican
American has been elected at-large under the 8-3 system. The defendants, Mayor
Annette Strauss and several council members, argued that the best person is being chosen
to fill the at-large seats. Further, they argued that minorities could raise enough money to
run effectively for an at-large seat.176
On March 28, 1990 the District Court ruled in favor of the Plaintiffs. The court's
position was that the 8-3 system for electing city council members violated Section 2 of
174 Ibid.




the Voting Rights Act because it diluted the votes of politically cohesive blacks and
Hispanics in Dallas. Specifically:
Under the 8-3 system, African-Americans and Hispanics are
denied access to the 3 at-large seats because they cannot raise-from
their own communities-the enormous amount of money (at least
$150-200,000) that is required for an effective at-large, city-wide
campaign in Dallas; and
under the 8-3 system, blacks have been unfairly prohibited
from electing more than two single-member district council
members by the "packing of blacks into two districts with 75-87
percent concentration and 85-01 percent total minority population
(Districts 6 and 8) and by the "cracking" ofthe remaining African-
American population in Dallas between Districts 1 and 7, to
prevent the creation of a third black district.177
Conclusion
The political, housing, and social conditions for Black families in the City and in
Dallas, County, Texas have been slow to change. This fact has been documented by the
political history that has evolved in Dallas. There continues to be racism in the school
system such as Tasby v.Estes. It conveys that although education is important for the
vitality of the city, certain educational policies have been put in place to preclude
minorities from obtaining a quality education. For example, minority students were not
pushed to attend advanced placement classes. If this is going to change there must be
monitoring of the progress of students and the hiring of faculty. It is necessary to track
what works and what does not work in the ever-growing student population. Moreover,
obtaining a great education has a direct baring on a families living condition. Statisics
show that a great education leads to a great career and more of an opportunity to choose




the case. Although other factors also play role in providing assistance in housing, it is
no secret that to obtain and maintain housing education is required. The DHA has been
working on this point although progress had been slow. Chapter IV will further
illuminate the struggles ofblack families to obtain decent, affordable housing in Dallas
County, Texas.
CHAPTER IV
HISTORY OF HOUSING FOR BLACK FAMILIES
IN DALLAS, TEXAS: 1920-1985
The original charter for the City of Dallas was written in 1907 and it contained a
section entitled "Segregation of the Races." This section was repealed in 1968. Before
this section was repealed, however, the city council passed ordinances providing for the
use of district blocks for housing, for amusement, for churches, and for schools by whites
and blacks.178 Under the Segregation-of-the-Races section of the Charter (and in
accordance with its spirit),
The City Manager specified the areas of Dallas that were reserved for
whites, for Negroes and for Mexicans, and the city council passed a
number of racially motivated ordinances, including one that required
blacks to sit in the back ofthe city buses.
.The council tried to solve the Negro housing problem, and keep blacks
from moving into the white areas of Dallas by having the DHA construct
the massive, 3500 unit West Dallas Housing Project.
.Even as late as 1960 the Dallas Independent School District resistance
to desegregation was bolstered by a federal judge who wrote that most of
the whites and Negroes in the city do not favor integration ofthe schools
because this is in all probability, the most direct and surest route to
amalgamation of the races.179
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The Charter provision grew out of a long history of Dallas politics. During the 1920s,
businessmen consolidated their hold on the city's political and civic leadership by
communicating to the citizens that they were promoters of the city's welfare. Business
leaders reformed city government, which resulted the adoption of a council-manager
form of government with the council members elected at-large council. They also
maintained a permanent political organization, the Citizens Charter Association (CCA),
to guarantee that "the right type" ofmen would be elected to city government.180
Shortly after the governmental reform movement, the city's most influential bankers,
Robert L. Thornton and Nathan Adams, organized the city's leading businessmen into a
group called the "Yes or No Council," which became known as the Dallas Citizens
Council (DCC). The DCC was chartered in 1937. This organization united the city's
most powerful businessmen into a civic organization with the financial resources to get
things done. Rather than selfish competition, it emphasized cooperation for the good of
Dallas.181
Early Housing for Blacks
Before public housing became available to blacks in Dallas, blacks did not have
adequate housing in Dallas or in Dallas County, Texas. According to Alwyn Bar, in the
book Black Texans, many black families lived in small, dilapidated houses with no
180 Robert Fairbanks, "From Consensus to Controversy," Legacies 1, No. 2 (Fall 1989), 37.
181 Ibid.
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plumbing or screens on dirt roads or streets.182 The first black neighborhood in Dallas, at
the beginning of the 20th Century, was located at what is presently known as Elm Street
and Central Avenue. The population evolved to what is presently known as Deep Ellum.
Later, a large black community formed, starting at Thomas Avenue and incorporating
Hall Street, Boll, San Jacinto, Good Street, and Washington Avenue. This neighborhood
began in the 2700 block of Thomas Avenue and extended to the 2700 block of
Washington Avenue. The area also included Hall Street from Ross Avenue to State
Street.183 Often, more than one family crowded into dwelling units and shared the rent.
Although there were several blocks of black neighborhoods, less than 14 percent of
blacks owned homes in Dallas. This statistic remained consistent well into the 1930s.184
The largest black newspaper in Dallas was the Dallas Express founded in 1892.
In the 1930s, its founder, W.E. King, wrote about many issues concerning the black
community. One of these was the lack of low-cost federal housing for blacks. The city
had one federal housing project, Cedar Springs Place, completed in 1937 for 181
families. However, Cedar Springs Place was strictly for low-income white families.1
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Further public housing units were made possible in 1937 by the passage of the
U.S. Housing Act, which authorized the U.S. Department of Housing and Urban
Development to buy 90 percent of the bonds issued by a municipal authority for low-
income housing projects. As the Express pointed out, federal housing for Negroes would
represent "a symbol with far greater meaning than mere shelter. It would set up a new
direction in the thinking of such people who felt they were foredoomed to live in the
city's alleys in close proximity to the open toilets with which Dallas is generously
studded. Blacks were continually confronted by the ugliness and filth underlying the
city's supposed beauty.".186
In addition to the creation ofthe Housing Act of 1937, the city council created the
Dallas Housing Authority, which included four businessmen and a Jewish rabbi. The
Dallas Housing Authority worked on the public housing program from 1939 to 1942.
Led by Executive Director D. L. Stephenson, it erected more than 1,500 segregated units
for whites, blacks, and Mexican Americans. Construction of the largest units for blacks,
Roseland Homes, called attention to the city's most serious housing problem.187
The Role of the Press
In a 1938 municipal government housing survey, it was discovered that the
majority of black housing was found to be substandard. A Dallas Morning News article,
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stated: "The shortage of housing for Negroes in Dallas is acute and critical. Serious
tension has resulted. Many Negroes are living under conditions that threaten our entire
community's health and welfare."188 The survey estimated that the black population of
metropolitan Dallas had jumped from 50,000 to 80,000 in the last ten years. The extra
30,000 residents represented 8,000 new families who needed homes. The net increase of
Black dwellings since 1940 had been about 1,000. Thus, "... 7,000 Negro families are
doubled up or tripled up.... At least 4,000 additional dwellings are needed in the
immediate future to relieve the distress and tension".189
The article pointed out other problems that created a shortage of black housing.
The first problem was the limited, incomes of black families, which made both rent and
mortgages unaffordable. Second, building sites were limited which meant that there were
only a few places where blacks could live at that time. The City was faced with the
critical question ofhow housing would be provided for Blacks in Dallas when there were
only a few places where blacks could live.190
Because the housing opportunities were limited, blacks were left with four
options:
1. Continue to live doubled up.





2. Build or rent a substandard shack. (Much of this is being done at the
great discredit of the city). In Negro slum areas, fifty people lived in
nine shacks less than three feet apart. They all used an outdoor
hydrant for drinking, bathing and laundry water.
3. Live in standard dwelling units that were provided by private builders
with or without government aid for rent or purchase for $25 to $30
monthly.
4. Live in public housing. Dallas had 900 units and had a waiting list of
7,000 black families.191
The report also implied that there were two factors necessary to cure the black
housing problem. First, all housing should be built within the corporate limits of the city
or in areas where government regulation could ensure that new slums would not crop up.
In conjunction, housing residents must have access to police, fire and health protection,
zoning laws, transportation, schools, recreation, and shopping facilities. Second, a
satisfactory solution could be found only in racial segregation. This should prevail so
long as segregation does not mean discrimination.192
Not only was a black newspaper publishing articles about the plight of blacks in
housing, so was The Dallas Morning News. Alonzo Wasson wrote about the issue in
various editorials. One was entitled "Removing City Slums."193 In it he wrote that to
maintain a beautiful city it is necessary to tear down slum areas. Furthermore, he said:
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who contribute to welfare agencies. Slums breed diseases, increase
mortality rates and place a heavy burden on public health agencies.
They are firetraps that run up the cost ofprotection against conflagrations.
They breed vice and crime adding much to the cost ofpolice services.
They place an additional load on taxpayers by the chronic tax
delinquency ofmuch slum property."1 4
Wasson wrote another editorial entitled "High Cost of Slums".195 In this editorial
he pointed out that slum dwellings and apartments may be inexpensive to those who
occupy them, but they are expensive to the city. These slum areas have a high rate oftax
delinquency, which implies the city was not receiving the taxes for which it is entitled. In
addition, slum areas, according to Wasson, impair the tax values of neighboring property.
Moreover, they drained the city treasury because of the cost of police, fire, and health
protection.196
Racial Tensions and Housing
Nonetheless, racial problems continued to grow in spite of efforts to advance
housing for black families. The black community's success in getting the new Lincoln
High School built was marred by new tensions arising in the transitional neighborhood
where the school had been built.197 Many whites felt threatened by the school's location
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violence arose as Lincoln High School opened in January 1939. On the first day of
school the doors remained closed because of a temporary injunction. By noon, however,
the injunction was lifted and classes began.
The DHA decision to build a Slum Clearing Project in a black North Dallas
neighborhood to ease racial tensions met resistance from lacks concerned with the fate of
those who would be displaced by the project. There were few vacancies for blacks
throughout the city. In a series of meetings beginning on June 19, 1939, those concerned
gathered at the Munger Avenue Baptist Church and denounced the government's
decision to undertake slum clearance in their neighborhood. They argued that rather than
being a slum Hall-Thomas was "the most highly cultivated, progressive and sanitary
Negro community in Dallas."198 At one gathering there were seventy-five black property
owners who vowed not to sell and ended their meeting by singing "I Shall Not Be
Moved." The DHA recognized the severity of the re-housing problem. At one DHA
meeting officials even recommended re-housing the black families in tents.199
In spite of having acknowledged the problem, the DHA never devised or
implemented a plan to re-house the people who had been dislocated. As a result, a few
black families purchased homes in South Dallas in an already established black
neighborhood. When they tried to move in September of 1940, they were met with an
198 Robert Fairbanks, For the City as a Whole: Planning, Politics and Public Interest in Dallas,
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angry mob of neighborhood whites, including many rock-throwing housewives. This
event precipitated more than eleven months of violence in the South Dallas
neighborhood.200
Racial tension continued. The black population in Dallas and other southern
cities multiplied during the Depression ofthe 1930s. Blacks were forced to leave the rural
areas for employment in the city. In 1940, there were 61,605 blacks living in Dallas,
Texas. A 1940s study showed that 83.5 percent of black housing was tenant-occupied in
many substandard conditions.201 Even when blacks could afford to live in certain areas,
whites resisted their moving into their communities. A Dallas Housing Authority survey
in 1940 found 19,620 tenant families living in substandard housing in Dallas. Anglo
Americans occupied more than half of these (10,096); blacks occupied 8,350; and the
202
remaining few were occupied by Mexican Americans.
Escalating Resistance to Blacks
In the fall of 1939, white residents in South Dallas began meeting to plan ways to
stop black encroachment into their neighborhoods. Whites were concerned with black
children who were walking through white neighborhoods to school. In fact, the idea of





Many whites were agitated by the expansion of blacks into the South Dallas area
of Oakland Avenue, Pine Street and Eugene Street near the Oakland Cemetery. Some
whites proposed building an eight-foot concrete or brick wall to mark the border between
black and white neighborhoods.203
The tension lingered. A series of bombings, mysterious fires, and the throwing of
stones and bricks rocked the area in late 1940 and 1941. In an effort to force a black
funeral home on Oakland Avenue to move, a mob of whites threw stones and broke
electric signs. Several months later, the city council purchased the property to ease the
situation. One witness stated that white citizens considered purchasing black-occupied
residences to keep the community white.204
In 1940, dynamite shattered the front porch and front windows of a vacant house
in the 2600 block of Hatcher that stood between two houses occupied by black families.
Three months later another home was bombed. No one was injured. Police assigned
extra detectives to patrol the neighborhood. The mayor indicated the race relation issue
would be high on his priority list in the coming year of 1941.205
South Dallas was not the only area with racial turmoil about integrated housing.
In September 1940, blacks moved into two adjoining houses in an all white neighborhood





them said to be housewives—surrounded the house and bombarded it with stones. Blacks
who drove by in automobiles were stoned. Other blacks witnessed the scene. This made
blacks apprehensive about going into the existing neighborhood. In addition, the police
did not make any arrest. In fact, the only thing they did was to make whites disperse after
midnight.206
Because of the overflow of black families into white areas, and other political
pressures, Roseland Homes was built in 1942. It was low-cost housing for 650 black
families (see Figures 1 through 4). To be eligible to live there, the head of household had
to have a job and be ofgood character.
The Means Family Experience
One ofthe first black families to move into Roseland Homes was Wilfred Means,
Sr. and Ruby Lee Means (formerly Ms. Ruby Lee Carter). Mrs. Means came to Dallas as
Ruby Lee Carter from Kirvin, Texas, which is located one hour southeast ofDallas. She
moved in with her two sisters who lived in the servants' quarters of Mr. and Mrs. Paul
Stone, Sr. on Oak Lawn in North Dallas. Mrs. Means indicated that the accommodations
were livable for a couple of years but she knew it would not be suitable for an extended
period oftime; there was no kitchen, and transportation was hard to obtain.
Ruby Lee began the 9th grade at Booker T. Washington High School and
graduated in 1938. The following year, she entered C.J. Walker Beauty College in North
206 Ibid.
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Dallas and graduated in 1939. As a way of supporting herself, while attending the beauty
college, Ruby Lee kept children. After graduation, she worked at Flora-Mays Beauty
Salon located at 2300 Thomas Avenue in North Dallas. In 1941, Ruby Lee Carter
married Wilfred Means, Sr. ofMexia Texas. It was not long before World War II began.
In 1942, after the bombing of Pearl Harbor and America's entry into World War
II, Wilfred Means did what many black males did during that time—he joined the military
and went off to war. While the war was going on, Mrs. Means moved the family (herself
and two children) to Roseland Homes. This move was made in order that the family
would be able to save money to purchase a home and for their children to attend
college.208
Although the plan worked, the marriage ended in separation in 1946. Both
parents worked together, however, to see that their children received a good education
and had a decent place to live. Always resourceful, Mrs. Means, by 1943, had saved
enough money to purchase a beauty shop, which was named Skyway Beauty Salon. The
shop was located on Warren and Oakland. Not only did she prosper in business, but also





The Barton Family Experience
Ruby Lee's experience is a textbook example of how a black family could grow
and prosper in Dallas. In 1943, as Mrs. Means, she and her family moved to Roseland
Homes a public housing unit so they could save money and plan to buy a home.210 They
raised their two children in Roseland Homes along with other black families. Although
the family began in public housing, this experience motivated her to start and maintain a
successful business as one of Dallas' earliest black business owners. More importantly,
the opportunity gave the family a chance to obtain a home and raise children who would
exceed all expectations to become pillars in the Dallas community.
Mrs. Means (who remarried in 1954 and become Mrs. Barton) recalls: "It was
tough, but I knew what I was doing was right." Now 90 years of age, Mrs. Barton points
out that their stay in Roseland Homes units was not going to be permanent. She believed
that buying a house would help her family grow and help them save money for their
children to attend college.211
In 1951, before becoming Mrs. Barton, the Means family purchased a home at
6730 McTeir. This area was known as the Elm Thicket area. To the community at large,
it was known as the Love Field area. Mrs. Barton recalled that many black families




purchase this land to build an airport. In the course of events, Mr. and Mrs. Barton were
able to purchase a home at 1806 Driskell in South Dallas.212
The growth of black neighborhoods, with no place to go, continued to be a
problem in Dallas, Texas. Half a dozen homes occupied by blacks were dynamited or
firebombed in a matter ofmonths in the early 1950s.213
Expanding the Housing Supply for Blacks During the War Years
Although World War n began in 1939, the black housing crisis continued during
the coming years. There was still opposition to building black housing in many areas
throughout Dallas.214 Housing developers were reluctant to build because of these
potentially violent oppositions. The director of the Dallas district of the Federal Housing
Administration (FHA) actively discouraged most large projects for several years.
The Chamber of Commerce did not concern itself with the black housing crisis.
A crisis was defined when the homes of the black residents of South Dallas were
bombed.215
By the end of 1941, the DHA began construction on three public housing projects.
It developed a new project for whites in East Dallas. The new housing development
housed 250 families. The DHA also expanded Cedar Springs by adding 220 units to the
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181 already erected. Finally, the DHA built a 200-unit project for Blacks in East
Dallas.216 Between 1941 and 1945, the DHA constructed 1,569 public housing units in
Dallas. Of those, 900 units were for blacks and 102 for Mexican Americans. Despite
these achievements, the civic leaders' recruitment of the war industry and the military
housing needs intensified the city's housing crisis. When the Housing Authority
completed the Cedar Springs Place addition in November 1942, military personnel
associated with the Eighth Service Command, rather than low-income residents, became
its first occupants. The DHA also turned Washington Place Homes over to the military
after completion. As a result, the DHA reported in 1945 that families of servicemen
occupied 30 percent of its dwellings.217
Dallas Mayor David Rodgers thought the housing crisis for blacks was critical.
During the same time, The Dallas Morning News ran a twelve-part series on the city's
slum problem written by reporter Allen Quinn.218 After documenting the city's problem
of black housing, Quinn went on to emphasize its negative impact on the city. Citing
both the bad health and economic impact slums had on the city, he concluded: "There can
be no excuse for Dallas keeping the slums which are a cancerous growth upon the city's
health."219 Quinn blamed the greed of white landlords, the economic conditions of






blacks, and the lack of adequate housing codes and zoning laws for creating slums. And,
because of segregation, he concluded, "virtually every Dallas Negro, no matter what his
economic or intellectual status, lives under slum conditions or in slum surroundings. It
isn't from choice; he has no where else to go." 220 Although Quinn wanted more private
building of black housing, he recognized that public housing was necessary. Mayor
Rodgers echoed this point, and several years later, a joint Congressional Committee came
to Dallas and confirmed that blacks in Dallas lived in overcrowded and appalling living
conditions.221
Early Efforts to Address the Housing Shortage
Dallas sought a prestigious planner, Harland Bartholomew, to help solve the black
housing crisis. Beginning in 1943, he issued a stream of reports called "Your Dallas of
Tomorrow."222 Bartholomew did not suggest black expansion into white neighborhoods.
Instead, he surmised that the black population would grow. He suggested that many city
leaders would agree to support corporations with construction of mostly single-family,
low-cost housing in non-white areas. He proposed four locations that were not close to
any white neighborhoods. Two of these locations were in West Dallas; another was near
the city's airport, Love Field; and a fourth was in South Dallas.
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With the development of these areas, many people requested the building of
levees to protect against water overflow. Bartholomew also suggested that there were
some black families already living in the areas.224
By 1945, when Bartholomew was issuing the cost of his planning reports, black
leaders and housing contractors formed an alliance to suburbanize black housing. They
worked to pursue planned developments. Circumstances limited their plan, however.
The idea was not connected to the elites and it did not have political power or adequate
financial resources to purchase land.
Attempts to find building sites started in 1945 and continued into 1950. Leading
contributors in these efforts were A. Maceo Smith, a leader in the black community, and
the local race relations advisor of the FHA, and John W. Rice, the Secretary-Manager of
the Dallas Negro Chamber ofCommerce and chairman of its housing committee.
Although leaders like A. Maceo Smith, real estate agents, and builders were able
to build some housing for blacks, it was not nearly what Dallas blacks needed. Fewer
than 1,000 new dwellings for blacks were built, although the black population increased
by 30,000 between 1940 and 1950. Whites diverted efforts by private developers to build
large projects for blacks on the city's outskirts.225 For instance, builder Hub Hill's plan
to erect a 2,000-unit housing development just south of the Dallas city limits, near
224
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Cockrell Hill and Arcadia, ignited protest from the two suburban communities as well as
nearby Oak Cliff. White homeowners claimed the location of an all black subdivision
near their neighborhoods would lower real estate values. Moreover, they alleged that
such a development exploited blacks by locating them so far away from employment
opportunities.226 Because of pressure from inside and outside the city, the city council
refused to provide water for the development and therefore blocked additional black
housing. Other actions continued in this vein for five other large-scale black
developments. Not only did little new black housing appear, but also completed public
works projects, such as the construction of Central Expressway and the expansion of
Love Field, further prevented the building of black housing in Dallas.227
Coping With Limited Housing
Faced with limited housing opportunities, blacks responded in several ways.
Many doubled or tripled up with relatives, friends, or others, creating overcrowding.
Other black families moved into an incorporated tract, West Dallas, separated from the
city's downtown area by the Trinity River. Located on the flood plain that had been
remodeled by the levees, the housing site still had flooding due to drainage problems. It
Ana s
was estimated that over 9,000 blacks resided in this area of nine square miles. This





wells. Fewer than 10 percent ofWest Dallas dwellings contained indoor toilets in 1948,
and only 15 percent of the houses had running water. Problems with inadequate water
and sewage explained the area's disproportionably high number of typhoid, tuberculosis,
and polio cases. The area also became a notorious center of criminal activity.229
Enduring More Bombings—The Shelton Experience
More prosperous blacks attempted to find housing in South Dallas and bought
houses from whites eager to leave their neighborhoods. Some Dallas whites reacted as
they did in 1940 with bombings and arson to keep blacks from moving into then-
neighborhoods. On February 8, 1950, whites bombed Horace Bonner's home at 2515
Southland Street but no one was hurt.230 During the next one and half years, bombers
attacked twelve black homes in a two-square mile neighborhood of South Dallas.
One ofthe earliest homes to be bombed in South Dallas was owned by Robert and
Marie Shelton. Mrs. Shelton moved from Madison County in Bryan, Texas, to Dallas in
1938. She came to Dallas for an education and to find work. Her original goal was to
study business at Booker T. Washington, Dallas' only black high school. The black
students who lived in the city went to school from 8:00 am. until 12:00 noon, and black
students from the country went from 12:00 noon until 4:00 p.m. Although Mrs. Shelton
originally intended to study business, she changed her educational plans because the




In spite of this setback, Mrs. Shelton worked and got her beautician license. She
and another licensed beautician, Mrs. Ruby Lee Barton, opened the Powder Puff Beauty
Salon in 1948. The shop was on the corner of Thomas Avenue and Hall Street. They
both explained that moving to South Dallas was hard. Mrs. Shelton said that at that time
blacks did not own homes. Instead, they lived in rented rooms, public housing, and the
servants' quarters of houses owned by whites. Mrs. Shelton explained that her situation
was not unique. She lived in a room at 5509 Gaston Avenue from 1944 until 1946. Then
she moved into a room at the Jackson House at Munger and Caddo from 1947 to 1949.
Next, she moved to 3411 Kimble Street in South Dallas in 1948 and 1949 before living at
the present day location.
Mrs. Shelton remembered that the process of buying their home on Pine Street
was a struggle. First, she and Robert had to negotiate aggressively with the mortgage
company to work out a deal so they could afford the house they bought on May 8, 1950.
Second, the neighbors did not want her to live next door to them. They offered her money
to move. She also endured racial slurs. Finally, there was her child. While they lived in
the neighborhood, she worked hard to protect her children from possible racial harm.232
The Sheltons turned off their lights early the first night of their stay. Their home
was bombed. Her husband's leg was hurt, but the rest ofthe family was not injured. The




Colored People (NAACP). They decided to post an armed guard at her home for the next
six months to protect the family. The police arrived and took a report, but the crime was
never solved. Furthermore, the NAACP accused the police ofbeing the ones to throw the
bomb into the house. The NAACP found out later that the whites met at a local church
right down the street from Mrs. Shelton.
Mrs. Shelton explained that even though Mills Grocery Store on Oakland Street
and other homes had been bombed, she was determined to remain in her neighborhood.
This was her home and she was not going to move even if it would cost her life. In her
words: "We are going to fight it out." She knew that her options were limited, for blacks
could only stay in servants' quarters or rented rooms.
Mrs. Shelton remembered that the bombings continued. At one place, however, a
homeowner shot back at the bombers; after that, the attacks declined. In addition, she
said, when the black community began to speculate about the police involvement, that is
when the bombings ceased.234
The City's Response to Bombings and to Housing Needs
The bombings made the Dallas' city leaders work to find answers to the black
housing crisis. The mayor, Wallace Savage, pushed for public housing to be built for




they did not materialize because of state politics.235 Furthermore, there was fierce
resistance against public housing by groups such as the Dallas Council for Free
Enterprise, established by local realtors and homebuilders, and this also stalled the
building of public housing. Chaired by D. A. Frank, the Council for Free Enterprise
lobbied against slum clearance and public housing, arguing it would provide "temptations
for great corruption and favoritism." Frank also claimed that he had not "found any place
in Dallas he would call a slum".
In 1948 a reporter and columnist for the Dallas Morning News, Lynn Landrum,
wrote about the housing needs for blacks. His article was written at the request of several
black civic leaders. Landrum blended a discussion of the white man's debt to
blacks with a denial that integration was a solution to minority housing. He wrote that
blacks inhabited grisly, segregated slums and grim segregated public housing in officially
desegregated northern cities. "A good, all-Negro [housing] addition, run as the Negroes
themselves want it run, is better than any other solution," Landrum wrote.
The lack leaders and various other black and white groups met in an effort to end
the housing crisis. In March 1948, John Rice said: "to help the crisis we need to look at
235 Robert Fairbanks, For the CityAs a Whole (Columbus, Ohio: Ohio State University Press,
1998), 192.
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The contractors came to the conference, although not exactly with the pure
motives that Smith might have wished. A concern for overcrowded blacks, for profit, for
the racial stability of existing neighborhoods, and fears of expanded public housing, all
motivated the contractors to plan sizable, well-grouped black neighborhoods.
Unfortunately, the announcement or discovery of almost every proposed black
subdivision created opposition. Whites based their persistence on the threat to land values
and future white development, the doubtful suitability of the land for residences, and
racial disharmony. The results were frustration for contractors, black expansion into
white areas, and a subdivision built in Hamilton Park.242
Proposed Black Subdivision in Mesquite. Texas
One solution in 1948 was to build a 6,000-unit black subdivision in an
incorporated territory ten miles southeast of downtown Dallas. The land was in
Mesquite, Texas. The plan proposed to establish a park, a shopping center, 5,000 houses
and 1,000 brick apartment units.
The plan drew immediate protest from surrounding whites. "A project with 6,000
units included would mean a Negro population of about 30,000 would suddenly be placed
right in the middle of a fast-growing area containing many first-class houses costing from
$7,000 to $10,000.00.243 Hal F. Buckner, president of Buckner Orphan Home, was a
242 William H. Wilson, "This Negro Housing Matter," Legacies 6, No. 2 (Fall, 1994), 31.
243 Dallas Times Herald, April 11,1948, Section 3.
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principal objector. In April a group composed of officials from the Mesquite Chamber of
Commerce, the Mesquite Lions Club, the Mesquite Women's Club, and the City of
Mesquite, all protested.
What began as a protest group soon became the East Dallas Chamber of
Commerce, a collection of fifty people representing nine incorporated or unincorporated
communities. The chamber prepared to raise funds and to employ an attorney to combat
the possible effects of blacks in the community, assuming black residents would have a
detrimental impact. These effects would include a decline in the existing property values,
inadequate services to the site, inexpensive houses that generate insufficient taxes to
support the necessary new schools, and a negative impact on new white residential
development.244
The building of these houses hinged on FHA's approval for construction on low-
cost mortgage loans. It would not succeed. The FHA district director, Ronald Shepherd,
asserted that a black housing development should be located as near as possible to
downtown and to industrial areas, and should have good transportation to residential
sections that would employ domestic help. Because the plan was ten miles from
downtown and because the white protesters had criticized the plan for its lack of adequate
transportation, the plan was rejected.245
The Cedar Creek Project
244 The DallasMorning News, April 13,1948, Section 2.
245 Ibid., April 15,1948, Sec. 2,1.
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In July, two other builders, Torn Lively and Ira Rupley, proposed a project of247
houses on a 61-acre site in the Cedar Creek area. The land was four miles from
downtown. Bus transportation and utilities were available as well as a black shopping
area, and several black churches. However, one major problem about this area was
inadequate drainage. Opposition by the FHA had already been discussed. It was not
FHA's policy to approve African-American housing projects in the face of significant
• • 246
opposition.
Cedar Creek whites had already circulated a petition against building the houses
there. They organized the Cedar Crest-Skyline Improvement League. The organization's
formal objective was to oppose by all legal and reasonable means any attempt to impose
conditions on personal and property rights. In fact, the organizers once exclaimed: "We
are not going to lie down and let them put a Negro settlement five blocks from our
doorstep. No nice section of Dallas would stand for it and we won't either." The
Improvement League appointed an executive committee to present a petition of 614
signatures to the city council against the construction ofthe houses.
At first the builder, as did the previous builder, appeared determined to see the
project through. "There is no question we will go right ahead with our plans with no
hesitation at all. We are not disturbed about this chatter. We anticipated it. Whites would
be no closer to blacks than 200 feet." Within a few days the protestors presented their
246 Ibid, July 13, 1948, Section 2,1.
247 Ibid., July 16, 1948, Section 2., 20.
94
petition to the council and suggested an alternative site. The opposition gained
momentum. When the dust settled, the builder's plans were abandoned.
The John Stuart Plan
In August, another developer, John Stuart, accused the FHA of blocking his
proposed development for blacks. Stuart's plans were to build on two acres east west in
the Trinity area. The site would accommodate five hundred to eight hundred units at a
price of $5,000 to $6,000 and some rental duplexes. The U.S. Army Corps of Engineers
certified that the levee would protect the area from a flood "of considerably greater
magnitude than the greatest known flood." The housing committee of the Dallas Negro
Chamber of Commerce approved the project. It was west of Arlington Park, a
developing, but small, Black sub-division that had encountered no white opposition. The
location, five miles from downtown, was convenient to public transit transfer points and
to most sections ofthe city where blacks worked.248
The FHA would quell Stuart's plans. FHA officially stated that "from our
investigations ofthe site, we would not be able to approve it because ofthe possibility of
flood waters should the levee ever break."249 Contrary to their ruling on this site, the
FHA insured mortgages in other places that were behind the levee. New Orleans is an
example. Other places behind the levees were eligible for FHA insured mortgages. New
Orleans was the first city to build behind the levee. When the FHA Commissioner
248 Ibid., August 27,1948, Section 2,1.
249 Ibid.
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upheld the original ruling on Stuart's proposed project, Stuart promised an appeal. In his
words, "The need for adequate Negro housing is acute".250
The most controversial search for black homesteads was Joseph Martin's search
in 1948. Martin, a white, small-scale homebuilder, observed that in post-World War II
Dallas, "hordes of builders, large and small, were building homes for the white veterans
but none were interested in the Negro veteran."251 He searched for a location away from
white developments that would not oppose a black settlement. He and his associates
found and purchased a black-owned, eighty-seven acre farm outside the city limits, on the
northeast edge of White Rock Lake, about seven miles northeast of downtown. The
name was Bel Aire Estates. Four or five whites and some 50 to 60 Black families owned
the farms.252
Although Martin thought there would be little opposition to his idea, it was later
discovered there was a lot of opposition. A prominent white landowner obtained a State
district court injunction closing a county road giving access to Bel Aire Estates through
his property. The landowner strung a barbed-wire fence across the road. Beginning in
the summer of 1949, blacks had to find other ways to travel to and from their lots. Martin
sued to get the injunction lifted. In February 1950, he persuaded the district judge that the
250
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road was public property. The white landowner's attorney filed an appeal and the fence
remained in place.253
Martin turned to the city and the FHA for help with utilities and financing. The
city informed him that water lines and sewers could not be extended within two to three
years. Martin made a proposal to the FHA for a community water system and septic
tanks, but he found that the FHA requirements were unrealistic. He proceeded with his
idea anyway with 350 lots. Mr. Martin also put his idea in the newspaper to gain
attention. In January of 1949, his company offered a Lincoln Continental convertible to
the buyer who wrote the best completion of the phrase "I bought a lot in Bel Aire Estates
because ...". The same advertisement announced a sale of lots regularly priced at $2,000
for $900 each. Martins' plans included a country club, a swimming pool, and a shopping
center. By April 1950, he had sold 225 lots.
In spite of all the accomplishments that had been made by Martin and his
associates, the problems for the development ofthe black community were apparent. The
lack of available and affordable financing limited actual construction to fourteen houses.
Moreover, the absence of lot sales, the lack of support from key black leaders in the
community, and the fact that the area was undeveloped did not help Martin. Martin
argued "sitting back and bringing down objection and criticism have little weight in the




while your government bureau [chiefs] spins around in swivel chairs to seek Utopia for
them."254
By April 1950, Martin and his co-developers were badly overextended. The Bel
Aire Estates was on the brink of bankruptcy. In May, unnamed developers, builders, and
landowners intervened and helped Martin uproot the black settlement. They bought him
out and refunded investments of lot purchases and house owners. At the same time, they
announced that Bel Aire should be changed to a white neighborhood to conform to the
general neighborhood north ofWhite Rock Lake.255
Because of pressure from the Free Enterprise Council and the Dallas Home
Builders Association, the city postponed actions on public housing and gave builders
ninety days to propose private solutions to the black housing crisis. One proposal was to
allow blacks to encumber South Dallas.256 However, many whites fought this idea
vigorously. Roland Pelt, builder and councilman, proposed building a Negro City on
vacant land in the Trinity River bottom in Northwest Dallas.257 He argued that the city,
or Dallas businessmen, could buy land and then resell it to private builders for
development following a city approval plan. This would be a logical place to build
254 William H Wilson, Hamilton Park: A PlannedBlack Community in Dallas, 20.
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35,000 to 40,000 homes for blacks, according to Councilman Pelt. It would also include
a business district, churches, shopping centers, a university, and public schools.258
Black leaders did not agree with the proposal because it was at the bottom of the
river and because of its proximity to businesses. John W. Carpenter, president of the
Dallas Chamber of Commerce, agreed with black leaders, indicating that the area would
only be useful for residential development.259
There was a move and formulation by the Dallas Chamber of Commerce and
Dallas Citizens Council of Negro Housing in Dallas County to study the housing crisis.
The two goals were to emphasize that all housing solutions should take place within the
city limits of Dallas and to support segregation of the two races as long as there was no
discrimination.260 The committee considered many arenas in which to combat the black
housing crisis. In addition to welfare, a serious health issue needed to be considered.
First, the committee proposed to annex West Dallas. Next, the committee wanted
to locate good housing sites for blacks that were able to afford better housing. Further, it
recommended that DHA build 1,000 units for Blacks in twelve months and 1500 units in
eighteen months. It also recommended that the city officials cooperate with the DHA in
an urban re-development program. In addition, it suggested the creation ofan Inter-Racial
Committee of not less than fifteen citizens to study the bombings in South Dallas.
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Finally, the Committee asked that all citizens assume individual responsibility in meeting
the black housing shortage in a spirit of Christian helpfulness.261
In October of 1950, the Dallas Citizen's Council and the Dallas Chamber of
Commerce worked to build more public housing. They acted out of concern for the
negative impact that the lack housing shortage would have upon the city. While they
were not enthusiastic, they believed building public housing would decrease crime,
sicknesses and racial tension.262
The Annexation ofWest Dallas
With the support of the city's business elite and the Citizens Charter Association
(CCA), the DHA built a 1,500-unit project for whites, 1,500 units for lacks and, 500 units
for Mexican Americans. The city annexed West Dallas to accomplish this goal. The
West Dallas housing did not stop the growing slums in Dallas.263 The same year builders
finished these public housing units; Congress passed the Housing Act of 1954, which
established the Urban Renewal Program. The federal government's Urban Renewal
Program provided funds to cities so that local redevelopment agencies could clear slums
and sell the land, below cost, for private and public development. The Housing Act also
included a new mortgage insurance program that encouraged the rehabilitation ofexisting
261 Dallas Morning News, May 28,1950.
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dwellings in designated urban areas. At first, Dallas was not able to participate in slum
clearance because the state had not passed appropriate legislation; but the emphasis on
rehabilitation provided an alternative way for Dallas to clean up its slums.264
In anticipation of the new law, the city established a seven-member Citizens
Housing Rehabilitation Committee. Under the leadership of Alexander Bal, a city
planning official, the committee selected the Little Mexico area, sixty acres north of
downtown, to pilot the city's rehabilitation program. With the assistance ofFHA backed
modernization loans, the city's rehabilitation program helped clean up some of Dallas'
worst areas.265
Despite this success, Dallas continued to suffer from inadequate low-income
housing and slum conditions. As a result, when the state passed an urban renewal
program in 1957, civic leaders turned their attention to West Dallas. As it had done
seven years earlier, the Dallas Citizens Council (DCC) initiated action by appointing a
committee to investigate West Dallas. On the basis of that survey, which found the
conditions replicated those ofwartime concentration camps, the committee recommended
that the city undertake massive slum clearance of a selected area in West Dallas.
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The DCC report led to the creation ofthe Citizens Committee for Urban Renewal.
Composed of bankers and businessmen, the committee helped convince the city council
to secure grants from the federal government to conduct a feasibility survey for urban
renewal in West Dallas. Until this time, it appeared that the city's leaders would turn to
urban renewal because the city's welfare depended on it. The general public seemed
supportive of urban renewal. A 1958 Dallas Morning News poll found 59 percent
favored renewal for the city. Despite such support, no urban renewal occurred in Dallas.
Factors preventing it include changes in city politics and the new priorities of the city's
business leadership.267
City politics in the 1930s, 1940s and early 1950s had been non-partisan and
dominated by the city's business elite. The Citizens Charter Association claimed to work
for the city as a whole. It had the support of middle upper-class voters, the city's blacks,
and the AFL laborers. By the late 1950s, the CCA coalition began to lose its support.
Neighborhood groups such as the North Dallas-Walnut Hill Improvement League started
to play an important role in local politics by emphasizing only group needs.268
The Emergence of New Politics and Its Impact on Housing
The development of the Republican Party for Dallas had a major influence on the
political climate in the city in the 1950s. Republican Bruce Alger's surprise election to
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Congress in 1954 is an excellent example of change taking place in Dallas. Alger, a
realtor and former president of the White Rock Chamber of Commerce, drew support
from North Dallas because ofhis strong opposition to federal interference in local affairs.
Although city elections officially remained non-partisan, a growing partisanship entered
municipal politics as never before. This type of politics was new to the area and
disrupted the Dallas Citizens Council's work on social issues ofthe city.
One of the first results of this new politics surfaced when Bruce Alger attacked
the federal urban renewal programs in April of 1958. He argued it was better to see local
money finance any renewal schemes. In response to this new idea, the Citizens
Committee for Urban Renewal asked the city council to postpone its plans for a public
referendum on urban renewal until after the congressional vote of 1958.270 The issue of
urban renewal entered the 1959 municipal campaign. When Earl Cabell, dairy
storeowner, challenged Mayor Robert Thornton for office, he questioned the Citizens
Charter Association endorsement of urban renewal and promised to work against its
implementation. Cabell called the urban renewal progress "the most socialistic measure
to ever be pressed on the citizens ofDallas."271
By the 1950s there appeared to be a new mood in Dallas emphasizing citizen
participation in local government rather than merely elite guidance. A growing climate
269 DallasMorning News, April 13,1958.
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also surfaced: that the city's leaders were more interested in improving the downtown
areas than working for Dallas as a whole. Some citizens suspected that the movement to
improve West Dallas was a ploy to get local approval for programs that ultimately would
benefit downtown.272
While Thornton squeaked to victory, Cabell's supporters got their way with
regard to urban renewal. The mayor was unable to unite the Dallas Citizens Council for
Urban Renewal. He opted for a revitalization program for West Dallas: it would use
FHA monies but avoid the federal government's slum clearance program. No
referendum was ever held in Dallas over the Slum Clearance Component of Urban
Renewal.273 The likelihood of additional federal help appeared to decrease even more
after the election in 1961 of Earle Cabell as Mayor. Cabell was an outspoken critic of
urban renewal and an opponent, generally, of federal government involvement in any
local affairs. Cabell had a commitment to improve West Dallas, however, and was
impatient with the slow pace of rehabilitation documented by new studies of that area.
The city's newspapers also publicized the state of West Dallas housing conditions.
Eventually, Mayor Cabell offered his support to urban renewal.274
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The Push for Public Housing Rather Than Urban Renewal
The mayor had opposed urban renewal because it used eminent domain to use of
privately owned land for public purpose. Rather than embrace urban renewal, Cabell
turned to public housing for help. He worked to implement a program for West Dallas.
The program called for an additional 3,000 public housing units on vacant land in the
city. Those units would allow enforcement of housing codes in West Dallas without
hurting the tenants who lived in the substandard dwellings. Moreover, West Dallas
homes meeting the minimum codes would be spared the bulldozers, something that
would not have occurred under slum clearance.275
The mayor's proposal created a stir and won support from both the Dallas
Morning News and the Dallas Times Herald. However, other groups, like the Dallas
Real Estate Board, were opposed to the idea. In June of 1961, realtor Lyn Davis called
for a public referendum on public housing.276
Cabell did not sit idle as opposition grew. He lobbied the city's businessmen and
the Dallas Citizens Council for support. Because ofthe divided views ofDemocratic and
Republican ideologies, however, the Dallas Citizens Council refused to endorse the
mayor's plan.277
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As the November referendum neared, Congressman Bruce Alger intervened in the
local debate. He called for the defeat of the referendum. He also called for the
liquidation of West Dallas public housing. The combination of Alger's words, the
indecisiveness of the city's businessmen, and the frightening prospect of future building
of public housing resulted in a defeat of the public housing referendum with a 41,269 to
26,272 vote on November 7, 1962.278
DHA's Freedom ofChoice Plan
Because the city was less supportive ofdevelopment ofpublic housing, the Dallas
Housing Authority worked to aid black families in the area of housing. The DHA
accomplished this by assigning families in public housing by race despite the passage of
the Title VI ofthe 1964 Civil Rights Act, 42 U.S.C.§ 2000.279
After delay and resistance, aided by City Attorney Alex Biekley, the DHA
adopted the "Freedom ofChoice" desegregation plan that was approved by Dallas' mayor
and other local officials. Although this plan was in place, white units remained 100
percent white and minority units remained 100 percent minority.
In 1967, HUD rejected the use of "Freedom of Choice" plans by the DHA
because it perpetuated racial segregation in low-income housing. HUD required all
housing authorities to adopt a first-come, first-serve tenant selection policy and used a
278 DallasMorning News, November 7,1962.




community-wide waiting list for all projects administered by the authority. The DHA
rejected the plan. HUD responded by threatening to sue DHA and to withhold federal
funds from both DHA and the City. As a result, the DHA stopped the "Freedom of
Choice" plan.281
In 1969, the DHA sought to continue the "Freedom of Choice" plan. The DHA
board prepared a resolution to HUD asking for a waiver to continue its plan. HUD did
not respond. Nevertheless, the DHA continued with its plan.282
In February 1970, the federal government notified DHA that its refusal to change
tenant assignment plans was in violation of Title VI of the 1964 Civil Rights Act, 42
U.S.C. § 2000 d. As a result, HUD stopped funding to all DHA projects that had been
approved. From 1969 to 1974, the DHA forfeited more than $31 million because the
DHA board refused to end racial segregation in public housing in Dallas. This included
the:
(i) allocation of money for several hundred units of new
public housing for Dallas;
(ii) cancellation of HUD's approval for the funding of Cliff
Manor, a low-income project for the elderly;
(iii) loss of all modernization funds for over four years and
the deferral of any modernization funds for West Dallas




HUD specifically asked the City for assistance in getting DHA to stop its
violation of Title VI; it also asked the city to adopt tenant assignment policies that would
help desegregate public housing in Dallas. The city council did nothing. This conduct by
DHA and the City hurt the West Dallas area from 1969 through 1974. It was discussed in
this manner:
Until 1969 the Dallas Housing Authority maintained its properties
in a reasonable manner and kept the financial reserves high.
During this period DHA accepted no federal money for
modernization and much equipment and structural components
(roofs, doors, windows, etc.) were near the end of their economic
life and would soon need replacement. From 1969 to 1974 DHA
did not participate in federal modernization programs. Faced with
declining real income, the DHA management attempted to
preserve financial soundness at the expense of physical
maintenance. The physical condition of DHA properties
deteriorated rapidly and most projects have never been returned to
the condition they were in before.. ,284
A Change in Policy at DHA but Little Desegregation
The mayor appointed a new DHA Board of Directors. In addition, William
Darnall became Acting Executive Director for DHA. An assistant city attorney was also
retained to represent DHA. With the new team, the DHA changed its policy on tenant
selection and assignment plans to end discrimination. HUD acknowledged this plan.
283 Ibid.
284 Report ofthe Task Force on Public Housing (Dallas, Texas: January 1983), 22-23.
108
However, by DHA's own admission, this new plan really did nothing to offer black
residents ofDHA projects an opportunity to move into desegregated housing.285
In 1975, the DHA began to operate the Section 8 program to provide rent
assistance to tenants seeking low-income housing. While DHA helped a few families
obtain Section 8 assistance, the record shows that still many families did not receive
Section 8 assistance. This was because the suburbs did not want Section 8 housing in
their areas.286
In February 1980, HUD advised DHA to adopt a new tenant assignment and
selection plan that would comply with Title VI of the Civil Rights Act. Specifically,
DHA was notified that:
(i) Title VI requires DHA to remedy the situation under
which white tenants find other public housing while
black families must rely on DHA for housing
assistance.
(ii) DHA's Section 8 program should be used to increase
housing opportunities for current DHA minority
tenants, so non-minority applicants could be placed in
the resulting project vacancies, thus reducing the
segregated nature of DHA's entire program.287
The DHA's response to HUD's demand was to adopt a new policy that required






apartment before they were eligible to apply for Section 8 assistance. The DHA also
adopted a revised tenant selection and assignment plan. However, it contained nothing
that would allow black DHA tenants to use the Section 8 program to move into non-
segregated housing. This plan received local but not national approval.
In 1980, the DHA was completing two Section 8 developments for the elderly:
Lakeland Manor and Forest Green Manor. The DHA used a special waiting list to place
residents in these developments. The new residents were all white. The DHA opened
another development, Oakland Apartments. It was located in a black neighborhood and
had 100 percent black residents.289
In 1982, the DHA was working to build public housing. A lawsuit was filed
which challenged the sale of Washington Place to Baylor University Medical Center.
The settlement of Walker v. U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development,
ordered DHA to build additional units with HUD funds in a similar location. When the
units were built, they were occupied with fewer black residents than previously stated.
Furthermore, units were built in a predominately white area with predominately black
residents. The name ofthis new development was Town Park.
There was substantial opposition to the location of Town Park in East Dallas.
First, many opponents disagreed because the unit was not built in a black area set by the




including stores and hospitals. They also argued that public transportation was not
available, and opposed it because they believed the selection of Town Park would not
further desegregation of public housing. Additionally, it was argued that public schools
and neighborhoods would be adversely affected. Lastly, it was argued that the DHA was
paying too much for Town Park. These very same arguments were raised again and
again with regards to other public housing proposed in non-minority areas.290
In 1983, the City Task Force on Public Housing found:
(i) at least 35 percent of the West Dallas units were so
deteriorated that they were uninhabitable; and
(ii) the underlying assumption for upgrading the West
Dallas projects is that simply rehabilitating the
housing units will not solve all of the problems. The
large concentration of units in the West Dallas area
has created poor security conditions and the overall
perception that West Dallas is not a desirable place to
live. The revitalization strategy must attempt to
reverse this perception through provision not only of
decent housing but also retail centers, security, and
jobs.291
In the same year, the DHA prepared a master plan for rehabilitating units in West
Dallas and for the revitalization of the surrounding community. The cost of the plan was
$58 million. However, DHA was able to get support from HUD, the city, and private
sources. HUD contended it would give only $18 million for this project and stipulated




"submit a workable plan that would restore both projects, and the surrounding
community, to viability."292
The mayor's task force recommended that the City use CDBG funds for
rehabilitation of the West Dallas units. The city council refused, contending it was not
worth the expense to the city.293
The Washington Place settlement in 1984 also did not help matters. Although it
provided for construction of more units in non-minority impacted areas, the requirements
were not met. The DHA selected new sites, but political and neighborhood forces made
construction impossible. Two months before the site selection deadline, the DHA asked
HUD to approve placement of units in its existing Cedar Springs project. HUD gave its
approval, but it violated the lawsuit settlement because it was a minority area. The DHA
asked the City to amend its CDBG housing assistance plan to help construct units at
Cedar Springs. The city complied with this request. However, HUD rejected this as well
as the city's attempted modification of its housing assistance plan because Cedar Springs
"is lower-income and contains a high proportion of assisted housing units-and therefore
was not a location acceptable for construction ofthe new units."294
The DHA sought help from the city in locating units in non-impacted areas.






intent of the city's initial grant. The DHA managed to purchase scattered locations for
construction of units. There was opposition to these sites by neighborhood groups and
politicians.
DHA Executive Director Jack Herrington summarized the conditions of West
Dallas in late 1986 at a congressional sub-committee hearing, just before the consent
decree in the Walker v. HUD case:
In the three West Dallas housing projects-George Loving Place, Edgar
Ward Place and Elmer Scott Place-there is an urgent need to reverse 30
years of wear, deterioration, vandalism, poor maintenance and inadequate
funding. The overall housing conditions and 1,200 vacant, uninhabitable
units have a negative impact on surrounding neighborhoods, business,
industry and the city as a whole. More than 8,000 adults and children live
in a square mile area that has become, in many respects, a publicly owned
slum*5
Because ofthe conditions in West Dallas, including vacant housing, high crime,
and health risks due to lead contamination, people in need of housing there refused to
accept housing in West Dallas. One ofthe plaintiffs, Mary Dews, a counselor for the
Dallas Tenant Association testified. She stated:
... it was an awful experience. She talked about taking her own life if she
couldn't do better and she did not want to take her family to West Dallas.
She was just that firm about it. She hatedWest Dallas....
... [And] many of the tenants [at West Dallas] would come into the office
and ask for housing or want to relocate or want to transfer. And because of




begin to cry. They talk about things like seeing children raped and
syringes outside, the children going outside and picking up the syringes.
And they want a better lifestyle for their children and for themselves. It's
just-it's heart breaking, [they] just break into tears and start crying WE
WANT OUT!296
The City has played a significant role in the segregation in public housing in
Dallas, Texas. The Walker v. HUD case cites some examples:
.. .the City Manager selected the site for the DHA's first "Negro" housing
project;
.. .the mayor (and city council) requested the DHA to construct the 8,500-
unit West Dallas housing project as a solution to the "Negro Housing
Problem" of the 1950s, in order to keep Blacks from moving into white
areas ofthe city;
...because of the city council's opposition, the additional 3,000 units of
public housing available in 1962 were denied to those in need of the low-
income housing;
...because of the city support for (and the active participation of the city
Attorney in) tenant assignment and selection plans, the DHA was
permitted to forfeit over $31 million in federal funds from 1969 to 1974-
and this loss resulted in the rapid and irreversible deterioration of West
Dallas projects.
...the city blocked DHA's development of the units of needed public
housing that were available in 1978;
...the city did nothing to help the DHA locate sites for housing in non-
minority areas, nor did it help the DHA use § 8 programs to move Black
public housing families out of minority areas;
...the city supported the opposition to DHA's efforts to locate the Town
Park and Country Creek projects, and the Washington Place replacement
units, in non-impacted areas;
...the city has done very little to enforce "fair housing," or to increase the
housing opportunities for the poor outside of minority areas, despite its




.. .the city has made (or promised) grants of CDBG funds to DHA when
the particular project furthers segregation, but has refused CDBG grants to
DHA for efforts to correct its past policies of discrimination (for example:
funding for the mobility and relocation benefits under the Consent Decree
in this case); and
...the city simply continues to refuse to recognize that it has any
responsibility to help solve the monumental problems that are the legacy
of the city's mistake in having the West Dallas project built to keep at
least 3,500 Blacks out ofthe white areas ofDallas.
But if nothing else, this does demonstrate, as City Council member Lori Palmer
testified, that:
.. .this particular city has not been kind to poor people and to minorities. It
has not been kind in providing the adequate availability of housing for
families with children in particular. We are finding ... a major lack of
low-income housing in our city and we do not yet find the public will or
the private will to change that...298
U. S. Desegregation Policies Related to Public Housing
In 1896, the United States Supreme Court, in the case of Plessy v. Ferguson,
established the "separate but equal" doctrine. Racial segregation persisted in public
facilities. It was within this legal and political framework that federally assisted public
housing was initiated.
Federal Assisted Public Housing
The failure ofthe mortgage market during the Depression brought foreclosure to
thousands of homeowners. To help this situation, the National Housing Act of 1934




Insurance Corporation, and the Federal National Mortgage Association. The FHA
developed racial segregation policies that remained in effect until 1950. One FHA policy
determined that racial homogeneity was essential for the financial stability of a
neighborhood. The FHA was involved in providing housing for the working and middle
classes, but its policies were indicative of official attitudes toward segregation.299
Robert Wagner of New York sponsored the Housing Act of 1937. Its purpose
was to cut slum areas, provide employment and locate good, affordable public housing.
Local authorities developed and managed low-income housing. The federal government
financed the program by authorizing annual federal contributions to authorize the capital
cost. The federal contribution allowed rents to be reduced so that families, otherwise
unable to afford adequate shelter, could be properly housed.300 Yet no provisions were
made for families who were too poor to afford reduced rentals of subsidized housing.
The projects were initially designed for underpaid workers and innocent victims of
economic reverses who needed a break to tide them over in lean years.301
Early Public Housing Projects
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The construction of public housing projects did not begin on a national basis until
the onset ofWorld War II. In support ofthe defense mobilization effort, Public Law 171
was passed in June of 1940. This bill waived the low-income eligibility standards for
admission to the projects, allowing defense workers to live in public housing. At the end
of the war, approximately 100,000 units were occupied and hundreds of local housing
authorities were fully staffed. A senate subcommittee on Housing and Urban
Development decided in August of 1945 to continue the public housing program. They
asserted the following:
The local authorities had substantial vested institutional interests not only
in continuing to handle the projects already in being, but [also] in
resuming the program for which they had been created, and which had
been preempted by the war.302
Racial desegregation was not a policy ofthe local authorities. The United States
Commission on Civil Rights' 1963 report to the President ofthe United States stated that
"at the end ofWorld War II, virtually all public housing in America was segregated.303
Political Debate on Housing Desegregation
Political sanctions concerning racial segregation were debated during the years
following World War n. On May 3, 1948, the U. S. Supreme Court ruled in Shelly v.
Kraemer that "private agreements to exclude persons of designated race or color from the
302 Milton P. Somer," A review of Federal Subsidized Housing Programs," Housing in the
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use or occupancy of real estate for residential purpose did not violate the 14th
Amendment, but that it is in violation of the equal protection clause of the 14th
Amendment for state courts to enforce them."304 Congressmen from southern states,
including Texas, were opposed to desegregation and were able to delete an anti
discrimination clause from the Housing Act of 1949.305
In 1950, the Federal Housing Administration deleted its rule that neighborhoods
be racially homogenous. Following the case of Brown v. Board ofEducation in 1954,
two circuit courts ofappeal ruled that government enforced segregation in public housing
denied citizens equal protection of the law and was, therefore, in violation of the 14th
Amendment.306 In 1960, public housing projects in 32 states were operating on an open-
occupancy basis. The following cities had anti-segregation policies: New York, Los
Angeles, Cleveland, Pittsburgh, Seattle and Boston.307
The executive branch of the federal government first attempted to assure non-
discrimination in public housing when John F. Kennedy issued Executive Order 11063,
entitled "Equal Opportunity in Housing," on November 20, 1962. This order had little
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impact on housing segregation for it applied only to newly constructed projects and
lacked enforcement regulations. 308
The Civil Rights Act of 1964 codified the federal government's policy on non-
discrimination when it enacted Title VI, which stated:
No person in the United States shall, on the grounds of race, color, or
national origin, be excluded from participation, be denied the benefits of,
or be subjected to discrimination under any program or activity receiving
federal financial assistance.309
Federal enforcement regulations under Title VI became effective on
January 1, 1965. These laws applied to all federally assisted housing
projects and urban renewal agencies for public housing. Title VI required
"the elimination of discrimination not only in the selection and assignment
of tenants, but also in the selection of sites for projects and in the
provision of services.310
In August of 1965, local housing authorities were given federally approved plans
issued by HUD to end discrimination in tenant selection and assignment. Local officials
were allowed to choose between or to combine "first come, first serve" and "freedom of
choice" plans. Many chose the latter method, which did not guarantee freedom of choice
in public housing.311 In 1967, the following statement was issued by the General Counsel
ofthe Department ofHousing and Urban Development (HUD):
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Under these plans, the entire burden for expressing a choice or project or
location was upon the individual applicants, who were to make this choice
in many communities in which segregated housing patterns had been
traditional. The existence of a segregated pattern of occupancy was in
itself a major obstacle to true freedom of choice, since few applicants had
the courage to make a choice by which they would be the first to change
the pattern. Without inducement of local authority staff, the plans tended
to perpetuate patterns of social segregation and consequently separate
treatment.
The 1965 tenant assignment plan did not assure non-discrimination in housing. In
most cases, it contributed to the continuation of segregated housing patterns.
In 1967, HUD developed a modification of the 1965 tenant assignment
procedures in order to comply with Title VI. This was done at the request of President
Lyndon B. Johnson who had not been able to get Congress to enact a comprehensive fair
housing law during the 1967 sessions of Congress.313
In addition, President Johnson appointed the Kerner Commission to explore the
links between racial discrimination and urban policy. The President charged the Kerner
Commission to investigate "the origins ofthe major civil disorders in our cities, including
the basic causes and factors leading to such disorders." The commission was also
charged to propose methods and techniques for averting or controlling such disorders,




later, in March 1968, the commission, chaired by Illinois Governor Otto Kerner,
delivered a report to the American nation. It included the following statement:
Our nation is moving toward two societies, one black, one
white-separate and unequal.... Reaction to last summer's
disorders has quickened the movement and deepened the
division. Discrimination and segregation have long permeated
much of American life; they now threaten the future of every
American.314
Moreover, the commission pointed out that America was more racially divided
than ever before. This point was made although such groups as the Southern Christian
Leadership Conference, the Congress of Racial Equality, the NAACP, and the Student
Non-Violent Coordinating Committee had all prompted Congress, in 1964 and 1965, to
enact the two most sweeping civil rights statutes written into American Law: The Civil
Rights Act of 1964 and The Voting Rights Act of 1965. Together, these Acts were
designed to end racial discrimination in education, employment, voting, and
governmental programs.
According to the report, resulting residential separation was virtually absolute:
• Almost all Negro population growth (98 percent from
1950 to 1966) is occurring within metropolitan areas,
primarily within central cities.
• The vast majority of white population growth (798
percent from 1960 to 1966) is occurring in suburban
portions of metropolitan areas.
314 John Boger, Race Poverty andAmerican Cities (North Carolina: The University of North
Carolina Press, 1996), 6.
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• As a result, central cities are becoming more heavily
Negro while the suburban fringes around them remain
almost entirely white.315
Only in the area of housing did the commission prescribe solutions tailored to
address the urban/suburban racial segregation central to its analysis of the underlying
problem. The commission's suburban housing strategy was twofold. First, it called for a
comprehensive and enforceable federal open housing law to cover the sale or rental of all
housing, including single-family homes. To implement the law, the commission urged
voluntary community action to disseminate information about suburban housing
opportunities to urban minorities and to provide education in suburban communities
about "the desirability of open housing". Second, the commission urged an expansion of
federal housing programs that would target more low- and moderate-income units in
suburban areas, to be implemented through a revitalized federal housing program that
would add six million units to the federal low-income housing inventory within five
years.316
The Urban Crisis of the 1970s Through the 1990s:
The Kerner Commission Report Revisited
Although it has been over 30 years since the Kerner Commission Report of 1968
was published, current research shows that blacks still face a significant level of




Commission pointed out that blacks often lived in sub-standard housing facilities. The
Report also noted greater overcrowding among non-white units, and offered evidence that
a higher proportion of non-whites paid at least 35 percent of their incomes for housing in
many cities.
Several current trends are positive: overall housing quality arguably has
improved and the percentage of poor renters receiving some form of housing assistance
has grown substantially. William Apgar reports that according to the 1987 American
Housing Survey, 4.3 million households resided in public housing or rental housing
otherwise subsidized by federal, state, or local governments. Much of the increase in
housing assistance has gone to aid households at the lowest end of the income
distribution range. Among poor renters with incomes between 50 percent and 100
percent of the poverty threshold, the increase was more modest, rising from 681,000 (or
23 percent) in 1974 to 1,370,000 (or 33 percent) in 1987.
Yet, the low-income housing crisis has continued because of several factors.
First, there has been a sharp slowdown in the production of new federally assisted
housing. This fact exists because of shift in housing policies during the Reagan years. A
second factor in the low-income housing dilemma is the disappearance of older low-
income rental units from the private market. The third factor is the displacement of low-
income tenants. The Fourth factor is the cut back ofwelfare assistance.317 The impact of
317 William Apgar and Denise Dipasaquale, The State ofNations Housing, 1990 (Cambridge,
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these trends has been especially severe among the Black and Hispanic urban poor.
According to one study, some 37 percent of poor black households paid at least 70
percent oftheir income for housing costs.318
Title Vin ofthe Civil Rights Act of 1968
Title Vin of the Civil Rights Act of 1968 was established to help diminish the
isolation of the urban ghetto and to promote a more racially integrated society. Title VIII
prohibits the denial of housing on the basis of race, color, or national origin.319 Senator
Walter Mondale sponsored title VIII. The legislation passed in the Senate but appeared
unlikely to pass in the House. But, a series of events in the summer of 1968, including
the assassination of Dr. Martin Luther King and riots in urban areas, prompted the House
to pass the bill without delay. The Senate floor debates indicated Congress intended Title
VIII to help disperse urban ghettos by implementing more integrated neighborhoods.
Towards this goal, Title Vin prohibits a wide range of discriminatory practices:
the refusal to rent or sell housing on the basis ofrace or other status; discrimination in the
term of sale or rental; discrimination in the advertising of housing sales or rentals; and
discrimination in the terms of mortgage or home improvement financing. Section
318 John Boger, Race Poverty andAmerican Cities (North Carolina: The University of North
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3603(b) provides an exemption to this general prohibition under the following
circumstances: the sale or rental of a single-family home by an owner who (1) does not
own interests in more than three houses at one time; (2) does not use any type of broker
or salesman; and (3) does not use any type of discriminatory advertising in violation of
3604(c).320
Special Authority ofHUD
The Department ofHousing and Urban Development (HUD) is the federal agency
responsible for administering Title VIII. As such, it has the authority to investigate and
consolidate files; it may ask the Department of Justice (DDT) to enforce Title VIII
through litigation. The Attorney General may pursue civil actions against the public and
private entities for violations of Title VIII. Finally, individuals may litigate under the
statute in either federal or state court. The plaintiff may be able to recover compensatory
and punitive damages or seek injunctive relief.321
The Brooke Amendment
Before 1969, federal public housing subsidies consisted of annual contributions to
cut capital costs and other subsidies for units occupied by elderly or handicapped tenants
that were provided for by the Housing Act of 1961. Section 213(a) of the Housing and
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Urban Development Act of 1969, known as the Brooke Amendment, lowered the amount
of rent charged for a public housing unit to 25 percent of a tenant's income. Congress
then authorized an increase in public housing subsidies to cover the difference between
project operating expenses and the amount of rental income received under the new
procedure.322 This change ensured that families with extremely low incomes could live
in public housing.323 In 1969, it was noted that public housing could no longer continue
to serve the lowest income families because of rapidly rising costs. Albert A. Walsh,
chairman of the New York City Housing Authority in 1969, advocated enacting the
Brooke Amendment.324 Senator Edward Brooke, a Republican from Massachusetts and
second black U.S. Senator elected since Reconstruction, explained that minimum rents
needed to pay operating costs were excluding the very poorest of citizens from
participation in public housing projects. He further indicated that this bill would help the
most needy citizens with the issue of housing.
U.S. Senator Thomas J. Mclntyre, a New Hampshire Democrat, co-sponsored the
housing bill with Senator Brooke. When the bill was introduced, he explained the need
for it as follows:
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The crisis in public housing is reaching dramatic proportions. Public
housing authorities across the Nation are no longer able to provide
adequate maintenance and services for tenants and at the same time
preserve the low-rent character of the projects. Even though the Housing
Act of 1937, which established the public housing program, stated that the
program would serve those "families in the lowest income group" local
authorities have been forced to set minimum income requirements and
raise rentals in order to meet the rising costs of maintenance and
operation. As a result, more and more of the poor and very poor are
barred from admission to public housing projects.
Further, Senator Mclntyre contended the local housing authorities would no longer
require minimum rents. Tenants with the very lowest incomes would be eligible for
admission to public housing. It would also mean that tenants already living in public
housing would not be spending a disproportionate amount of their incomes for shelter.
The housing authorities would no longer have to resort to the only method available,
raising rents, to support a decent place to live.327
When the bill was considered on the floor in September of 1969, Senator Brooke
elaborated further on the need for the change. He stated:
Information available from HUD indicates that there are approximately
180,000 tenants in public housing projects who pay in excess of 25
percent of their income for such housing. This problem is further
accentuated by inflationary pressures, which are increasing operating costs
considerably. Many public housing authorities, unable to obtain
additional funds to cover these increased costs, are looking to public
housing tenants for their source of additional funds. But these public
housing tenants are unable, in many cases, to meet prior payment
schedules without allocating a disproportionate share of their income to
326 Congress, Senate, Committee on Housing and Urban Affairs on Banking and Currency:
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housing, and they find it impossible to do so as their rental payments
increase still further.
We believe that no public housing tenant should pay more than 25 percent
of their income for housing; however, we certainly would encourage
public housing authorities to charge considerably less where it is
economically feasible to do so.328
Another aspect of the proposed Brooke Amendment was that it allowed for local
public housing agencies autonomy to establish rents and eligibility requirements to pay
those rents. This allowed agencies freedom to revise tenants' rents when operating cost
outpaced increases in the tenants' income. President Nixon signed the bill into law on
December 24, 1969.329
The Housing Act of 1975
In 1974, lawmakers passed the Housing Act of 1975, which required that at least
20 percent of all new public housing units be set aside for families with incomes below
50 percent ofthe median income in a local area.330
In the 1980s, President Ronald Reagan directed a shift in federal housing policies.
He cut funds for new construction and created a system of vouchers to fund affordable
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housing. Implicit also in this change was the idea to raise rents for public housing tenants
to 30 percent of a family's adjusted income.331
The Tax Reform Act of 1986 triggered another shift in the provision of low-
income housing. It provided special tax credits for investors who invested in existing,
rehabilitated and low-income housing. It also spurred the idea of a low income tax credit.
The Tax Reform Act is comprised of profit and non-profit firms working together to
reduce rents in very low-income households. Cities generally added on funds they
received from HUD, including Community Development Block Grants and money
allocated through the Home Investment Partnership Act (HOME). These grants provide
funds to state and local governments that were responsible for matching money to meet
local housing needs.332
Despite numerous housing programs, and federal experiments, the need for
housing grew tremendously. In September 1987, Congress established a 26-member
National Housing Task Force headed by Jones Rouse, founder of the Rouse Company, to
reexamine America's housing policy. In 1988, it released the report "A Decent Place to
Live" to suggest steps for public housing reform. These steps included more tenant
involvement and tenant home ownership.





President George W. Bush's social policy was in agreement with Reagan's as far
as minimal government involvement toward social policy goes. Yet, Bush's staff
perceived that many voters were turned off by the image of not caring about human
needs, as was the perception of many people toward the Reagan Administration. The
promise of a kinder, gentler nation was included in his campaign message, along with the
assurance that he would not raise taxes in order to pursue a more expansive social
agenda.
Change in HUD Leadership
Representative Jack Kemp was selected as Secretary of Housing and Urban
Development. Kemp was a popular conservative. He believed in government action to
assist the disadvantaged. He believed programs should be designed to foster self-
sufficiency. Like Reagan, he believed that too much government would hurt Americans'
quest for responsibility in housing.333
Although Kemp was supported as the new Secretary of HUD, HUD's former
secretary, Samuel Pierce, had just been alleged to have been involved in a Section 8
Moderate Rehabilitation scandal. In May of 1989, Pierce appeared before the U.S. House
Committee on Government operations. In many instances he claimed lack of recollection
of any events. He also alleged that people working under him did dishonorable things.
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He was later asked to review several answers he had previously given, but chose to
invoke his Fifth Amendment rights.
Secretary Kemp began to work through the crisis. He worked on legislation that
restricted the HUD Secretary's control over discretionary funds, restricted the use of
waivers ofregulations, and put limits on consulting fees for HUD projects.
Cranston-Gonzalez Affordable Housing Act
With the work of Secretary Kemp and the support of the Bush administration, the
Cranston-Gonzalez National Affordable Housing Act became law on November 28,
1990. The major elements ofthis new paradigm are as follows:
1. Primary reliance on tenant-based assistance through vouchers and
certificates, utilizing existing standard housing.
2. Local control of existing production programs, exercised either though
local government or through local nonprofit community development
corporations.
3. Homeownership as a central strategy for assisting low-income
households.
4. Integration of other social services with housing.334
The first component to be discussed is the Assisted Housing Plan. This Act
authorized additional units of Section 8 certificates and vouchers for families in assisted
housing.
The second component of the Act was the Home Investment Partnership Act
(HOME) Program. The Act provided for the production of new and rehabilitated units.
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It placed production under local control by providing block grants that could be used for
various housing development strategies. In addition to rehabilitation of units, the Act
permitted HOME funds to be used for construction if other needs could be proven
necessary.
HOME also required that 15 percent of local funds be set aside for use by
community housing development organizations. This requirement prompted the
formation of groups that provided affordable housing.
The third component of the Act was Homeownership. A large part of this
component was the Housing Opportunities for People Everywhere (HOPE) program.
This element implies that homeownership was a central element in self-sufficiency and
pride for low-income persons. Moreover, HOPE I dealt specifically with public housing.
It worked for the sale of project units to tenant management organizations. HOPE II
allowed for a similar process in privately owned projects receiving federal assistance,
HOPE IE established non-profit organizations to build or rehabilitate units for purchase
by low-income persons.335
The fourth component of the HOME Act is the integration of social services.
This HOME Act provided for the Family Self-Sufficiency program. The goal of this





public support for housing and other needs, while receiving assistance for education and
job training necessary for upward mobility.
The Clinton Administration and Housing Policies
In the early 1990's presidential candidate Bill Clinton wrote a book entitled
Putting People First. In it he called for the elimination of drug dealing in public housing.
He also advocated that criminals should not be permitted in public housing units.336
The presidential election of 1992 meant new ideas with regards to housing for the
poor. Bill Clinton drew ideas from a book by David Kusnet, Speaking American: How
the Democrats Can Win In the 90's. He argued the party should advocate the use of
government to improve the lives of ordinary citizens, including addressing many of the
core social problems they have always defended. Yet he believed Democrats must also
deliver a clear message that they support the value of hard work, family, public civility,
and other types of responsibilities. If the Democrats appear to be soft on crime, or
unwilling to require some effort from the poor in return for government benefits, the
Republicans will use these ideas to convey that the Democrats do not have a great plan to
assist the poor.337
Another influence Clinton had was that of Professor Robert Reich who wrote
extensively on the economic problems ofthe 1980s. Reich was critical ofthe Reagan
336
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Administration "hands-off' strategy for promoting economic growth. He advocated
business and government working together for wise investments to help society.
Clinton's campaign strategy showed he had taken both kinds of advice to heart.
He took a tough stance on welfare, promising to end "welfare as we know it" and replace
it with strict requirements for work or job training. He emphasized job creation strategies
and programs such as health care reform that would deliver benefits to a diverse
population. He also distanced himself from some black leaders like Jesse Jackson, whom
voters associated with the old Democratic attitudes.339
Restructuring and Reforming HUD
The Clinton administration worked on four themes for the Housing Program
Initiatives. To this end, President Clinton picked Henry Cisneros, former Mayor of San
Antonio, to lead the Department of Housing and Urban Development. First, Cisneros
worked to reform HUD itself. He called for cutting 1,000 jobs in order to remove a layer
of bureaucracy. He also searched for ways to simplify the planning documents required
by HUD from local communities.340
He also tackled the agency's troubling financial problems, for instance the
numerous bankrupt private housing projects under its control. Because ofthe failing
338 Robert Reich, The NextAmerican Frontier (New York: Penguin Press, 1983), 27.
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housing program initiations, HUD had to dispose of certain units. Later, Congress gave
HUD more flexibility to dispose ofthese projects.341
A second theme Cisneros worked on was to remove tight bureaucratic controls on
local public housing authorities. The report on "Reinventing Government," written by
Vice President Al Gore, gave a lot of attention to public housing. His work also
advocated allowing local public housing agencies the freedom to run their own show.
Scaling Back HOPE Programs and Reemphasizing Fair Housing
The Clinton Administration also scaled back the HOPE programs. HOPE I and
HOPE n, designed to facilitate the sale of public housing units and federally subsidized
private rental units to their tenants, was cut in Clinton's budget. Funding for HOPE III, a
program to build or rehabilitate additional units for low-income home ownership, was
limited to those projects that had already received planning grants.
A third major theme stressed under Clinton's leadership was a renewed emphasis
on fair housing. One part of this emphasis was the provision of more housing
opportunities for minorities in predominantly white areas. Cisneros had expressed the
view that racial segregation is one of the most serious barriers to the advancement of
minorities. He criticized discrimination in the private market, and he promised tough
enforcement of fair housing laws. He also criticized the perpetuation of racial and ethnic




wider distribution of units across jurisdictions. He also tried to settle some of the
outstanding discrimination suits against public housing authorities.
In 1999 HUD initiated an experimental program, called "Move to Opportunity"
(MTO), modeled after local experimental programs in Chicago and other cities. This
program encourages and supports families receiving housing vouchers (including some
who are currently tenants of public housing) to move to neighborhoods where their race
is underrepresented. Particularly encouraged are minority moves to majority areas since
it is felt that this will enhance job and educational opportunities for these families. The
Chicago program was initiated in response to the lengthy Gautreaux litigation, and it is
regarded as having been reasonably successful in "deconcentrating" about 6,000 minority
families away from traditional minority areas.342
The other part of the fair-housing strategy was aimed at upgrading existing low-
income and minority areas. Cisneros promised an attack on redlining of inner-city
neighborhoods both by lending institutions and by companies providing property
insurance. Some banks are already induced to cooperate with government and nonprofit
agencies in special lending programs for lower-income homeowners or neighborhoods,
because they fear that approval of mergers and other business transactions by banking
342 William Peterman, "Deconcentrating Chicago Public Housing Residents." Paper presented at
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regulators may be delayed if their Community Reinvestment Act profile is not
acceptable.343
The fourth housing program initiative theme of the Clinton Administration was
the need to commit more resources to assisting the homeless. This is a problem that has
been greatly understated by previous administrations. Particularly grim is the fact that
approximately 500,000 people are to be found homeless on any given night. The plan
stresses that while problems such as mental illness contribute to homelessness, the
shortage of affordable housing is a central factor in its existence as well.
HUD's annual review is critical of the federal resources going to support housing
for the affluent in the form of taxes. It also advocates increased resources for housing
assistance and expanded programs for the mentally ill, including aggressive outreach
programs.
Greater Flexibility for Housing Authorities
In 1993, Vice-President Al Gore worked to help President Clinton maintain his
policy in public housing. In Al Gore's report, "Creating a Government that Works and
Costs Less," he espoused the idea that public housing agencies should have more
flexibility to enforce rules and regulations. Further, he called for the management of new
343
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public housing free of most regulations, provided that they meet performance standards
set by HUD.344
Empowerment Zones
One of the Clinton Administration's policy initiatives has spoken directly to the
overall development of cities. Since such policies have a direct impact on housing and
neighborhood improvement, it will be highlighted here. The initiative was the
Empowerment Zone, signed into law in August of 1993. It designated six urban and
three rural empowerment zones and utilized a competitive application process. Zones
must have substantial concentration of poverty. Applications must include a strategic
plan emphasizing sustainable economic development through job creation and
coordination of related social and community services, from housing, to education, to
drug abuse prevention and community policing. Among the benefits these zones would
receive are:
1. Tax-exempt facility bonds for certain private business activities;
2. Social service block grant funds, passed through the state, for activities
identified in each state's Strategic Plan;
3. Special consideration in the competition for funding in numerous federal
programs;
4. An employer wage credit to employers for hiring zone residents.
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Another 60 cities and 55 rural areas were designed as Enterprise Communities.
They will benefit from items 1 and 3 above and block grant funding would be lower
Quality Housing and Work Responsibility Act.
On October 21, 1998, President Clinton signed the Quality Housing and Work
Responsibility Act of 1998 (QHWRA).346 The Act allowed more flexibility for local
public housing agencies to help families obtain affordable housing. Similarly, public
housing agencies now had discretion to set admissions policies that could help welfare
reform. In addition, QHWRA also pushed for agencies to develop a plan providing for
the de-concentration of the poor in public housing. Furthermore, it allowed more
flexibility for public housing agencies to set payment standards for rental subsidies. For
families that do not work, the Act required residents to perform eight hours per month of
community service. Adults who are enrolled in an economic self-sufficiency program or
that comply with state welfare program requirements, however, are exempted from the
mandatory community service.347
The Bush Administration and Home Ownership
During President George W. Bush's campaign, in April of 2000, he indicated he
would focus on increasing homeownership rather than on programs to boost rental
housing. He proposed allowing low-income families to use up to a year's worth of
346 Barbara Sard and Jeff Lubell, "How the Statutory Changes Made by the Quality Housing and
Work Responsibility Act of 1998 May Affect Welfare Reform Efforts," Center on Budget and Policy




federal rent subsidies for down payments on a house. In addition, these families would
still receive subsidies during the first five years they are paying mortgages. President
Bush made the following remarks about his support for homeownership in Cleveland in
April of 2001:
Looking at today's construction boom, it's easy to forget that many
Americans are still waiting for this experience. The homeownership rate
among whites in America is 73 percent. Among African Americans and
Hispanics, it is 47 percent.
Right now the government offers help to low-income families, but mainly
in the rental market. Through what's known as the Section 8 program, the
federal government makes up the difference between fair-market rents and
what a given family is able to pay.
This is a good aim, as far as it goes-but we should extend it further.
Instead of receiving monthly voucher payments to help with the rent, I
propose a path to ownership.
Under my plan, low-income families can use up to a year's worth of rental
payments to make a down payment on their own house. And for five
years after that, as they pay their mortgage and build equity, they can still
receive housing support, just as they would if they were still renting.
It makes a lot more sense to help people buy a home than to subsidize
rental payments forever. They are not only gaining property but also
independence and the sense ofbelonging that ownership brings.
For the millions of low-income families not enrolled in Section 8, we will
create a new program called the "American Dream Down Payment Fund."
When a low-income family is qualified to buy a house but comes up short
on the down payment, we will help them. If they and the bank can come
up with 25 percent ofthe down payment, the government will pay the rest,
up to $1,500.
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This simple reform could help over 650,000 families in five years
purchase homes.348
Another key component of Bush's housing agenda is boosting savings accounts
for those in the lowest 20 percent of the income scale. Bush proposed an individual
development accounts program in which banks would be encouraged to match up to
$1,300 in savings in exchange for federal tax credits. Some argue this is not a good idea
because most people need education and counseling on keeping an account.
At the end of 2000, President elect Bush selected Melquiades Rafael Martinez as
Secretary of HUD. During his Senate conformation hearings, Martinez said he would
work to ensure that more minority families could buy their own homes. In his words he
said:
...despite record-high levels of homeownership, Blacks and Hispanic-
Americans homeownership rates remain below 50 percent. That is not
acceptable.349
Martinez, a wealthy personal injury lawyer and former chairman of the Orlando
Housing Authority in Florida, assured the committee he was not part of the wing of the
Republican Party that wanted to cut out HUD. Martinez contended the nation faces a
looming housing problem in rural areas and in cities. He also pointed out that the number
of affordable houses for sale had declined while the number of poor people seeking
housing had grown. In his own words he said: "Unless we make sure that everyone is
348 "Affordable Housing," Congressional Quarterly (February 2001), 104.
349 Elizabeth Becker, "HUD Candidate would seek More Homes for Minorities," New York Times
(January 18,2001), Al.
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participating in this great economic expansion and until we ensure that barriers to
homeownership are torn down for everyone .... until then, ourjob is not done."350
Promoting Bush's campaign theme of "Compassion Conservativism," Martinez
said he hoped to create partnerships with private entities to help solve the housing
problems. He also added he would promote Bush's plan to provide tax credits to
financial institutions that help low-income families finance houses.
Bush's proposals and those of others depend on financial support from Congress.
And with the nearly even split between Republicans and Democrats, it remains to be seen
how much bipartisan cooperation will work.
Conclusion
The history of housing for black families in the city of Dallas, Texas has faced
many barriers. These barriers have not only arrived from the agency but also from the
city of Dallas. While concerned citizens have been working for justice in housing, the
accomplishments have been slow. They have come from tenants and concerned citizens.
They, along with others, have endured racial segregation and house bombing in their
communities. Among these individuals include A Maceo Smith, Ruby Barton, and Marie
Shelton. The area of West Dallas was annexed to blacks to help in the housing crises.
However, this did not help. With the spread of blacks to South Dallas, fighting ensued.
The city ofDallas tried to respond with new ideas. However, no surrounding community




help a few black families with living conditions. In addition, blacks could live in certain
sectors of South Dallas. However, the greatest help has been provided by the courts. The
Walker v. HUD case will provide further discussion about implementing solutions for the
housing needs of black families in the city of Dallas, Texas. These laws have helped
although they continue to be revised to meet the needs of the residents on the Dallas
Housing Authority.
CHAPTER V
WALKER, ct al. v. U.S. DEPARTMENT OF
HOUSING & URBAN DEVELOPMENT IN DALLAS, TEXAS
It has been 67 years since 1939 when the U.S. Congress prohibited racial
discrimination in housing, directing that "all citizens...shall have the same right...as is
engaged by white citizens...to inherit, purchase, lease, sell, hold, and convey real and
personal property."3?1 In 1954, the Supreme Court held that federal, state and local
governments are constitutionally obligated to eschew racial discrimination in their
programs and activities.352 In 1968, the Court held that the Constitution requires
disestablishment of -existing segregation and elimination of the vestiges of past
segregations "root and branch."353 These mandates were reinforced in 1964, 1968, and
351 Jones v. Mayer, 392 U.S. 509 (1968).
352 Brown v. Board ofEducation, 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
353 Green v. County School Board, 371 U.S. 430 (1968).
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1994 by the U. S. Congress. The 1968 Federal Housing Act required HUD to act
affirmatively to end segregation in the federally assisted housing."354 Despite these legal
354 Florence W. Roisman, "Long Overdue: Desegregation Litigation and Next Steps to End
Discrimination and Segregation in the Public Housing and Section 8 Existing Housing Programs,"
Cityscape 4,No.3 (1999), 171.
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requirements, housing programs administered by federal, state, and local government
agencies consistently have been characterized by racial discrimination and segregation.
housing."355 In particular, residents of both public and Section 8 housing still suffer
separate and unequal treatment on the basis of race.356 HUD has acknowledged the
existence of "a profoundly disturbing pattern of racial disparities within the public
housing system."357 Most black public housing residents live in largely Black and poor
communities.358 Black public housing residents endure housing and neighborhood
conditions that are vastly inferior to those ofwhite public housing residents.35 Similarly,
HUD has found a pattern of racial segregation and economic isolation in Section 8
programs across the country.
Yet, HUD has helped to create and exacerbate these conditions.361 The few
desegregation steps HUD has taken have been motivated by civil rights suits filed against
the department. In the landmark case of Hill v. Gautreaux, HUD and the Chicago
Housing Authority (CHA) were found guilty of perpetuating racial discrimination in
housing. The Supreme Court, in 1976, ordered the formulation of a racial dispersal
355 Florence W. Roisman, "Long Overdue: Desegregation Litigation and Next Steps to End
Discrimination and Segregation in the Public Housing and Section 8 Existing Housing Programs,"
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strategy that would place a specific number of black public housing residents in
racially desegregated neighborhoods throughout the Chicago metropolitan area.362
At the heart ofthe court's findings was:
(1) CHA "deliberately located public housing to perpetuate and intensify racial
segregation," and
(2) The consent decree established a Section 8 certificate program and a Section 8
Project-Based program, in addition to programs for building scattered site
public housing
The Supreme Court ordered the CHA to develop a racial dispersal strategy that
was to include placing 7,100 black public housing residents in racially desegregated
neighborhoods throughout the Chicago metropolitan area. This program included unit-
based and tenant-based programs.364
Major characteristics ofthe program included the following:
1. Households eligible to participate in the program consist of those that live or
have lived in Chicago family public housing since 1981;
2. Households selected to participate in the program are chosen by the Lending
Council from the total pool of eligible participants;
3. Participating households must relocate to racially desegregated
neighborhoods, defined as neighborhoods that have no more than a 30 percent
black population, and
4. Households that move to an eligible location must remain at that location for a
year before moving to another location without losing their right to the
Section 8 certificate.365
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A Study by James Rosenbaum in 1987 examined the long-term effects ofthe
Gautreaux program. Families were surveyed to compare households that moved
within Chicago to those that moved to the suburbs. His major findings revealed that:
1. The employment level was significantly higher for mothers who moved to the
suburbs than for those who moved within the city;
2. The likelihood that the children completed high school and attended college
was far greater for those who grew up in the suburbs; and
3. Suburban dwellers expressed that greater personal safety was one of the chief
benefits of living in the suburbs.366
The Gautreaux program paved the way for deconcentration of poverty programs.
It was generally looked upon as a successful strategy for helping low-income families.
Evidence has shown the program to be successful in improving family living conditions,
improving employment opportunities for adults, and improving education and
employment for youth (for a list of desegregation suits in which HUD is a defendant in
Texas cases, see Figure I).367
This chapter discusses the Walker v. HUD case and its implications with regard to
discrimination against public housing and Section 8 residents ofDallas, Texas.
On June 25, 1985, plaintiffDebra Walker, a black woman eligible for federal low-
income housing assistance, filed suit against the Mesquite, Texas alleging that Mesquite
had failed to enter into a cooperation agreement with the Dallas Housing Authority
(DHA) in violation of 42 U.S.C §§ 1981, 1982, 1983, and 42 U.S.C. § 3604. Walker
claimed that the city's refusal in this regard made subsidized rental housing in Mesquite
366 J. Rosenbaum and M. Kulieke, "The Social Integration ofLow-Income Black Children into
White Suburbs," Journal ofNegro Education 56 (May 1987), 38.
367 J. Rosenbaum and S. R. Miller, "Can Residential Mobility Programs be Preferred Providers of
Tenants?" (Illinois: Institute for Policy Research, 1977), 42.
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unavailable to her on the basis of her race. Walker amended her complaint to assert a
class action. Six named plaintiffs, all black women eligible for Federal housing
assistance, were added to the original complaint. They were Jeanett Washington, Hazel
Williams, Zelma Long, Renita Brown, Lillie Thompson and Mary Dews, a counselor at
Dallas Tenants Association.368
The complaint was further amended to include other Dallas metropolitan suburbs
such as Carrollton, Piano, Richardson, Irving, Addison, Garland, and Farmers Branch as
defendants. Eventually, these suburban communities agreed to participate in DHA's
Section 8 program and were dismissed from the litigation. This settlement left DHA and
the U.S. Department ofHousing and Urban Development (HUD) as defendants.369
Thus, the court found that DHA and HUD had established and perpetuated racial
segregation in the West Dallas housing projects. Furthermore, Dallas Housing
Opportunity Program (HOP) was mandated by a consent decree following the court's
finding that the Dallas Housing Authority and HUD had established and perpetuated this
segregation.370
The consent decree and other remedial orders sought to move the West Dallas
housing project residents and those on the public housing waiting list to non-impacted
areas through the Section 8 program. From 1987 to 2000, several court actions followed
in an effort to resolve the lawsuit. Non-impacted areas were defined as census tracts
containing fewer than ten Section 8 families. In addition, a predominantly white area in
368 Walker v. CityofMesquite, 858 F.2d 1071 (5th Cir. 1988).
369 Ibid.
370 Walker, 734 F .Supp. at 1231.
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Dallas was defined as an area that did not exceed 13 percent of the poverty rate and
had less than 37 percent Hispanic, black, or other minority representation. This strategy
helped to move Section 8 households, but it did not lead to desegregation. Under the
1987 settlement, HUD provided an additional 1,435 Section 8 certificates. Other
remedies included the construction of new units in scattered site locations, a reduction in
the number of units in the West Dallas public housing projects, and improvement of
existing public housing units.371
The 1987 consent decree established targets for household moves under Section 8.
DHA agreed to place 15 percent of its Section 8 households in non-impacted areas within
one year. Within three years, DHA was ordered to have 50 percent of low-income
households located in non-impacted areas, either in Dallas or in the suburbs. At least 15
percent ofthe households were to be placed in the suburbs.372 The suburbs agreed not to
resist the use of DHA section 8 certificates in their jurisdiction in return for being
dropped from the lawsuit. Below is a brief summary of the twists and turns in the
lawsuit, one that turned out to be the most expensive in Dallas' history (see Table 5).
Many of the DHA housing units were located in West Dallas, which has always
been considered an undesirable area in which to live. This area is bordered by the Trinity
River to the north, the Continental Street Bridge to the east, 1-30 to the south, and Loop
12 to the west. The population of the area was composed primarily of minority
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Debra Walker, et al. Consent Decree
Opinion Walker I-Special Master
Opinion Walker H-Frost-Leland Amendment
Opinion Walker El-City
Supplemental Consent Decree
Opinion Walker IV-Demolition ofPublic Housing
Remedial Order Affecting DHA
District Court Affirms Remedial Order
5th U. S. Circuit Court Overturns Remedial Order
U.S. Supreme Court Denies Review
The population of the area was composed primarily of minority households: 60
percent black and 30 percent Spanish origin ,374 West Dallas was one of the poorest
communities in the city. The median income, in West Dallas, in the 1980 census, was
$9,481 compared to a city median of $21,872.375 Out of 8,669 households in West
Dallas, 2,751 households (32 percent) live below the poverty level; 4,308 or (50 percent)
374 Craig Flourney, "Federal Grant Money Spent on Bureaucracy, Not Poor," DallasMorning
News (March 8, 1990), C2.
375 U.S. Bureau of Census, County and City Data Book (Washington, D.C. Government
Publication, 1980), 20.
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of these households received public assistance or Social Security benefits. The 1980
median housing value was $16,876 and the median rent was $86.376
Unemployment was high (twice that of the city) and education levels low in West
Dallas. With regard to education, 75 percent of the adult population did not complete
high school compared with 32.8 percent citywide. Only 5.2 percent of the West Dallas
population had some college education compared to 39.8 percent in other areas of the
city.377
Housing conditions in West Dallas were poor in comparison to the rest of Dallas.
West Dallas had the largest proportion ofboarded up units (10.9 percent) and the largest
percentage ofover crowded households (10 percent) in the city.378
West Dallas Projects—History and Conditions
The West Dallas project is the second largest public housing project of any type in
the United States. Three West Dallas sites compromise 3,500 units; these are George
Loving (1,500), Edgar Ward Place (1,500), and Elmer Scott Place (500). Approximately
1,200 of these units are vacant and boarded up because DHA does not have the funds to
restore them. Additionally, the units are on a lead site that the DHA estimates will take
millions ofdollars to clean up.379
The crime rates in West Dallas are high. It is noted that a considerable amount of
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West Dallas projects almost five times more often than it does in the rest of Dallas.
For rape, the incidence rate is over six times higher than for the rest ofDallas.
Several unsuccessful efforts have been made to cure the West Dallas area. From
1967 through 1975, the DHA applied for rehabilitation funds for all of its housing units.
DHA was denied funds by HUD because the DHA violated Title VII.380 In 1976, the
DHA secured a $13,000,000 grant for the West Dallas Projects, but it was not enough for
the 3,500 units.381
In 1983, the DHA applied for a $54,000,000 grant to rehabilitate West Dallas.
HUD only granted $18,000,000 with strict conditions. However, HUD did not give DHA
the funds because the DHA failed to meet the preliminary requirements.
Debra Walker et al. Consent Decree (1987)
In 1987, Debra Walker et al., Plaintiffs, and HUD and the DHA, Defendants,
entered into a Consent Decree for the purpose of resolving the issues raised by the
Walker v. HUD lawsuit. In general, the decree provided that: (1) DHA would refrain
from discriminating in any form with regard to all existing or future DHA-owned
housing; (2) DHA would make available to all people, regardless of race, the same right
to lease and own property as is afforded to white citizens; and (3) DHA would, within ten





the Dallas metropolitan area making them aware of DHA's goals in achieving the
objectives ofthe decree.383
Some ofthe specific provisions ofthe Decree were:
1. DHA was to move the West Dallas housing project residents and those on the
public housing waiting list to non-impacted areas throughout the Section 8
program. Non-impacted areas were defined as census tracts containing fewer
than ten Section 8 families in 1987;
2. DHA was to place 15 percent of Section 8 households in non-impacted tracts
within one year. 50 percent were to be relocated to such areas either in Dallas
or the suburbs within three years;
3. A minimum of 15 percent of households were targeted for the suburbs (In
exchange for being dropped from the lawsuit, the suburbs agreed that DHA
Section 8 certificates could be used in their jurisdiction);384 and,
4. Concerning the West Dallas units, the DHA agreed there was virtually no
possibility of achieving an acceptable physical and social living environment
without a massive commitment of resources to the West Dallas units, and that
even with such a commitment of resources, there was no prospect for any
long-term viability. Therefore, remedial efforts included allowances for
modernization of certain sections of units. In addition, DHA was required to
submit a plan regarding units to be reviewed by HUD, submit an application
to HUD for approval to relocate all residents of the clearance areas of units
without regard to race, and demolish the units located in the clearance area, as
noted in the Plan.
The major provisions ofDHA's Plan included the following:
1. Establishing a new Housing Mobility Division within DHA's organizational
structure to promote and make housing mobility possible for Blacks and other
minority families;
2. Providing counseling and assistance to families seeking housing in areas
where few Section 8 certificates or voucher holders reside;
3. Working with organizations involved in fair housing issues;




4. Achieving a decent, safe, and sanitary environment for residents of the
West Dallas project by modernizing 800-900 units. Of the remaining 2,600
units, demolish those currently vacant and relocate current occupants outside
the West Dallas area;
5. Providing special opportunities to families currently participating in the
existing Section 8 housing program; and
6. Conducting public information and outreach programs to landlords with units
in the Dallas metropolitan area.385
Opinion Walker I (1989 Special Master)
In 1989, the court held that the DHA violated the Consent Decree of 1987 in the
following areas: delay in implementation of a new, nondiscriminatory tenant assignment
and selection plan; failure to provide tenant mobility services; failure to meet the decree's
first year goal for the use of Section 8 assistance in non-impacted areas; refusal to use a
substantial number of Section 8 certificates and vouchers allocated by HUD; and failure
to meet the decree's deadlines for the site selections, constitution, and initial occupancy
of 100 units of new low-income public housing. To address the violations, the court
appointed a Special Master to monitor compliance ofthe decree by all parties.386
Opinion Walker II (1989 Frost-Leland Amendment)
The Frost-Leland Amendment was named for its two Congressional sponsors,
Representatives Martin Frost (D-Dallas) and Mickey Leland (D-Houston). The
amendment was part ofthe Department ofHousing and Urban Development Independent
Agencies Appropriations Act of 1988.387 This amendment specifically prohibited the use
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The Frost-Leland Amendment resulted from the development of a diverse
coalition, which arose in response to the consent decree. Reasons for opposing the decree
ranged from politics to racism. The mayor and the city council were in disagreement.
Dallas Mayor Starke Taylor was not in support of the Frost-Leland Amendment. The
city council members were not in support ofthe consent decree because they believed the
mayor did not have the authority to act on the city's behalf.389
City council members Al Lipscomb and Matti Nash, black representatives whose
districts encompassed the West Dallas housing development, opposed the demolition of
any buildings in the projects because the demolition would cause the current residents to
move into other neighborhoods thus reducing the population in their district and diluting
the voting power of blacks. Council member Lori Palmer's objection to the decree was
based in part on her belief that Dallas was simply not ready for blacks to move to suburbs
and non-impacted areas with Section 8 assistance.
In addition to the council members, a group of housing advocates joined the
coalition against the consent decree because oftheir belief that affordable housing was in
such short supply in Dallas that the market would be unable to absorb the loss of
affordable housing.391 Congressman Leland, in further clarification of the Frost-Leland
Amendment, stated that the intent behind the amendment was to prevent the demolition
388 Ibid.
389 Walker, 734 F. Supp. at 1231.
390
Ibid.
391 Gina Briley "Getting the Government Out of the Housing Business: Are Housing Vouchers A
Viable Policy Alternatives?" (Thesis, University of Texas at Austin, 1997), 78.
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of "these extremely vital public housing units." In Leland's view, the government
would best serve the people by adding to the stock, not reducing it.392
This opinion concerned only one part of the decree involving the demolition of
many ofthe vacant and uninhabitable housing units at the West Dallas project. The court
held that the Frost-Leland Amendment, which "purports to prohibit the use of federal
funds for the demolition of any of the housing at West Dallas-as required by the Consent
Decree...," is unconstitutional.393 In effect, the court ruled that the West Dallas
demolition could proceed in accordance with the court's approval ofthe Consent Decree.
Opinion Walker III (1989 The City of Dallas)
This opinion held that the City was to be joined as a party defendant in the case of
Walker v. HUD. The court ruled that the Consent Decree of 1987 would be modified to
be binding on the City because "the undisputed facts establish that the city was a
substantial cause of DHA's deliberate racial segregation and discrimination in its public
housing programs in Dallas... ."394
Opinion Walker IV (1990 Funding the Demolition of Public Housing)
This action was brought to determine HUD's obligation to fund the demolition of
public housing units. The United States District Court for the Northern District of Texas
held that the Consent Decree required funding for the demolition of public housing units
in West Dallas. An appeal of this decision was filed. The Appeals Court held that: (1)
the Consent Decree did not stop HUD from funding housing units scheduled to be
392 Ibid.




demolished; (2) the federal statute eliminating funding for the demolition of public
housing did not unconstitutionally interfere with pending litigation; and (3) the statute
imposing preconditions ofapproval ofdemolition did not apply retroactively.
Supplemental Consent Decree (1990)
This Supplemental Consent Decree was established to set forth the obligations of
the City in furthering the remedial goals ofthe original decree. Simultaneous to the city's
battle against the court decision, tenant groups, church leaders, and community-based
organizations came together to oppose the demolition of portions of the West Dallas
housing projects. The reasons remained the same: political forces did not want the
dilution of minority votes, nor did they look forward to losing any of their constituency;
housing advocates agonized over the lack of affordable housing in the city; and church
and community leaders were adverse to the loss of the community and the neighborhood.
In 1992, DHA, HUD, and the City arrived close to a settlement that would
demolish 1,500 units and satisfy the demands of almost all players. The plan called for a
settlement, which would renovate 617 units in West Dallas and construct 383 new
units.395 While the severely distressed conditions of the West Dallas public housing
caused an extremely high vacancy rate, the 617 renovated units could effectively double
the number of families in the project units. The renovation would increase the livability
ofthe units and therefore increase the likelihood of occupancy.
This plan seemed to satiate the various political interests in Dallas. First, over 90
percent of the cost of the plan would be borne by the federal government. Thus, the city
did not have a financial interest in obstructing the plan, which Dallas approved on
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October 14, 1992. Second, the plan would double the number of families in West
Dallas. 6 This would maintain a solid constituency for local council members as well as
increase the voting power of the African-American community. Third, the commitment
to the project would ensure the continuation of community and neighborhood building
efforts currently being implemented. Finally, the promise of 383 newly constructed
public housing units appeased the housing advocates. From a political perspective,
everyone at the table would share a piece ofthe pie.
Unfortunately, not everyone involved in the Walker v. HUD case was at the table.
The plaintiffs and their attorney Mike Daniel were not a party to the proposed solution.
The plaintiffs opposed the plan because it fundamentally did not address the issue of
segregation in Dallas public housing. By doubling the number of families in the West
Dallas projects, the city, DHA, and HUD were continuing the restriction of African
Americans to West Dallas; this action also contributed to the over concentration of
minorities in low-income neighborhoods. Thus, the plaintiffs challenged the adoption of
the new agreement before the Northern District Judge Jerry Buchmeyer.397
Before Judge Buchmeyer could rule, the new agreement was dissolved. The
presidential election of 1992 caused a dismantling of political forces in Dallas. The
confirmation of Henry Cisneros as HUD Secretary in 1993 significantly rerouted the
desegregation plan agreed to the previous year. In September of 1993, Cisneros directed
395 Craig Flournoy and Randy Lee Loftis, "Council OK's Renovation of West Dallas Project," The




HUD lawyers to discontinue efforts to gain approval for the negotiated settlement of
the Walker v. HUD case.398 Cisneros withdrew the promise ofHUD support and federal
funding for the potential settlement.
In December of 1993, the new HUD administration presented its plan to settle the
Walker v. HUD case. The new plan mimicked the 1987 consent decree, including the
renovation of 1,200 units, the demolition of 2,300 units, and provisions of Section 8
assistance. In addition, the plan called for construction of335 new units in non-impacted
neighborhoods, or those without concentrations of minorities and below average
incomes. Cisneros' plan was celebrated nationally as a commitment to improving the
lives of public housing residents. Locally, the plan received support from those
previously opposed to demolition efforts. City officials, including the Dallas mayor and
the DHA executive director, supported the HUD plan. In 1994, Judge Buchmeyer
vacated the 1987 consent decree.400
Although demolition of a portion of the West Dallas development began in 1994,
implementation ofthe Walker v. HUD case settlement was halted. In 1994, the plaintiffs'
attorney petitioned the court to force the U.S. Justice Department to cease obstruction of
the settlement and to name the Justice Department as a defendant in the suit. The Justice
Department, acting as attorney for the federal government's executive branch, obstructed
the settlement by preventing HUD from agreeing to any final details on the grounds that
398 Craig Flournoy and Randy Lee Loftis, "A Way Out: Cisneros Housing Plan to Help Many
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there were no findings establishing either Dallas public housing as segregated or the
federal government's role in promoting segregation. This position was clearly contrary
to public statements made by top federal officials, including HUD Secretary Cisneros and
U.S. President Bill Clinton. According to a Georgetown law-professor, the reluctance on
the part of the Justice Department could be attributed to carry-over appointments from
the Reagan-Bush years and a lack of leadership in crucial positions.401 Additionally, any
admission of segregation would create liability on the part ofthe federal government and
open the door for additional law suits throughout the country.
Remedial Order Affecting DHA (1995)
This order was handed down to set forth the actions DHA was to take in
alleviating the concentration of poverty in its public housing projects. The ruling noted
that 92 percent (2,876 of 3,116) of black households in DHA's non-elderly public
housing units resided in predominantly black or minority-concentrated areas where the
poverty rate exceeded 40 percent.
It was not until the Remedial Order Affecting DHA was handed down in 1995
that the focus ofthe DHA program changed from dispensing Section 8 housing into non-
impacted areas to more specifically dispersing households to low-poverty and non-
minority areas. The result ofDHA's Remedial Order was that it opened up the entire city
for relocation of Section 8 housing rather than restricting residents to predominantly
Black areas. This strategy made it easier for residents of the West Dallas housing
projects, and those on public housing waiting lists, to move to non-impacted areas. And
while Black residents were allowed to use rent certificates to live in suburban areas, no
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significant changes in public housing practices followed. As late as 1994, more than
90 percent of black families in Dallas public housing still lived in mostly Black
neighborhoods ofconcentrated poverty.402
The most controversial aspect ofthe Judge's orders of 1995 required that the
housing authority provide 474 new public housing apartments in mostly white
neighborhoods
District Court Remedial Order (1997)
DHA officials first selected a site at Marsh Lane and Frankford Road for the new
housing project. This site was non-impacted and occupied by middle-class residents.
Many of the homeowners in the neighborhood opposed the selection of their
neighborhood as a site for low-income housing. Nevertheless, the DHA opened the
complex in May 1998. In 1996, DHA announced that it had selected two more sites—a
4.8-acre site at the northeast corner ofMeandering Way and MaCallum Boulevard and an
8.8-acre site east of Hillcrest Road. The DHA planned to build 40 apartments at each
site.403 This time, DHA worked to seek local community support to build housing in
their community.
Despite DHA's efforts to mend bridges with homeowners, Preston Highland and
Highlands of McKamy homeowners associations filed suit to block the construction.
They argued that the desegregation order was unconstitutional because it was a "race
401 Craig Flournoy, "Housing PlaintiffRip Agency; Lawyers Say Justice is Promoting
Segregation," The DallasMorning News (February 9, 1994), 27A.
402 Roismen, "Long Overdue: Desegregation Litigation and Next Steps to End Discrimination and
Segregation in the Public Housing and Section 8 Existing Housing Programs," 171.
403 Craig Floumoy, "Court Strikes down public housing ruling," DallasMorning News (March 17,
1999), 1A
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conscious remedy." They also argued that public housing would harm property
values. According to homeowner association president Joe Darby, the homeowners
wanted to make sure this was not viewed as a race issue.404 He was quick to point out
that Asian American, American Indian, Hispanic, and black homeowners were also
against building public housing in their community. In fact, the lead plaintiff in the
homeowner's lawsuit was a black homeowner named Ginger Lee.405
Leaders of the homeowners group insisted that socio-economics, not prejudice, is
the motivation behind their drive to keep the housing project from their neighborhood.406
Dallas City Council member Max Wells, whose district encompassed the housing
project, said he planned to support the homeowners. He also stated: "If I were opposing
this group, I would worry about how determined they are and their quiet rage."
Opposition leaders planned an aggressive public-relations campaign aimed at
influencing elected local and federal officials. They hoped to persuade Judge Buckmeyer
to replace the project with Section 8 vouchers that poor families could use in
predominately white middle class areas. "If that doesn't happen, then we will try to pull
together a war chest of funds and attempt to intervene in the lawsuit," Mr. Wilkins
said.407 The housing authority's announcement of its plans to build in neighborhoods
near their property prompted the formation ofhomeowner groups. At the same time
strategy meetings were held in defense of building public housing.
404 Andrew M. Feldman, "Contest of Wills," Multifamily Executive (June 1999), 30.
405 Tom Pauken, "The Puppet Master,"13.
406 Craig Floumoy and Steve McGonigle, "North Dallas Homeowners Battle Housing Project,"




The largest gathering of homeowners was held at Valley View Christian
Church on May 11, 1995. Approximately 300 people came to express their concerns and
they formed a committee to kill the proposed project. Several residents of the area
interviewed about the planned project expressed fears; these ranged from drops in their
property value to school overcrowding to rising crime rates. Adding to their fears, Mrs.
Lisa Conrad, vice-president of The Meadow Glen Homeowners Association, said "A
number of builders in the area have reported that customers have canceled contracts for
new homes or are attempting to renegotiate deals."408
Leo Naeger, treasurer ofthe Louvere Homeowners Association, said he was ready
to sell his duplex rather than live near the housing project. "My wife and I went house
hunting last week," he said. He also believed that the housing authority should pursue
de-annexation ofthe housing units from Dallas and join the city of Carrollton. In fact, he
stated: "We feel we are the forgotten corner of Dallas. The only time the City thinks of
us is when they want to put a new housing project here."409
The Highlands of McKamy and Preston Highland housing association hired
attorneys Bob Goodfriend and Mike Lynn to fight the public housing project.
Goodfriend believed he could beat Mike Daniels' constitutional argument that
homeowners have to accept public housing projects in predominately white
neighborhoods as a remedy for the vestiges of past racial discrimination. He argued that





In August 1997, Judge Buchmeyer disagreed with the homeowners. He
ordered the housing authority to proceed with the construction of the two housing
projects^* U.S. Circuit Court ofAppeals Overturns
Remedial Order (1999)
The homeowner groups appealed Judge Buchmeyer's decision in the District
Court. On March 17, 1999, The 5th U. S. Circuit Court of Appeals in New Orleans ruled
unanimously that Judge Buchmeyer's decision was unconstitutional.
The court held: "We also recognize that [the use of vouchers] is overwhelmingly
preferred by public housing families, that it allows market forces and personal
preferences to control the homemaking decision, and that it has not proven ineffective at
desegregating Dallas' public housing programs when combined with a vigorous mobility
program."410
Further, the 5th Circuit panel did not find any justification for what it called Judge
Buchmeyer's arbitrary definition of a white neighborhood as being at least 63% white.
"There is no evidence in the record to support the court's arbitrary definition of a
predominately white neighborhood. The emphasis should instead be directed toward
placing public housing participants in neighborhoods of their choice through a vigorous
[voucher] program, non-black neighborhoods, census tracts in which no public housing
currently exists, or non-poor neighborhoods."411
The three-judge panel ruling implied that the housing authority should use
vouchers and certificates to achieve desegregation in housing. But, the 5th Circuit
410 Ibid.
411 Tom Pauken, "The Puppet Master," DMagazine (June 2000), 13.
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opinion did not rule out the ultimate use of race in site selection. Instead, the panel
ordered U.S. District Judge Jerry Buchmeyer to hold additional hearings to work out that
issue.412
U.S. Supreme Court Denies Review (2000)
On January 19, 2000, the U.S. Supreme Court refused to review the Walker case.
This action affirms the appellate court's decision. The Court maintained:
Because there are promising, non-racially discriminating ways to continue
desegregating public housing in Dallas, the provision of the court's
remedial order calling for the construction or acquisition of units of public
housing in predominantly white areas is unconstitutional. It is premature
to utilize such a last resort measure.413
The Clinton administration said the Supreme Court review was not warranted. It
said the appellate court's decision "is to a great extent fact-based" and does not preclude
Judge Buchmeyer from "re-imposing a race-conscious site selection requirement if [he]
finds, based upon a more complete record, that the race-neutral alternatives positioned by
the court of appeals will not, in fact, fully remedy the violation."414
U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development
Settlement (2001)
412 Craig Flournoy, "Court Strikes Down Public Housing Ruling," DallasMorning News (March
17, 1999), 1A.
413 Mike Williams, "High Court Rejects Dallas Judge's Order on Public Housing," Houston




On March 8, 2001, the plaintiffs and HUD reached a settlement. The settlement
resulted in HUD giving DHA 3,305 rent-subsidy vouchers and $9.6 million to help low-
income blacks move into predominantly white neighborhoods (see Table 6).415
TABLE 6









Seven low-income black women sue the U.S.
Department of Housing and Urban Development and
the Dallas Housing Authority, saying thousands of
poor black families are forced to live in segregated
slums, including the 3,600 apartments West Dallas
housing project.
A settlement calls for dramatically expanding the
number of black families in neighborhoods using rent-
subsidy certificates. At the West Dallas project, 832
apartments would be renovated with the rest being
demolished.
The plaintiffs sue the city, saying officials obstructed
the 1987 settlement.
U. S. District Judge Jerry Buchmeyer says the city
engaged in conscious discrimination against minorities
in public housing.
The city agrees to settle by spending $118 million to
upgrade existing public housing. And expand
opportunities for poor minority families.
Judge Buchmeyer strikes down the 1987 settlement.
Plaintiffs say government officials have fallen short of
their goals.
HUD proposes a 1,200-unit West Dallas Project. The
rest of the West Dallas units would be demolished and
replaced with rent certificates and public housing
apartments.
Judge Buchmeyer rules that the housing authority and
HUD are liable for deliberate racial segregation.
Judge Buchmeyer orders the housing authority to
provide housing for 3,205 families in predominantly
415 Kim Homer, "Deal Paves Way for Housing Aid-rent Vouchers, funds from HUD Close










white areas of Dallas and its suburbs. At least 474
apartments must be new.
Table 6 cont.
DHA officials plan to build 75 apartments at the
northeast corner of Frankford Road and Marsh Lane.
More than 1,000 homeowners in far North Dallas sue
to stop the project.
Judge Buchmeyer orders the housing authority to
proceed with construction of the far North Dallas
project.
Judge Buchmeyer orders HUD to equalize conditions
between predominantly black and predominantly white
projects. DHA plans to build two 40-unit public
housing developments in far North Dallas.
Homeowners associations from two neighborhoods
file a federal suit to stop the two proposed housing
developments.
Judge Buchmeyer rules against the homeowners.
They appeal to the 5th U.S. Circuit Court of Appeals.
The appeals court strikes down Judge Buchmeyer's
ruling calling for the construction of 474 public
housing apartments in predominantly white
neighborhoods.
The U. S. Supreme Court refuses to hear the case.
Implications ofthe Walker Case
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The fundamental appeal of the U.S. Civil Rights Movement was its sense of
justice. As applied to public housing, it meant that poor people should have a right to
determine where they would like to live. They should not have to live in shotgun or
shack housing. The Walker v. HUD case broke new ground because it mandated building
public housing in the suburbs. Moreover, it allowed neighborhood associations to have a
say in building public housing in different areas oftown. Advocates ofthese beliefs
argued from the sure foundation of the Fourteenth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution:
"No state shall deny.. .to any person, the equal protection ofthe laws."
Moreover, other literature such as the Report ofthe Kerner Commission argued for de-
concentration of poor Blacks from the urban ghettos ofthe nation.
When the plaintiffs' attorney, Michael Daniel, argued the Walker v. HUD case, he
was seeking to give definition and application to the Civil Rights Acts of 1964 and 1968
and to existing federal regulations. Daniel had to show that administrative practices
intentionally guided the concentration of public housing in black neighborhoods. The
Walker decision (and later litigation) set a precedent for the nation in determining that
public housing could no longer be concentrated in urban ghettos of the United States. It
also mandated that HUD equalize conditions among the races in housing, policy, and in
other family services.
The Walker v. HUD case is an example of what happens to government agencies
if they institute out-dated patterns of behavior and are overtaken by a great social
movement, which finds support among many significant leaders in a community.
Authorities at a higher level forcefully impose social changes.
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The Kerner Commission called for both de-concentration of low-income
blacks from public housing in the ghetto and for government programs to promote ghetto
enrichment. Through such projects as Community Development Block Grants, there has
been progress in inner city areas, but large areas of Dallas still need help.
Several lessons can be learned from the Walker v. HUD case. The first area that
will be discussed is the cost ofthe case. Through September of 1999, the City spent $123
million in direct costs for products and services to satisfy the decree. This cost did not
include the $943,000 in attorney's fees awarded to the plaintiffs attorney. Mr. Daniel
also received $1,645,000 in attorney's fees from the Dallas Housing Authority and
$54,000 from HUD. The total recovery of attorney's fees, thus far, has been around
$2,642,000416
As a result of the decree, the City has also had to pay for outside counsel. The
Walker litigation has resulted in the City paying the law firm of McKool, Smith,
$3,095,000 to represent it in the litigation. Fees paid to other lawyers prior to 1992 are
not available but can be estimated at about $1 million.417
Like the City, the DHA had to pay for outside counsel that cost approximately
$4,000,000. Additionally, once the city became a defendant in September of 1990, Judge
Buchmeyer named Louis Weber, a close friend, to serve as special master of the case.
Weber's job was to mediate the parties' differences. He was compensated with
416 Tom Pauken, "The Puppet Master," DMagazine (June 2000), 10.
417 Ibid, 11.
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approximately $1,283,000 in fees from the City and over $1.1 million from DHA.
Weber's hourly rate was $345.00 per hour.418
The grand total for the Walker v. HUD case exceeded $13,213,000. The
enormous cost of the litigation implies that both the City and DHA have the resources to
build affordable housing in affluent communities. The tax money ofthe citizens is better
spent working together instead of fighting and paying for expensive litigation. This also
proves that each party can obtain aid in promoting ideas to assist the poor in an efficient
and effective manner.
The second lesson of this case is not all minority families are in support of
building housing in non-impacted areas. Asian Americans, American Indians, Hispanics,
and blacks have fought against building public housing in non-minority areas. Therefore,
in order for the DHA to accomplish its goal in building public housing in non-minority
areas, it must listen to the ideas of all the residents of the area.
The third lesson is that, because of the 5th Circuit Court's ruling, Mr. Daniel will
now argue that poverty, not race, is the reason public housing should be built in non-
minority, affluent areas. In so doing, he does not contradict the 5th Circuit's order, which
says that the use of race as a criterion for the placement of public housing is
unconstitutional. His argument is also expected to be approved by Judge Buchmeyer.
The concern that placing DHA families in affluent communities in Dallas will bring




support this idea. Furthermore, an increasing number of families are seeking
culturally diverse neighborhoods in which to reside.
DHA's leadership has grown more efficient and effective over the years. In
March of 1979, Jack Herrington led the organization. While he was credited with helping
some DHA families obtain housing, his work was not as innovative as that of future
leaders. In 1989, he was forced to resign after the decision to resurrect the Robin Square
Apartments. It was reported that this project cost DHA $3,000,000 and, after the
resurrection, the property was still in very bad shape.419
The next president of DHA was Alphonso Jackson. Jackson was selected in
January of 1989. He is a native ofDallas, born in the West Dallas area and is an attorney.
Before his present position, he headed public and assisted housing in Washington, D.C.
He was a hard worker and he is credited with improving the image ofDHA. Jackson led
DHA to acquire and redevelop a dilapidated shopping center next to West Dallas housing
in an effort to improve the neighborhood property values and make shopping more
convenient for families in the West Dallas area. In addition, he did the following:
• Increased the number of public housing units being
renovated from fewer than 400 to more than 2,200;
• Instituted a comprehensive personnel system and a separate
financial accounts system that tracks rent payments;
• Oversaw the sale of the Kenilworth-Parkside public
housing project to tenants, making them the first public
housing residents in the nation to sign a sales contract to
buy their apartments; and,
419 Craig Floumey, "Dallas Housing Director Resigns," DallasMorning News (December 10,
1988), 33A.
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• Increased the number of evictions tenfold in an effort to rid the
projects of drug users and those who habitually failed to
pay rent.420
Further, Jackson championed the Cisneros plan and a federal judge's order to put
public housing in far North Dallas and in the suburbs, in spite of opposition from
thousands of North Dallas homeowners. Lastly, Jackson changed the rating of DHA
from a moderate housing authority to a first-class housing authority. Jackson's
leadership was like night and day compared to that of the previous administrations. At
the end of his tenure, he left DHA to work with a Dallas-based utility holding
company.421 His hard work continued to pay off. In November of2000, he was selected
by President Bush and confirmed by the U. S. Senate to become the Assistant Secretary
ofHUD.
In June of 1996, Lori Moon was appointed as president of DHA.422 Ms. Moon
had been working with Alphonso Jackson for almost a decade. She was part ofJackson's
success, and she was also credited with assisting DHA to transform the West Dallas
neighborhood into a better community. Moon led the way for DHA to build public
housing in predominantly white neighborhoods in far North Dallas. She is also credited
with renovating Roseland Homes, the oldest public housing unit in Dallas, into one ofthe
nicest areas in East Dallas today. This is monumental because it opened the doors for fair
420 Ibid.




market units as well as public housing within the DHA complex. Moreover, Moon
helped to build new units for the elderly, another pressing issue in Dallas.423
When Moon decided to step down as president of DHA in August of 2000 in
order to complete her Ph.D. in Public Administration from the University of Texas at
Arlington, she recommended Ms. Ann Lott to take her place as president of DHA.424
Lott took the position in August of 2000 and has been working hard to keep up the
success at DHA. Under her leadership DHA has maintained HUD's perfect score ratings
as a superior housing authority. She has worked to give more families vouchers for
assisted living. Moreover, on November 14, 2002, Ann Lott announced to the Lake
Highlands community town hall meeting that DHA wanted to convert 226 units into
public housing at the Hidden Ridge Apartments, near Interstate 635 and Skillman
Avenue. One unit would be used as a learning center and another to house a live-in
manager .425
Leadership ofDHA has clearly improved since the 1970s. This new leadership
style has brought DHA many success stories, not only with regard to renovation of
housing units, but also with respect to helping families with housing assistance. It has
not been easy running DHA, but the leadership of Jackson, Moon and Lott moved DHA
into the 21st Century. While each leader had a different personality, the goals of each one
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Michael Daniel, the attorney in the Walker case, raised another point
concerning the effect of property values. If local city government continues to improve
the Lake Highlands community, there should be no reason why property values would
decrease. In this case, perception is reality. If the city government chooses not to spend
renovation money in certain areas, because DHA families live there, then property values
could decrease. But, if property owners and DHA families work together for the city's
support, there would be no reason for property values to decrease. More importantly,
other families will want to move in that area of the city and families who live in the area
will want to continue to live there.426 Moreover, equality of enforcement is important.
The police must enforce the laws in all areas oftown, not just in some areas. This is not
to negate the valiant efforts of good police officers, but in some cases police will go
beyond the call ofduty in certain areas and lack the same diligence to duty in others.
The City also has an exorbitant amount of power in appointing the DHA Board of
Commissioners and its chair. This board decides what policies will be set by DHA. It
stands to reason that the mayor must appoint individuals who want effective change for
the city as a whole. The mayor must also appoint representatives who care about the
families in DHA housing and who care about developing skills needed to help those
families maintain self-sufficiency.427
Part ofthe City and DHA's success hinges on landlord cooperation. Landlords
are important in this matter because their properties are where DHA families are looking
to live; many landlords work with DHA to provide housing for families. On the other
426 Mike Daniels was interviewed by the author, 20 November 2002, Texas.
427 Ibid.
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hand, other landlords choose not to work with DHA families. Further, some
landlords say they will work with DHA families but really work to lock DHA families
out of housing opportunities. Some landlords make move-in deposits extremely high for
families. Some landlords require that families make three or four times what they pay in
rent. Other landlords may require an unrealistically high credit rating for DHA families.
Ifthose practices continue, more housing problems will exist. But, if the landlords of
these large developments choose to cooperate with families, they could help more
families acquire housing in the Dallas area. Some ofthe largest landlord owners to
consider are Trammel Crow, Saber Realty, and JPI. 428
Clearly, HUD was instrumental in helping cause the problem of racial
segregation in public housing and through Section 8 vouchers. Yet, because this has been
the case, HUD has been working to help break down segregation in public housing.
HUD could be assisting families even more, though. Further, HUD has failed to perform
specific obligations imposed by the settlements. Finally, the reliefHUD has provided has
been inadequate in quantity and quality.429
Roisman, a housing expert, has also made suggestions that would help HUD
continue to break down segregation in public housing. First, HUD should create a fair
housing enforcement organization dedicated to protect Section 8 recipients from unlawful
discrimination. By having this program, HUD will be able to enforce anti-discrimination
laws and provide for public education.430
428 Ibid.
429 Roisman, "Long Overdue", 173
430 Ibid., 175.
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Second, Roisman makes the assertion that HUD should extend Section 8
vouchers to 120 days, thereby allowing participants time to find a place to live.
Third, HUD should require that public housing agencies make the payments
needed to facilitate desegregating moves. Two kinds of costs are associated with this
idea. First, money should be given to residents for searching and moving to certain
sectors of the community. Second, payments should be given to residents for
transportation, childcare, utility connections, and moving expenses.
The fourth and last suggestion is to improve mobility programs by directly
addressing employment and gender issues. Families moving to a new area need a job that
is close to that area. Moreover, most families needing assisted housing are women of
color. Most ofthese women need assistance in finding better employment and education.
Assistance provided in these areas would help families many times over.431 History
teaches that courts go beyond strictly interpreting the law when other governmental
agencies incorporate discriminatory practices. The courts will become lawmakers if
necessary. The move by Judge Buchmeyer to appoint a special master to assist him in
fashioning a remedy is also commendable to help fight against unfair housing in Dallas.
Judges should seek outside assistance from both the public and the private sectors for
their decisions and orders in such cases.
Conclusion
The Walker v. HUD case has helped DHA work to facilitate fair public housing
for Black families in Dallas, Texas. The new rules have not been easy to enforce under




has worked with other local governmental agencies to help families with housing.
With DHA's effective leadership style, it will continue to make monumental strides to
meet the needs of families who desire to live in decent, affordable, desegregated housing.
CHAPTER VI
CONCLUSION
This study attempted to assess whether or not the Dallas Housing Authority is
providing decent affordable housing for black families in the City and County, Texas
utilizing the case-study method. Supplementing a host of primary sources with
secondary data, this research also sought to analyze and describe conditions leading to the
Walker v. HUD case lawsuit.
Prior to the Walker suit, many blacks lived in substandard dwellings in central
West Dallas; many residents did not have a choice of living where they wanted to live.
Additionally, the waiting list to receive public housing assistance was long and
confusing. Thus, blacks placed in homes by the Dallas Housing Authority in the City,
and in Dallas County, Texas, constituted an apartheid system similar to that which
characterized black status all over America in the 1960s, especially that of blacks in the
American South.432 The fundamental appeal of the U.S. Civil Rights movement and of
organizations, such as the NAACP, was to work for justice. As applied to public housing
in Dallas, people accepting DHA assistance should have a right to determine where they
432 John Hope Franklin. From Slavery to Freedom: History ofNegro Americans, 5 . Ed. (New
York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1980), 450-462.
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accepting DHA assistance should have a right to determine where they would like to
live. They should not be forced to live in undesirable places. Advocates ofthese beliefs
argued from the foundation of the Fourteenth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution: "No
state shall deny, or abridge, to any person the equal protection ofthe laws."433 Moreover,
other literature, such as the Report of the Kerner Commission, urged de-concentration of
poor blacks from the nation's urban housing units.
Even as late as 1996, Dreier and Atlas pointed out in their study that the nation's
policies have failed to eliminate a number of persistent housing problems.434 By its own
admission, HUD produced "failed policies that contributed to a concentration of poor
families in inner city neighborhoods."
Perhaps Morris best articulates the goals of the plaintiffs in the Walker Suit when
he writes that:
. .the fundamental goal of blacks within the society is to alter their
subordinate status in the society. In operational terms this implies (1) a
desire to eradicate all of the rituals and symbols within the society that
suggest black inferiority or status subordination, and (2) improvement of
the quality of life for blacks so that Blacks are enabled to achieve a
socioeconomic status comparable to whites.
Thus, one cannot debate the fact that Dallas, Texas has undergone changes since
the 1960's. Nevertheless, one must wonder about the exact meaning of these changes
vis-a-vis the majority population in the county.
433 U.S. Constitution, Amend. 14, Seel.
434 J Atlas and P. Dreier, U.S. Housing Policy at the Crossroads: A Progressive Agenda To
Rebuild The Housing Constituency (Los Angeles: Occidental College International and Public Affairs
Press, 1976), 121.
435 William Van Vliet, Affordable Housing and Urban Redevelopment in the United States




To begin to highlight the focus of this research, the researcher utilized Dr.
Mack H. Jones' theoretical framework to profile county demographics and assess change
relative to conditions prior to and after the Walker suit. This study analyzed city
demographics. The demographics examined included population, employment,
education, and housing. Findings reveal that black life in the City improved in housing
and in education.
In 1970, blacks in the county occupied 26,686 housing units. Of this amount,
2,071 lacked some or all-plumbing facilities. By 1990, the number of housing units in
the county owned and occupied by blacks had increased to 126,182.
The educational level ofblacks in the city and county increased between 1970 and
1990. In 1970, the number of blacks who completed high school was estimated at
44,222. By 1990, the number of blacks completing high school had risen to 59,619. Yet,
while black educational status increased relative to whites, blacks were unable to
• 437
translate their educational gains into employment gains.
While the income for both white and black families increased in 1970, the income
gap widened between black and white families. In 1970, the median family income in
Dallas was $10,019. This breaks down into a median income of $6,309 for black
households, and $11, 289 for white households. By 1990, the gap in median family
income had increased. The median family income for whites had increased to $42,952
and for blacks, $21,242. The median family income for all families in the county that
year was $31,605.
Data revealed that economic progress was slow for most blacks in Dallas. The
gap between blacks and whites continues to widen.
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James Gaehwender writes:
A radical redistribution of income, capital, and property is at this stage of
U.S. history very unlikely. It is also unlikely that affirmative action
programs will significantly change the conditions ofthe poor and the great
majority ofblacks; a black person cannot be given hiring preference over a
white person if no jobs exist for either ofthem. As matters have stood for
the last decade, the supply of labor has continued to exceed the demand by
a significant amount. Attempts by government to create jobs have not
solved the problem, and private enterprises will not create jobs until it
helps their profits. Massive education and training of Blacks run up
against the same reality. We should . . .concentrate on the job of exploring
ways to correct the gross inequities that currently exist. While this may
seem a rather weak suggestion, facing reality must be our first step.438
Both the city and county ofDallas, Texas have experienced change. In the earlier
part of the twentieth century, black elected officials were non-existent. Yet, as time has
progressed, more minorities have been elected to office. The number of black elected
officials increased substantially, but the work of these officials has been limited. They
were elected by indigent constituents to represent a poor community, and limited
financial resources impeded their efforts to implement social policies that address
constituents' needs. As E.C. Foster states:
The truth is that few blacks elected officials have been in a position to
effectively improve the lives of those who put them in office. Thus, then-
value has been highly symbolic. That is the reality, but the challenge is
that more work must be done to elect more black officials to positions of
power in order that they can control more budget strings. When seeking
elected office, practically every black candidate vows to work on the
behalf of the black community and in general such a commitment is
sincere. Yet one black county supervisor out of five will consistently lose
a budget priority battle, but as the number increase, each time three out of
five should win.. .439
437 James Gesehwender, "Negro Education: The False Myth," Phylon 29 (Winter 1968), 377.
438 Ibid.
439 E.C. Foster, "A Time of Challenge: Afro-Mississippi Political Developments Since 1965,"
Phylon 19 (Winter 1969), 198.
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A few gains in lack life have been noted. It appears that some gains were
made in jobs for blacks in the city and in the county. Vilet and others have noted that
helping families with assisted housing is a comprehensive effort. It is comprehensive
because once families are outside of assisted living, they need survival skills that are
necessary to continue to live unassisted. These assisted living skills could include the
following: homeownership training, individual and family counseling, social services,
educational programs, day care provisions, health care services, recreational programs,
440
youth employment programs, and teen parenting programs.
The Difference Being Made by DBA
Among the various efforts to deconcentrate subsidized housing and provide
housing for families in Dallas, application of the Walker case proved to be most
significant. The continuing program to assist 47,000 DHA family members in moving to
areas of Dallas and the suburbs has proven itself to the satisfaction of most tenants; they
have new homes, more housing vouchers, and remodeled public housing units.
One of the largest groundbreaking DHA projects nationwide is the building of
Greenleaf Village in West Dallas.441 Greenleaf Village, designed for families of various
incomes will be built with the aid of the Dallas area Habitat for Humanity, the
partnership of KB Homes, American City Vista, and the Dallas Housing Authority.
Habitat for Humanity is a national nonprofit organization that builds houses for those in
poverty. The KB Homes and American City Vista partnership is one of the nation's
largest homebuilders and was founded by and now headed by Henry Cisneros, former
440 Willam Van Vliet, Affordable Housing and Urban Redevelopment in the United States
(Thousand Oaks, California: Saga Press, 1997), 256.
441 Deby Masterson, "West Dallas Site for One of the Nation's Largest Affordable Housing
Projects," Housing Work (Winter 2002), 1.
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Secretary of the Department of Housing and Urban Development. The Dallas
Housing Authority is the largest affordable housing provider in Dallas, Texas.442
This neighborhood is being constructed on land owned by DHA, located west of
Hampton Road and bordered by Canada Drive and Bickers Street. KB Home and
American City Vista will build 210 homes starting at $80,000 each. In addition, Habitat
for Humanity will build 100 homes starting at $60,000 each. Special financing options
will be available for homes in Greenleaf Village to create affordable monthly payments
for working families.
Construction of 25 homes began April of 2002. These homes will each be 1,500
square feet with three bedrooms, one bath and a half baths, one- car garage, and
constructed of brick on three sides. Families will be able to purchase the homes with no
down payment and an interest-free 25-year mortgage.443
Other homes by KB Homes will be built. They will range from 958 to 3,225
square feet. These brick homes will include privacy fences and a 20-year warranty.
American City Vista, Kaufman and Broad Mortgage Company, and Fannie Mae are
offering mortgages on these homes featuring reduced down payments and closing costs.
The partnership of American City Vista and KB Homes works with local





In East Dallas, DHA is remodeling Roseland Homes near Central Expressway
and Hall Street. All 611 units built in 1942 will be replaced with 698 new units. This
total includes 40 town homes that will be sold at market rates from $80,000 to
sno.ooo.444
The Dallas Housing Authority has demolished 2,945 run down apartments in the
West Dallas area and will tear down the remaining 55 units within two years. They will
replace the units with 623 new units that will resemble private apartments. In addition,
329 units will be added to the building renovation. This answers the first question in this
research of whether or not DHA is constructing public housing to meet the housing
demands oflow-income families.
Another research question posed was: Is DHA providing Section 8 vouchers to
black families? More than 12,000 units are now available in 500 privately run apartment
complexes throughout Dallas County. The landlords are paid through a federally funded
voucher program. Other DHA residents live in over 26 housing developments owned by
DHA.445 Residents pay 30 percent of their monthly income to live in a DHA unit or 40
percent for a private apartment in the voucher program. The research also provides the
answer that DHA is enforcing rental contracts with DHA families.
About 5,700 people are currently waiting for DHA owned housing. The current
racial breakdown of DHA residents is 88 percent black, 7 percent Hispanic, 4 percent
white, and 1 percent Asian.





DHA also has a 75-unit apartment complex in a largely white neighborhood in
far North Dallas. Frankford Town Homes opened in 1998 at Frankford Road and Marsh
Lane. Residents who once fought adamantly against having the development in the
neighborhood have accepted it. Although DHA has been rated as one of the best-run
agencies according to HUD, it still has work to do. It does not always get the help it
needs. For example, DHA asked HUD for funds to renovate the 60-year-old Frazier
Court units, and HUD said "No."446
The Kerner Commission called for the deconcentration oflow-income housing for
blacks and also for government programs to promote urban enrichment for families.
Through the DHA, the development of West Dallas area businesses, the Hope VI Funds,
and the Community Development Block Grants, there has been rehabilitation of housing
in inner city areas. However, much more work needs to take place in other areas of
Dallas and with certain landlords of different apartment complexes.
Opportunity for Lessons Learned
While lessons can be learned on how different agencies have worked to improve
the lives of families in assisted housing, no magic formula has emerged to help agencies
as a whole. Rose's study has articulated that evaluation must occur with reference to the
distinct characteristics of a particular city. Robert Rose, in 1993, suggests three factors '
that help identify lessons learned from unique programs.447
First, the fewer the unique elements the better an agency can learn from that
program. Each housing agency is trying to help those less fortunate. By evaluating how
446 Ibid.
447 Robert Rose, Lesson drawing in public policy (Chatham, NJ: Chatham House Press, 1993),
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one place has done it with similar size and place, other agencies can learn from that
particular program.
Second, the more substitutable programs are, the more points other agencies can
learn from them. Yet, adopting a program from elsewhere requires an instructional
capacity to do so. Institutions need not be identical, however, according to Rose. For
example, effective management practices can be reviewed. Perhaps an agency can take
on a particular management style that help programs aid families with assisted housing.
Likewise, technical assistance and professional expertise, best exemplified in another
agency, can aid substantially in certain programs.
Third, the greater the equivalence ofresources the better a program can be in
achieving its goals. Implementing programs requires resources. U.S. cities all operate
under the same federal laws. Although state and local laws may differ, the problems of
adjusting existing legal frameworks, or of creating new ones, are political. Resources
vary greatly. Some cities have less built-up land than others. Some cities have more
money than others. However, the issue may be more a matter of assigning a low political
priority to redevelopment when making tradeoffs or raising taxes.
The Effects of Political and Legal Confrontation
After the confrontation between the courts, the local agency, the city government,
and HUD, a prolonged stalemate ensued and finally, the old policy-making structure
broke down. The city council lost its power to approve or request sites for public
housing, HUD was found guilty and later required to facilitate the dispersal of public
housing throughout the suburban region, and DHA had to work to redo tenant-housing
selections. Debra Walker and others who brought the lawsuit to court were working to
breakdown racial inequality in tenant and site selection. The proponents of the suit
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including other housing residents, city leaders, and others, worked to promote
equality in the DHA. The opponents of the Walker suit, the City, and others argued it
was not time for such a case.
The move by federal judge Jerry Buchmeyer to appoint a special master to assist
in fashioning a remedy suggests the direction in which the courts could go if judges
decide, for whatever reason, not to defer to administrative agencies. Judges should seek
outside assistance for decisions and orders in such cases; this assistance may aid both the
public and private sectors. Experts in a variety of capacities can provide the courts with
general perspectives on the problems they will treat in opinions.
The original research questions asked whether DHA was progressing in providing
housing for black families in Dallas, Texas. The answer is yes. The summary findings
show that units are being built for black families. In addition, new programs are also
being put into place to help families to maintain their homes. Another question posed in
this research was whether DHA could work despite the local opposition? The answer to
this question is also yes. The research results show that DHA has worked with the
surrounding community to make plans to provide shelter for those who cannot afford an
adequate home.
Arguably, the issue of racial justice has been the dominant domestic challenge of
our times. This issue is incorporate in many other issues, such as social, economic, and
political opportunities. Ifwe can view the Walker litigation as a remedial part of a great
wrenching of society that occurred years ago, it is possible that this case can serve as a
productive model for the future of other public housing agencies.
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